



ANALYTICAL REPORT

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SOURCES OF INFORMATION, MEDIA LITERACY, AND RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA:

the results of the all-ukrainian
public opinion poll



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The all-Ukrainian opinion poll was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) at the request of the Detector Media NGO in February 2019. In the course of the study, adult residents of Ukraine (aged 18 or older) were asked to give their opinion on the use of mass media, media literacy among the population, and Russian propaganda. Information was collected in the period from February 9 to February 20, 2019. A total of 2,042 interviews were conducted with respondents who live in 110 settlements in Ukraine.

This all-Ukrainian opinion poll was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) at the request of Detector Media NGO. It was financially supported by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (Danida) and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency(Sida).

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METHODOLOGY OF THE POLL

The all-Ukrainian opinion poll was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) at the request of the Detector Media NGO in February 2019. In the course of the study, adult residents of Ukraine (aged 18 or older) were asked to give their opinion on the use of mass media, media literacy among the population, and Russian propaganda. The main stages of the study included drawing up a questionnaire and accompanying tools, preparing a sample, conducting interviews with respondents, monitoring the quality of work performed, entering data and checking it for logical errors, preparing a final data set, univariate and bivariate distributions tables, and an analytical report. A similar study with a similar questionnaire was carried out at the request of the Detector Media NGO in February 2018. Where appropriate, the dynamics of the population's attitude is presented.

A stratified four-phase sampling, which is random in each phase, was developed for the poll. The sampling represents adult population which is permanently residing in Ukraine, does not do military service, and is not in prisons or medical institutions (hospitals, nursing homes). The sampling did not include territories that are temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities, that is, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions..

First, the population of Ukraine was stratified according to the regions (24 regions and Kyiv), and then the population of each region was additionally stratified into urban (cities and urban type settlements) and rural population (except for Kyiv, where the entire population is urban). That is, the population of Ukraine was divided into 49 strata. In proportion to the size of adult pop-

ulation, it was determined how many interviews must be conducted in each stratum, as well as the number of settlements in every stratum in which polls must be conducted. In case of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, only the population of territories which are currently controlled by the Ukrainian authorities was used for stratification.

After stratification, specific points where interviewers were supposed to work were selected. At the first stage, settlements were selected within each stratum. Urban settlements were selected with a probability proportional to the size of the adult population in a settlement. Within the strata of the rural population, we first selected districts (with a probability proportional to the size of the adult rural population in a district), and then villages were selected randomly within a particular district. At the second

stage, polling stations were selected within each settlement. At the third stage, the first address – street, house number, and, in the case of multistory buildings, number of apartment where interviewers began the poll – was selected for every polling station. At the fourth stage, respondents were selected and interviewed using the modified route sampling method.

The poll was conducted in the form of personal interviews with the use of tablets, in the houses where respondents live.

As a result of the use of sampling which is random in each phase, women and older people are a little overrepresented in the final data set. In order to restore correct proportions, special statistical "scales" were constructed.

The data below are given both for entire Ukraine and for the four macro regions of Ukraine separately. Macro-region composition: **Western** macro-region — Volyn, Rivne,

Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi regions; **Central** macro-region — Vinnytsya, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kyiv regions, Kyiv; **Southern** macro-region — Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa regions; **Eastern** macro-region — Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv regions.

Information was collected in the period from February 9 to February 20, 2019. A total of 2,042 interviews were conducted with respondents who live in 110 settlements in Ukraine.

For 2,042 respondents, sampling error (with a probability of 0.95 and a design effect of 1.5) does not exceed:

- 3.3% for figures close to 50%;
- 2.8% for figures close to 25 or 75%;
- 2.0% for figures close to 12 or 88%;
- 1.4% for figures close to 5 or 95%;
- 0.7% for figures close to 1 or 99%; ■





THE MAIN RESULTS OF THE POLL



STRUCTURE OF USE AND TRUST IN THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- Central Ukrainian TV channels remain the top source of information for the absolute majority of the population, but **over the year, the number of respondents who most often receive information about the state of affairs in Ukraine and the world from national TV channels decreased by 12% (from 86% to 74%).** The share of those who mentioned relatives, friends, etc. as the sources of information also decreased from 18% to 11%. There is a tendency for the reduction of the use of print media. At the same time, **in the case of online resources, there were practically no changes:** in February 2018, 27% mentioned Ukrainian online websites, whereas now this figure is 27.5%; as for social networks, just as the last year, 23.5% currently receive information from this source.

- If we talk about trust in information sources, **the largest number of respondents – 40% – also trusts central Ukrainian television channels.** 14% of people trust Ukrainian online media, 12% trust social networks, and not more than 6% of respondents mentioned the remaining sources of information. We can see a similar structure in the case of trust in the information related to the confrontation in the Donbas.

However, **in February 2018, 57% of respondents trusted central television with regard to issues related to the war in the East of Ukraine, whereas now this figure is only 39%.** There is also a tendency for the reduction in the share of those who trust information from Ukrainian websites and social networks

- **4% of respondents stated that they receive information about the situation in Ukraine and abroad from Russian TV channels** (in February 2018, this figure was 5%). Although, on the one hand, it is much less than the number of those who trust Ukrainian sources, but on the other hand, in absolute terms, **this is about 1.3 million Ukrainian citizens.** For 40% of users, satellites are the main technical way of accessing Russian TV channels (at the same time, in December 2016, 79% of responders mentioned this method, whereas in February 2018, this figure was 69%). Another 20% are watching broadcasts on the Internet (in comparison, in December 2016, this figure was 8%, and in February 2018, it was 13%), 17% use an analog antenna (in comparison, in 2016 and 2018, this figure was 6% and 12%, respectively), and 13% watch cable television (in comparison to 6% and 8%, respectively).



UKRAINIAN TELEVISION. POLITICAL TALK SHOWS

- **Top TV channels in Ukraine still include 1+1** (50% of respondents mentioned it as one of the top 5 TV channels they watch most often), **Ukraine** (43%), **Inter** (34%), **ICTV** (32.5%), and **STB** (31%). 16% of the respondents mentioned Channel 112, 15% of the respondents mentioned Novyi Kanal, and not more than 6% of the respondents mentioned other channels (in particular, 6% mentioned NewsOne). At the same time, **in comparison to February 2018, popularity of all top channels, except for Ukraine, decreased:** the number of those who said that they watch 1+1 decreased from 61% to 50%, the number of those who said that they watch Inter decreased from 48% to 34%, the number of those who said that they watch ICTV decreased from 39% to 32.5%, and in the case of STB this figure decreased from 36% to 31%.
- The share of people who trust the channel is lower than the share of those who watch this channel at all. These top 5 channels also have the largest number of those who trust them. 1+1 has shown relatively the highest figures – 24% of Ukrainians trust this channel. However, **a year ago, 35% of respondents trusted it.** To a lesser extent, but there is also a downward trend in the figures of Inter and ICTV.
- **39% of Ukrainians watch some political talk shows:** the most popular talk shows include "Svoboda Slova" [*Freedom of Speech*] (20%) and "Pravo na Vladu" [Right to Power] (15%). 5-6% of respondents mentioned "Pulse", "Ukrainskyi Format" [*Ukrainian Format*], and "Narod Proty" [*People Are Against*], and 3.5% mentioned "Ekho Ukrainy" [*Echo of Ukraine*].

UKRAINIAN WEBSITES AND SOCIAL NETWORKS



- As far as coverage / popularity is concerned, the top online media have considerably lower figures than the top TV channels: the most popular ones include "Obozrevatel" [*Reviewer*] (8% of respondents mentioned this website as one of the top 5 websites which they read most often), "Korrespondent" [*Correspondent*] (7.5%), "Segodnya" [*Today*] (7%), and the Ukrainian Independent Information News Agency (UNIAN) (6%). Other websites were mentioned by not more than 4% of respondents.
- 42% of those who read websites stated that they use ad-blockers.
- As for those Ukrainians for whom social networks are the top source of information, **74% use Facebook**, and another 33.5% use Instagram. At the same time, 15% mentioned VKontakte, and 10% mentioned Odnoklassniki. In general, every fifth Ukrainian who actively "draws" information from social networks uses Russian social networks for this purpose.
- For the majority of active social networks users (56%), the main reason why they use these networks to receive

information about the current events is convenience, since they can find a lot of information from different sources in one place. Another 31% argued that information is posted there sooner than it becomes available in the media.

- Most users of social networks (63%) said that they saw political advertising during the last month.
- **3 out of 4 active** users of social networks (77%) agreed that **there is a lot of misinformation and fakes there**. At the same time, 51% believe that it is owners and network managers that must take measures to combat misinformation and fakes, 39% believe that this must be done by the state, and 28% believe that this must be done by the network users themselves.

CRITERIA FOR CHOOSING MEDIA AS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION



- **Top-2 criteria** for choosing media include **the quality of content** (this was mentioned by 30% of Ukrainians) and **similarity of views** (28%).
- The smallest number of respondents are ready to continue to use the media, if it advocates for the legalization of light drugs, prostitution (6% will continue to use it versus 76% will stop using it), for the support of the LGBT community (6% vs. 55%), if it promotes anti-democratic messages (3.5% vs. 73%) or xenophobic statements (3% vs. 70%). If the media supports migrants, 25% of respondents will continue to use it, while 34% will stop using it; if the media supports censorship, the figures are 22% versus 48%; if the media supports restriction of access to Russian media and websites, the figures are 19% versus 50.5%.

MEDIA LITERACY



- **Slightly more than half of Ukrainians (52%)** believe that they are, in most cases, able to **distinguish quality information** from misinformation and fakes on their own (in February 2018, this figure was equal to 53%). On the contrary, a quarter of Ukrainians (26.5%) believe that they cannot distinguish such information at all, or can only do this in a minority of cases (in February 2018, this figure was equal to 31%).
- As for the criteria for identifying fakes, respondents most often mentioned trust in the media which provided information (for 27% of residents of Ukraine, it is one of the main criteria) and the mention of the author (25.5%).

In general, about 58% of respondents mentioned at least one criterion they use to determine whether information is fake.

- A total of 60% of the population also performed at least one action to distinguish information from misinformation. Relatively the most popular practice is to read media which belong to different owners (37% of Ukrainians use this method). Less common practices include visiting websites and social networks of state institutions (16%), search for acquaintances in the relevant

field (15%), reading foreign media (11%).

- There is a **low interest** in television and radio programs and video blogs aimed at **combating fakes**, informational manipulations, and Kremlin misinformation. In general, 10% of respondents recalled that they were watching some programs aimed at combating misinformation during the last month. At the same time, **only 15% of Ukrainians would like to watch/listen to such television or radio programs or video blogs.**

INTERPRETATIONS OF TOPICAL EVENTS



- Over the past year, the **share of those who believe that it was the separatists and Russia that started the war decreased from 52% to 48.5%**. The share of those who believe that it was Ukraine that started the war is 17% (versus 15% in February 2018). **At the same time, one in three Ukrainians (35%) "cannot form their opinion" as to the question of who started the war.**

- Over the past year, the number of people who believe that Ukrainian-speaking citizens and patriots are persecuted in the Crimea and the "DNR" / "LNR" also decreased from 43% to 38%. On the contrary, the number of Ukrainians who believe that ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking citizens are persecuted in Ukraine increased from 10% to 15.5%.

- As for the conflict in the Kerch Strait, **44% of Ukrainians believe that Russian border guards attacked Ukrainian sailors**. In contrast, 19% believe that Ukrainian sailors provoked them. Another 37% of Ukrainians "do not have a definite opinion" on this issue. At the same time, when asked about the martial law, **51% of the respondents answered that there were no real grounds for the martial law, since there was no aggression on the part of Russia, and the law was just favorable to Ukrainian politicians in their preparation for the elections.** 24% of the respondents consider its introduction reasonable.

- There is also no consensus on Tomos: **39% of Ukrainians believe that the obtainment of Tomos was a necessary and important step towards strengthening the independence of the Ukrainian state. On the contrary, 33% believe that the obtainment of Tomos was a mistake and drove a wedge between Ukrainians who belong to different denominations.**

- In the West and in the Center there is a tendency for more pro-Ukrainian interpretations of topical events, whereas in the South and East, the share of those who "do not have a definite opinion" yet is higher. In addition, pro-Ukrainian / pro-Russian interpretations are, at best, equally widespread, and in some cases it is pro-Russian interpretations that predominate. For example, in the West and in the Center, 62-65% of the respondents said that responsibility for the start of the war lies with Russia, 10-12.5% said that it lies with Ukraine, and a quarter do not have a definite opinion on this issue. In the South, the share of those who "do not have a definite opinion" yet reaches 47%. At the same time, 30% of the respondents there said that responsibility lies with Russia, whereas 23% said that it lies with Ukraine.

In the East, the share of those who "do not have a definite opinion" yet reaches 55%. And in this region there are already twice as many those who said that responsibility lies with Ukraine – 31% versus 14.5% of those who said that it lies with Russia.

- **There is a tendency that viewers of NewsOne share pro-Ukrainian interpretations of events to a much lesser extent.** There is also a tendency for less pronounced pro-Ukrainian interpretations among the viewers of Inter channel (even though this is less noticeable than in the case of NewsOne). Viewers of Channel 5 share pro-Ukrainian interpretations most often of all. Those who watch "Pulse" and "Ukrainian Format" also share pro-Ukrainian interpretations of topical events to a lesser extent.

POLICY ON THE REGULATION OF THE INFORMATION SPHERE



- **The population of Ukraine rather has a negative attitude towards regulation of the information sphere by means of bans, while in comparison with the last year, there are tendencies for the spread of negative attitude.** Thus, 49.5% consider the ban on Russian TV channels to be a mistake (in February 2018, this figure was 44%), whereas 32% believe that it was the right step (versus 37% the last year). **55.5% do not support the ban on certain Russian films and artists** (versus 53% the last year), whereas 27% support this ban (versus 29%). With regard to **Russian social networks, 49% consider such actions erroneous** (versus 46% the last year), 29% think that this was the right thing to do (in February 2018, this figure was 30%).

- At the same time, the share of those who believe that **there are too many pro-Kremlin propaganda media in Ukraine has grown from 33% to 38.5%**. In contrast, 30% (as many as in February 2018) think that there is infringement upon freedom of speech in Ukraine.

- In the West and in the Center, the prevailing opinion is that there are too many pro-Kremlin propaganda media in Ukraine (51-54% of respondents had such an opinion), and only 20% think that there is infringement upon freedom of speech. On the contrary, in the South and East, there is the opposite situation: more people think that there is rather infringement upon freedom of speech (43-53%) than the excessive influence of pro-Kremlin propaganda media (8-21%).

- At the same time, even in the West and in the Center there are completely different opinions on the policy of bans. In the West, 41-47% support certain types of bans, but the share of those who do not support them is also considerable – 30-39%. In the Center, 35-42% support certain bans, whereas 40-47% do not support them. In the South and East, an absolute majority believes that bans on Russian TV channels, certain films / artists and social networks were a mistake.
- Viewers of NewsOne channel and (to a lesser extent) Inter and Channel 112 are more inclined to believe that there is infringement upon freedom of speech and, to a greater extent, do not support the bans. The same applies to those who watch "Pulse" and "Ukrainian Format" talk shows.

TV SERIES AND FILMS PRODUCED IN UKRAINE



- Two thirds of Ukrainians watch television series, of which **49% most often watch them on Ukrainian television** (in February 2018, 52.5% mentioned Ukrainian television). Another 11% watch Western TV series online (versus 10% last year). At the same time, the share of those who watch Russian TV series online increased from 4% to 7%, whereas the share of those who watch them on Russian television increased from 3% to 4.5%.
- The majority of the residents of Ukraine (56%) agree that over the past 3 years Ukrainian TV channels started broadcasting more TV series produced in Ukraine.
- For nearly half of respondents, it is difficult to evaluate modern Ukrainian TV series. At the same time, those who can evaluate them based on various criteria, most often praise such characteristics as interesting plot (46% believe that modern Ukrainian TV series tell interesting stories, versus 9% of those who do not think so, the acting of Ukrainian actors (43% versus 9%), the European level of shooting (38.5% versus 12%). Less confidently, but more people still do not agree with such negative characteristics as the fact that there are a few interesting well-known actors (29% disagree with this, and 21% agree with this) in the Ukrainian TV series, that they are less interesting than European and American TV series (28% vs. 19%), that there are a few Russian actors in them - and this is bad (26% vs. 18%), that they are less interesting than Russian TV series (32% vs. 17%).
- One third of respondents (35%) said that over the last year they have watched at least one full-length feature film (or cartoon) produced in Ukraine. Among those who watched such a film, the overwhelming majority (68%) watched it on TV.

SECTION I

STRUCTURE AND TRUST IN THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION

1.1

The general structure of sources of information for the population of Ukraine

Central Ukrainian TV channels remain the top source of information for the absolute majority of the population, but **over the year, the number of respondents who most often receive information about the state of affairs in Ukraine and the world from national TV channels decreased by 12% (from 86% to 74%) (Table 1.1.1).** The share of those who mentioned relatives, friends, etc. as the sources of information also decreased from 18% to 11%. There is a tendency for the reduction of the use of print media.

At the same time, **in the case of on-line resources, there were practically no changes:** In February 2018, 27% mentioned Ukrainian online websites, whereas now this figure is 27.5%; as for social networks, just as the last year, 23.5% currently receive information from this source.

At the same time, if we talk about trust in information sources, **the largest number of respondents – 40% – also trust central Ukrainian television channels.** 14% of people trust Ukrainian online media, 12% trust social networks, and not more than 6% of respondents mentioned the remaining sources of information. We can see a similar structure in the case of trust in the information related to the confrontation in the Donbas. However, **in February 2018, 57% of respondents trusted the central television with regard to issues related to the war in the East of Ukraine, whereas now this figure is only 39%.** There is also a tendency for the reduction of the share of those who trust

information from Ukrainian online websites and social networks.

4% of respondents stated that they receive information about the situation in Ukraine and abroad from Russian TV channels (in February 2018, this figure was 5%). Although, on the one hand, it is much less than the number of those who trust Ukrainian sources, but on the other hand, in absolute terms, **this is about 1.3 million Ukrainian citizens.** At the same time, it should be taken into account that some respondents could "avoid" mentioning the fact that they receive information from Russian TV channels, that is, the presented figures are rather a conservative than a lower limit. It should also be taken into account that in comparison with 2018, when 67% of those who were receiving information from Russian TV channels lived in the South and East of Ukraine, now their share decreased to 50%. On the contrary, half (49%) of those who receive information from Russian television live in the center of Ukraine.

For 40% of users, satellites are the main way of accessing Russian TV channels (at the same time, in December 2016, 79% of respondents mentioned this method, whereas in February 2018, this figure was 69%). Another 20% are watching broadcasts on the Internet (in comparison, in December 2016, this figure was 8%, and in February 2018, it was 13%), 17% use an analog antenna (in comparison, in 2016 and 2018, this figure was 6% and 12%, respectively), and 13% watch cable television (in comparison to 6% and 8%, respectively).

Table 1.1.1



Which sources do you most often use to receive information about the state of affairs in Ukraine and abroad? /

Which of the following information sources do you trust? /

Which of the following sources of information on the armed conflict in the Donbas region do you trust?

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)

100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than 3 answers	% of respondents who receive information about...				
	The state of affairs in Ukraine and abroad		Generally trust information	Trust information on the conflict in the Donbas	
	February 2018	February 2019	February 2019	February 2018	February 2019
Ukrainian television (national TV channels)	85.7	74.0	40.6	57.2	38.9
Ukrainian online media	27.1	27.5	13.9	14.1	11.9
Social networks	23.5	23.5	12.4	12.5	10.3
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances	17.9	10.6	6.0	8.7	6.5
Ukrainian newspapers (national periodicals)	8.1	6.7	3.8	3.3	2.7
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	4.2	4.5	2.6	2.4	2.8
Russian television	4.7	4.3	1.4	1.6	1.1
Local television	6.4	4.3	1.7	2.0	1.0
Local online media	2.5	4.1	1.9	0.6	1.6
Local print media	4.8	1.7	0.6	1.4	0.2
Local radio	2.0	1.6	0.8	0.7	0.4
Russian websites	0.5	0.7	---	---	---
"LNR-DNR" media (including websites)	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1
Russian print media	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Acquaintances who are currently in the combat zone, in the Crimea, or in the territories controlled by the "DNR/LNRI", or who have just arrived from these territories	---	---	2.4	4.9	9.1
Official announcements of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine / media of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine	---	---	0.2	0.3	0.5
Other sources	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.1
I do not trust any source	---	---	18.2	15.8	19.2
Hard to say / Refusal to answer	2.2	5.1	16.5	9.2	14.6

The data in *table 1.1.2-4* are given in a regional context. Central Ukrainian TV channels dominate in all regions (69-79% depending on the region), while Ukrainian websites and social networks tie for second place (with a significant gap between them and the "leader"). At the same time, in the West 0.1% of respondents mentioned Russian television, whereas in the Center this figure was 6%, in the South it was 5%, and in the East it was 7%.

Table 1.1.2



Which sources do you most often use to receive information about the state of affairs in Ukraine and abroad?

(% among all respondents)



100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than 3 answers	% of respondents from the macro-region...			
	West (n=571)	Center (n=712)	South (n=489)	East (n=270)
Ukrainian television (national TV channels)	73.2	73.0	79.1	68.6
Ukrainian online media	28.6	21.5	36.5	24.0
Social networks	20.0	23.9	25.8	25.0
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances	7.0	10.1	11.8	16.5
Ukrainian newspapers (national periodicals)	11.2	7.8	2.8	2.5
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	6.1	5.6	1.3	4.6
Russian television	0.1	6.1	4.8	7.2
Local television	5.1	3.7	3.8	4.9
Local online media	2.5	4.5	4.2	6.3
Local print media	1.9	2.7	0.6	0.7
Local radio	2.4	2.2	0.5	0.4
Russian websites	0.0	0.4	1.4	1.6
"LNR-DNR" media (including websites)	0.0	0.1	0.0	1.3
Russian print media	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other sources	0.1	0.7	1.6	0.5
Hard to say / Refusal to answer	6.4	6.5	3.1	2.9

Table 1.1.3 shows the structure of sources of information among those who visited the EU countries over the last two years and those who did not visit such countries.

Table 1.1.3



**З яких джерел Ви найчастіше отримуєте інформацію
про стан справ в Україні та світі?**

(% of respondents depending on whether they visited/
did not visit EU countries over the last 2 years)

100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than 3 answers	Those who visited EU countries (n=271)	Those who did not visit EU countries (n=1,707)
Ukrainian television (national TV channels)	59.3	77.4
Ukrainian online media	39.9	26.1
Social networks	32.5	22.4
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances	9.0	11.1
Ukrainian newspapers (national periodicals)	6.2	6.9
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	4.2	4.7
Russian television	4.6	4.2
Local television	3.7	4.2
Local online media	7.5	3.7
Local print media	0.5	1.9
Local radio	2.2	1.5
Russian websites	0.5	0.7
"LNR-DNR" media (including websites)	0.0	0.3
Russian print media	0.0	0.0
Other sources	1.9	0.5
Hard to say / Refusal to answer	3.4	4.2

In general, there are lower levels of trust in the South and East: in the West 77% trust at least one source of information, whereas in the Center, this figure is 69%, in the South it is 52%, and in the East this figure is 59% (Table 1.1.4). At the same time, we can see that the level of trust is lower in case of central Ukrainian TV channels: In the West and in the Center about 47% trust information from this source, whereas in the South and East this figure is 30-32%.

Table 1.1.4



Which of the following information sources do you trust?

(% among all respondents)



100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than 3 answers	% of respondents from the macro-region...			
	West (n=571)	Center (n=712)	South (n=489)	East (n=270)
Ukrainian television (national TV channels)	47.3	46.5	30.2	31.7
Ukrainian online media	18.3	14.0	11.9	9.1
Social networks	11.0	15.4	9.3	13.3
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances	3.1	4.9	7.1	12.2
Ukrainian newspapers (national periodicals)	5.8	5.5	1.4	0.5
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	4.2	3.0	0.4	2.1
Russian television	0.5	1.9	1.2	2.5
Local television	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.2
Local online media	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.5
Local print media	1.5	0.5	0.1	0.0
Local radio	2.1	0.5	0.1	0.4
"LNR-DNR" media (including websites)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Russian print media	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0
Acquaintances who are currently in the combat zone, in the Crimea, or in the territories controlled by the "DNR/LNR", or who have just arrived from these territories	1.4	2.2	3.5	3.0
Official announcements of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine / media of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.0
Other sources	0.0	0.4	1.2	0.2
I do not trust any source	10.9	14.6	22.9	32.6
Hard to say / Refusal to answer	12.2	16.6	25.4	8.4

We can see a similar tendency in the case of trust in the information related to the confrontation in the East of Ukraine (Table 1.1.5).

Table 1.1.5



Which of the following sources of information on the armed conflict in the Donbas region do you trust?

(% among all respondents)



100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than 3 answers	% of respondents from the macro-region...			
	West (n=571)	Center (n=712)	South (n=489)	East (n=270)
Ukrainian television (national TV channels)	42.5	46.9	30.7	26.5
Ukrainian online media	16.3	11.0	10.0	8.7
Social networks	9.6	11.7	7.6	13.1
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances	4.6	3.7	10.1	10.7
Ukrainian newspapers (national periodicals)	4.4	3.7	0.7	0.7
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	4.6	3.9	0.3	1.2
Russian television	0.6	1.3	1.1	1.1
Local television	1.0	1.2	1.1	0.5
Local online media	1.0	1.8	1.7	1.9
Local print media	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Local radio	0.6	0.5	0.1	0.0
"LNR-DNR" media (including websites)	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0
Russian print media	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2
Acquaintances who are currently in the combat zone, in the Crimea, or in the territories controlled by the "DNR/LNR", or who have just arrived from these territories	4.5	8.5	17.5	4.5
Official announcements of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine / media of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine	0.4	1.1	0.2	0.0
Other sources	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0
I do not trust any source	15.3	15.0	21.1	33.7
Hard to say / Refusal to answer	12.1	15.0	17.7	12.7

1.2

Receiving and trusting information from Ukrainian TV channels. Promotion of certain politicians by TV channels. Political talk shows

Top TV channels in Ukraine still include 1+1 (50% of respondents mentioned it as one of the top 5 TV channels they watch most often), Ukraine (43%), Inter (34%), ICTV (32.5%), and STB (31%) (Chart

1.2.1). 16% of the respondents mentioned Channel 112, 15% of the respondents mentioned Novyi Kanal, and not more than 6% of the respondents mentioned other channels (in particular, 6% mentioned NewsOne).


Chart 1.2.1



Which Ukrainian TV channels do you watch most often?
Up to 5 answers.

Which of the following Ukrainian TV channels do you trust most?
Up to 5 answers.

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)



At the same time, **in comparison to February 2018, the popularity of all top channels, except for Ukraine, decreased:** the number of those who said that they watch 1+1 decreased from 61% to 50%, the number of those who said that they watch Inter decreased from 48% to 34%, the number of those who said that they watch ICTV decreased from 39% to 32.5%, and in the case of STB this figure decreased from 36% to 31%.

The share of people who trust a particular

channel is lower than the share of those who watch this channel at all. These top 5 channels also have the largest number of those who trust them. 1+1 has shown relatively the highest figures – 24% of Ukrainians trust this channel. However, **last year this figure was equal to 35%**. To a lesser extent, but there is also a downward trend in the figures of Inter and ICTV.


The data in *table 1.3.1* are given in a regional context.

Table 1.3.1



Which Ukrainian TV channels do you watch most often? / Which of the following Ukrainian TV channels do you trust most?

(% among all respondents)



100% in the column	West (n=571)		Center (n=712)		South (n=489)		East (n=270)	
Respondents could choose up to 5 answers	Watch	Trust	Watch	Trust	Watch	Trust	Watch	Trust
1+1	51.3	29.7	50.5	26.8	49.9	16.9	44.6	19.8
Ukraine	39.6	21.2	44.0	20.3	44.4	16.8	44.7	24.6
Inter	26.3	10.8	31.6	15.4	42.2	14.5	43.4	21.0
ICTV	29.7	14.4	33.5	18.3	35.4	13.9	30.3	11.4
STB	26.3	10.7	32.5	14.2	38.0	12.6	26.4	13.5
112 Ukraine	12.2	4.0	18.7	10.1	15.4	8.7	18.7	10.6
NovyiKanal	15.6	5.5	18.4	8.4	11.2	4.0	15.0	7.5
NewsOne	1.9	0.7	7.3	3.9	8.8	4.0	8.0	4.2
Channel 5	8.6	4.2	4.5	2.2	3.9	1.6	4.0	0.5
Pryamyi channel	4.4	3.3	6.3	2.3	1.7	1.1	2.5	0.9
Channel 24	6.7	3.5	4.4	0.9	1.9	0.6	1.5	0.3
ZIK	6.6	3.8	3.1	2.4	1.4	1.0	2.6	2.0
UA: Pershyi	5.8	2.5	2.6	0.7	1.4	0.2	1.8	1.5
Espresso TV	3.2	2.0	3.3	1.7	0.7	0.2	1.4	0.7
Hromadske TV	1.0	0.2	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.2	0.3	0.0
Nash	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.5	0.5	2.3	0.9
ATR	0.2	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	2.1	0.5	1.5	0.5	3.3	0.6	4.0	0.8
I do not watch TV	10.6	15.0	12.2	13.0	13.8	13.6	18.5	19.4
It is hard to say	2.9	17.9	5.9	28.4	4.8	39.8	3.3	27.7

* The total amount in the column exceeds 100%, since respondents could choose several answers at once.

In general, the general population does not really understand which TV channels promote which politicians – the majority of respondents cannot relate politicians to certain channels (*Table 1.3.2*). Relatively the biggest number of respondents understand that 1+1 promotes V. Zelenskyi – this opinion was expressed by 24% of respondents. 21% of respondents believe that Channel 5 promotes P. Poroshenko, and 11% think that Inter promotes Yu. Boyko.

In other cases, the percentages are lower.

Table 1.3.3 does not contain data among the general population; it contains data among those who watch a certain TV channel. Even among the viewers of a certain channel, the majority cannot say whom the channel promotes (although a slightly higher percentage of people have a definite opinion on this issue than in the case of the general population).

Table 1.3.2



Which politicians, in your opinion, do TV channels promote?

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)

100% in the column Respondents could choose several answers	1+1	Ukraine	Inter	ICTV	STB	112 Ukraine	Novyi Kanal	NewsOne	Channel 5	Pryamyi channel	Channel 24	ZIK	UA: Pershyi	Espresso TV	Hromadske TV	Nash	ATR
Volodymyr Zelenskyi	24.4	2.0	2.9	2.0	3.5	2.3	1.5	2.0	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.1
Yulia Tymoshenko	5.2	6.3	4.8	3.9	4.9	2.0	2.5	0.7	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.8	1.3	0.8	0.6	0.1	0.3
Petro Poroshenko	5.0	8.8	5.7	5.3	5.3	5.1	2.8	2.3	21.3	7.7	2.0	1.1	6.2	1.9	1.5	0.5	1.1
Yuriy Boyko	2.4	6.8	11.4	2.2	2.9	3.6	0.9	3.7	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2
Oleh Lyashko	2.3	6.6	3.2	2.4	2.2	1.8	1.6	0.7	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.1
Oleksandr Shevchenko	2.3	1.3	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.1
Anatoliy Hrytsenko	2.1	3.0	2.4	1.9	2.7	1.6	1.4	0.7	0.8	0.4	1.0	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2
Oleksandr Vilkul	1.9	5.6	5.9	1.4	2.0	2.4	0.8	1.6	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1
Volodymyr Hroisman	1.4	1.3	1.0	0.7	0.9	1.1	0.7	0.2	1.3	0.9	0.4	0.2	0.7	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1
Vitali Klitschko	0.9	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1
Evheniy Murayev	0.8	1.2	1.7	0.8	0.8	1.6	0.5	3.7	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.2	4.5	0.1
Andriy Sadovyi	0.8	1.5	1.7	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.8	0.3	0.5	0.5	2.3	1.9	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.1
Viktor Medvedchuk	0.7	1.4	2.4	0.9	1.5	3.7	0.5	2.5	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
Arsen Avakov	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0
Vadym Rabinovych	0.6	1.4	1.9	0.5	0.9	1.9	0.3	4.2	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2
Serhiy Kaplin	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Andriy Parubiy	0.2	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.4	1.6	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.3
None of them	2.5	2.7	2.5	4.1	3.1	3.1	3.9	2.2	1.3	3.0	2.2	2.8	3.2	2.6	2.1	2.1	2.0
It is hard to say / Refusal	64.0	73.1	74.9	81.7	79.9	81.8	86.8	85.6	74.7	86.1	91.7	90.9	88.1	92.9	94.3	91.9	95.6

Table 1.3.3



Which politicians, in your opinion, do TV channels promote?

(% of respondents who mentioned the corresponding channel as one of the top 5 channels they watch most often)

100% in the column Respondents could choose several answers	1+1	Ukraine	Inter	ICTV	STB	112 Ukraine	Novyi Kanal	NewsOne	Channel 5	Pryamyi channel	Channel 24	ZIK	UA: Pershyi	Espresso TV
Volodymyr Zelenskyi	33.0	3.1	4.0	2.6	6.2	5.4	3.8	7.3	2.6	4.8	0.0	1.0	1.2	0.0
Yulia Tymoshenko	7.7	10.4	8.6	6.5	9.1	6.3	6.7	3.9	4.2	5.1	6.2	8.9	2.7	5.2
Petro Poroshenko	6.7	13.0	9.5	7.7	9.5	11.5	5.0	9.4	43.2	23.2	8.6	4.7	8.0	10.8
Yuriy Boyko	3.5	10.3	13.8	2.6	4.0	11.6	1.4	24.7	0.0	1.2	0.0	2.8	1.9	1.5
Oleksandr Shevchenko	3.3	2.4	1.3	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.6	0.0	0.6	1.4	2.2	4.5	1.2	0.0
Oleh Lyashko	2.9	11.0	4.8	3.8	3.3	5.5	2.9	2.6	3.1	0.9	0.0	2.0	1.2	0.0
Oleksandr Vilkul	2.5	7.9	6.1	2.2	1.6	7.0	2.6	12.2	0.0	0.9	0.0	2.8	0.0	0.0
Anatoliy Hrytsenko	2.3	5.1	3.1	3.0	3.7	5.1	3.9	1.9	1.3	4.1	3.2	1.0	2.1	0.0
Volodymyr Hroisman	1.6	2.2	1.0	1.1	2.0	3.8	1.3	0.0	2.6	4.4	3.2	1.0	2.4	0.0
Andriy Sadovyi	1.3	2.0	2.2	1.3	1.2	1.5	2.2	1.0	2.2	4.7	11.2	10.1	0.8	3.0
Vitaliy Klychko	0.9	0.7	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.6	2.8	2.4	2.1	0.0	2.0	1.2	0.0
Evheniy Murayev	0.9	2.4	1.8	1.6	1.4	2.6	2.0	14.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4	1.2	3.0
Viktor Medvedchuk	0.8	1.4	1.8	0.1	1.7	8.6	0.9	18.0	0.0	2.0	3.9	2.0	1.3	0.0
Arsen Avakov	0.8	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	2.8
Serhiy Kaplin	0.7	0.5	0.4	0.1	0.7	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	1.0	0.0	1.5
Vadym Rabinovych	0.4	1.8	2.2	0.4	1.1	6.1	0.4	22.8	0.7	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.5	0.0
Andriy Parubiy	0.4	0.7	0.3	0.7	0.1	1.4	0.0	3.0	1.9	1.5	1.8	2.0	0.0	0.0
None	2.4	2.4	2.6	4.9	3.7	5.2	3.5	4.0	0.7	2.7	5.4	6.3	7.2	4.5
It is hard to say / Refusal	54.5	63.7	69.4	75.4	71.3	61.8	77.8	54.2	48.6	63.9	71.4	67.7	79.8	78.1

39% of Ukrainians watch some political talk shows: the most popular talk shows include "Svoboda Slova" [*Freedom of Speech*] (20%) and "Pravo na Vladu" [*Right to Power*] (15%) (Chart 1.2.2). 5-6% of respondents mentioned "Pulse", "Ukrainskyi Format" [*Ukrainian Format*], and "Narod

Proty" [*People Are Against*], and 3.5% mentioned "Ekho Ukrainy" [*Echo of Ukraine*].

In the West of Ukraine 48% watch talk shows, whereas in the Center this figure is already lower, namely 42% (Table 1.3.4). In the South and in the East, it is even lower and equals 33% and 28%, respectively.

Chart 1.2.2



Which political talk shows do you watch?

(% among all respondents, n=2,042; respondents could choose several answers at once)




Table 1.3.4

Which political talk shows do you watch?



(% among all respondents)



100% in the column Respondents could choose several answers	% of respondents from the macro-region...			
	West (n=571)	Center (n=712)	South (n=489)	East (n=270)
Freedom of Speech	24.7	20.7	19.7	9.5
Right to Power	17.8	16.1	12.5	10.8
Pulse	3.3	5.3	8.0	8.6
Ukrainian Format	3.2	8.1	7.2	1.0
People Are Against	6.2	5.0	5.6	4.6
Echo of Ukraine	3.7	3.4	3.9	2.5
Other	0.7	1.0	1.4	0.4
I do not watch political talk shows	52.3	58.2	66.9	71.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	9.4	7.1	2.9	3.3

1.3

Receiving and trusting information from Ukrainian TV online media

As far as coverage / popularity is concerned, the top online media have considerably lower figures than the top TV channels: the most popular ones include "Obozrevatel" [Observer] (8% of respondents mentioned this website as one of the top 5 websites they read


most often), "Korrespondent" [Correspondent] (7.5%), "Segodnya" [Today] (7%), and the Ukrainian Independent Information News Agency (UNIAN) (6%) (Chart 1.3.1). Other websites were mentioned by not more than 4% of respondents.

Chart 1.3.1



Which online media do you read most often? Up to 5 answers. / Which of the following online media do you trust most? Up to 5 answers.

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)



The data in *table 1.3.1* are given in a regional context.

Table 1.3.1



Which online media do you read most often? Up to 5 answers. / Which of the following online media do you trust most? Up to 5 answers.

(% among all respondents)



100% in the column Respondents could choose up to 5 answers	West (n=571)		Center (n=712)		South (n=489)		East (n=270)	
	Read	Trust	Read	Trust	Read	Trust	Read	Trust
Obozrevatel.com	4.3	1.8	10.4	6.6	8.2	3.3	6.1	3.8
Korrespondent.net	3.3	1.7	8.9	5.7	12.3	5.8	3.8	2.2
Segodnya.ua	4.4	2.9	8.2	6.1	8.5	3.9	6.6	3.9
Unian.net	8.4	6.3	7.7	4.8	3.1	1.7	3.4	2.3
Pravda.com.ua	5.2	4.3	4.3	1.7	4.1	1.8	1.7	0.6
Politeka.net	1.2	0.9	3.8	2.6	5.5	1.9	1.9	0.3
Gordonua.com	1.3	0.6	5.6	3.7	1.9	1.1	2.8	1.4
Strana.ua	1.4	0.6	3.8	1.7	3.4	1.6	0.7	0.9
Znaj.ua	1.8	1.0	4.7	3.2	1.0	0.6	0.0	0.0
Censor.net	1.5	0.6	4.1	1.9	1.4	0.5	1.0	0.0
Nv.ua	3.6	1.1	2.4	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Expres.ua	2.9	1.5	1.3	0.7	0.7	0.5	1.4	0.2
Liga.net	0.7	0.4	2.4	1.5	1.7	0.6	0.9	0.4
Glavcom.ua	0.4	0.0	1.1	0.7	0.5	0.0	1.1	0.5
Rbc.ua	0.8	1.0	0.7	0.1	0.9	0.4	0.0	0.3
Apostrophe.ua	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0
Hronika.info	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.2	0.6	0.0
Unn.com.ua	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bagnet.org	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other	2.2	0.6	1.6	0.6	3.7	1.1	1.5	1.1
I do not use online media	54.4	54.6	48.8	48.1	42.9	43.0	64.7	65.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	19.7	25.4	16.2	22.8	28.9	39.7	16.6	21.3


42% of those who read websites stated that they use ad-blockers (*Chart 1.3.2*).

Chart 1.3.2



Do you use ad-blockers?

(% of respondents who mentioned at least 1 website which they often read, n=544)



1.4

The use of social networks


As for those Ukrainians for whom social networks are the top source of information, **74% use Facebook**, and another 33.5% use Instagram (*Chart 1.4.1*). At the same time, 15% mentioned VKontakte, and 10% mentioned Odnoklassniki. In general, one in five Ukrainians who actively "draws" information from social networks, uses Russian social networks for this purpose.

Chart 1.4.1



Which social networks do you use to receive information about the state of affairs in Ukraine and abroad?

(% of respondents who receive information about events that take place in Ukraine in general, in the Donbas, and in the world from social networks, n=529; respondents could choose several answers at once)



Facebook dominates among all groups (Table 1.4.1). At the same time, among young people under 30, Instagram is close to the leader (79% use Facebook, and 54% use Instagram), and among students they are equally popular (72% and 67%, respectively).

For the majority of active social network users (56%), the main reason why they use these networks to receive information about the current events is convenience, since they can find a lot of information from different sources in one place. Another 31% argue that information is posted there sooner than it becomes available in the media.

Table 1.4.1



Which social networks do you use to receive information about the state of affairs in Ukraine and abroad?

(% of respondents of the corresponding group who receive information about events that take place in Ukraine in general, in the Donbas, and in the world from social networks)


% у рядку Респондент міг обрати декілька відповідей	Facebook	Instagram	Vkontakte	Odnoklassniki	Twitter	LinkedIn	Other	It is hard to say / Refusal
REGION								
- West (n=153)	79.2	21.3	6.7	2.5	4.2	3.5	2.2	6.6
- Center (n=174)	77.5	34.4	11.9	8.6	10.3	0.0	0.7	12.5
- South (n=134)	68.7	38.8	18.3	17.5	7.8	2.8	2.8	15.8
- East (n=68)	68.0	41.9	33.0	9.5	3.6	2.1	0.0	11.1
TYPE OF SETTLEMENT								
- village (n=115)	75.9	35.8	13.5	7.4	9.9	1.0	0.9	8.7
- town (up to 20 thousand people) / urban-type settlement (n=91)	75.0	38.0	11.6	13.5	7.5	2.3	1.1	9.1
- city (20-99 thousand people) (n=62)	77.3	37.7	18.2	6.6	4.4	0.0	3.5	13.6
- big city (100 thousand people or more) (n=261)	72.5	30.0	16.9	10.0	6.6	2.6	1.5	13.6
AGE GROUPS								
- 18-29 years old (n=166)	78.7	54.1	19.1	5.9	11.5	3.0	0.8	4.4
- 30-39 years old (n=143)	74.7	29.9	19.2	9.2	6.0	0.8	1.2	11.2
- 40-49 years old (n=103)	76.1	27.0	9.7	10.1	5.0	2.1	1.9	12.6
- 50-59 years old (n=79)	75.2	12.4	13.4	14.9	5.0	0.0	3.0	15.9
OCCUPATION								
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=85)	72.5	33.3	15.7	10.8	6.8	1.7	3.2	7.6
- public servant (n=67)	63.6	27.8	13.9	9.6	10.5	0.9	0.0	20.5
- specialist (n=131)	82.7	36.0	16.5	9.6	7.7	1.5	0.8	10.1
- self-employed, entrepreneur, farmer (n=46)	70.6	30.7	20.0	3.8	10.4	3.8	0.0	10.0
- housewife (n=62)	86.8	26.5	13.1	1.9	2.7	0.0	1.8	6.4
- retired (n=49)	43.3	12.6	8.0	22.9	2.4	3.8	2.0	36.4
- student (n=35)	71.6	67.3	12.1	3.7	11.4	7.0	3.8	3.2

Chart 1.4.2



Why do you actively use social networks to receive information about the state of affairs in Ukraine and abroad?

(% of respondents who receive information about events that take place in Ukraine in general, in the Donbas, and in the world from social networks, n=529; respondents could choose several answers at once)



Most users of social networks (63%) said that they saw political advertising during the last month (*Chart 1.4.3*).

Most users of social networks, both in the regional context and in the age context, said that they saw political advertising in social networks (*Table 1.4.2*).

Chart 1.4.3



Did you see political advertising in social networks during the last month?

(% of respondents who receive information about events that take place in Ukraine in general, in the Donbas, and in the world from social networks, n=529)




Table 1.4.2



Did you see political advertising in social networks during the last month?

(% among respondents of the corresponding group)

100% in a line	Yes	No	It is hard to say / Refusal
REGION			
- West (n=153)	59.0	26.4	14.6
- Center (n=174)	70.5	21.8	7.7
- South (n=134)	65.0	22.3	12.8
- East (n=68)	45.7	45.4	8.9
AGE GROUPS			
- 18-29 years old (n=166)	65.3	26.0	8.7
- 30-39 years old (n=143)	62.9	24.4	12.7
- 40-49 years old (n=102)	65.0	23.1	12.0
- 50-59 years old (n=79)	66.6	25.3	8.0



3 out of 4 active users of social networks (77%) agreed that there is a lot of misinformation and fakes there (Chart 1.4.3). At the same time, 51% believe that it is owners and network managers that must take measures to combat misinformation and fakes, 39% believe that this must be done by the state, 39% believe that this must be done by the state, and 28% believe that this must be done by the network users themselves.

Chart 1.4.3

Do you think that there is a lot of misinformation and fakes in social networks?

Who must take measures to combat misinformation and fakes in social networks? Up to 3 answers.

(% of respondents who receive information about events that take place in Ukraine in general, in the Donbas, and in the world from social networks, n=529)



1.5

Criteria for choosing media as a source of information


Top-2 criteria for choosing media include **the quality of content** (this was mentioned by 30% of Ukrainians) and **similarity of views (28%)** (Chart 1.5.1).

Chart 1.5.1



What is important for you when choosing media as a source of information?

(% among all respondents, n=2,042; respondents could choose several answers at once)



The data in *table 1.5.1* are given in a regional context.

Table 1.5.1



What is important for you when choosing media as a source of information?

(% among all respondents)



% in a line Respondents could choose several answers	% of respondents from the macro-region...			
	West (n=571)	Center (n=712)	South (n=489)	East (n=270)
Quality of content	29.5	30.3	36.7	20.8
Similarity of views expressed by the media to own views	21.3	32.0	33.2	24.8
Ease of access to the media	19.6	15.2	16.1	22.2
Reputation of the media	18.5	15.6	16.6	13.2
Personality of journalists, TV presenters	11.1	11.9	16.0	10.7
Media owner	8.4	7.6	9.1	8.3
Other	0.1	0.4	0.2	2.2
It is hard to say / Refusal	29.9	27.4	22.1	43.6

The data in table 1.5.2 are given among those who watch top Ukrainian TV channels.

Table 1.5.2



What is important for you when choosing media as a source of information?

(% of respondents who mentioned the corresponding channel as one of the top 5 channels they watch most often)

% in a line Respondents could choose several answers	1+1	Ukraine	Inter	ICTV	STB	112 Ukraine	NovyiKanal	NewsOne	Channel 5
Quality of content	31.2	27.6	27.0	33.1	32.5	28.7	36.3	30.1	24.8
Similarity of views expressed by the media to own views	32.2	31.8	33.8	29.1	30.5	36.8	27.3	41.7	27.8
Ease of access to the media	18.2	19.7	19.5	17.7	16.5	22.6	16.0	19.5	18.5
Reputation of the media	15.6	16.0	14.5	16.9	16.8	19.5	16.5	29.1	29.0
Personality of journalists, TV presenters	14.3	14.8	15.7	11.7	13.4	20.4	8.6	22.9	16.9
Media owner	8.5	6.0	6.7	9.1	7.3	7.8	7.8	14.0	9.7
Other	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.9	0.7	1.0	0.5	0.0
It is hard to say / Refusal	24.7	25.7	27.0	24.8	23.7	24.3	27.9	19.8	20.0

The smallest number of respondents are ready to continue to use the media, if it advocates for the legalization of light drugs, prostitution (6% who will continue to use it versus 76% who will stop using it), if it advocates for the support of the LGBT community (6% vs. 55%), if it promotes anti-democratic messages (3.5% vs. 73%) or xenophobic statements (3% vs. 70%) (Chart 1.5.1). If the media supports migrants, 25% of respondents will continue to use it, while 34% will stop using it; if the media supports censorship, the figures are 22% versus 48%; if the media supports restriction of access to Russian media and websites, the figures are 19% versus 50.5%.


Chart 1.5.1



Will you use information received from the media that is constantly promoting...?

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)

● Yes ● No ● It's hard to say / Refusal



The data in *table 1.5.3* are given in a regional context.

Table 1.5.3



Will you use information received from the media that is constantly promoting...?

(% among all respondents)



100% in the column	% of respondents from the macro-region...			
	West (n=571)	Center (n=712)	South (n=489)	East (n=270)
ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MESSAGES (I.E. MESSAGES CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE)				
Yes	2.7	5.9	1.7	2.5
No	76.4	68.6	80.8	65.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	20.9	25.5	17.5	32.4
XENOPHOBIC STATEMENTS (I.E. STATEMENTS IN WHICH SOMEBODY ELSE'S POINT OF VIEW IS PERCEIVED AS UNPLEASANT)				
Yes	4.3	5.3	0.6	0.9
No	72.4	66.2	78.8	60.3
It is hard to say / Refusal	23.3	28.5	20.6	38.9
ADVOCATES FOR CENSORSHIP				
Yes	17.2	28.5	12.5	32.5
No	51.7	42.3	58.9	34.4
It is hard to say / Refusal	31.1	29.2	28.6	33.2
SUPPORTS RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO RUSSIAN MEDIA AND WEBSITES				
Yes	23.6	28.0	8.5	8.4
No	45.5	42.9	63.6	55.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	30.9	29.1	28.0	36.1
SUPPORTS LGBT				
Yes	2.8	8.1	2.9	0.4
No	62.0	49.5	57.3	47.7
It is hard to say / Refusal	35.2	42.3	39.7	51.9
SUPPORTS MIGRANTS				
Yes	25.9	28.8	19.9	22.5
No	38.0	32.9	36.1	26.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	36.1	38.4	44.0	51.4
ADVOCATES FOR THE LEGALIZATION OF LIGHT DRUGS, PROSTITUTION				
Yes	5.5	10.9	3.1	1.2
No	76.8	71.1	80.7	78.5
It is hard to say / Refusal	17.7	18.1	16.2	20.3

In the *Table 1.5.4* the data is given among respondents who often watch a certain TV channel. As we can see, viewers of different channels have quite similar attitudes.

Table 1.5.4



Will you use information received from the media that is constantly promoting...?

(% of respondents who mentioned the corresponding channel as one of the top 5 channels they watch most often)

100% in the column	1+1	Ukraine	Inter	ICTV	STB	112 Ukraine	Novyi Kanal	NewsOne	Channel 5
ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MESSAGES (I.E. MESSAGES CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE)									
Yes	3.6	2.1	2.5	3.7	3.1	3.5	5.4	4.2	4.2
No	76.3	77.2	75.8	77.2	76.6	74.8	70.9	79.7	80.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	20.1	20.7	21.7	19.1	20.3	21.7	23.8	16.1	15.8
XENOPHOBIC STATEMENTS (I.E. STATEMENTS IN WHICH SOMEBODY ELSE'S POINT OF VIEW IS PERCEIVED AS UNPLEASANT)									
Yes	2.8	2.7	2.1	3.1	2.8	2.6	7.5	4.9	4.7
No	72.8	73.0	73.3	76.6	72.7	71.7	66.2	76.3	72.8
It is hard to say / Refusal	24.3	24.3	24.5	20.2	24.4	25.7	26.4	18.8	22.4
ADVOCATES FOR CENSORSHIP									
Yes	22.5	22.2	22.9	20.5	20.9	28.6	25.4	24.3	24.1
No	50.5	49.7	48.0	53.2	50.4	48.2	44.8	60.4	56.2
It is hard to say / Refusal	27.0	28.1	29.2	26.3	28.7	23.3	29.8	15.3	19.7
SUPPORTS RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO RUSSIAN MEDIA AND WEBSITES									
Yes	20.4	17.7	14.3	22.3	20.2	18.9	26.6	15.2	30.4
No	50.3	52.6	55.4	51.2	50.2	53.4	42.1	63.3	50.3
It is hard to say / Refusal	29.3	29.7	30.4	26.5	29.6	27.7	31.2	21.5	19.3
SUPPORTS LGBT									
Yes	3.6	3.9	3.2	3.6	4.3	4.6	5.7	7.0	4.0
No	58.2	56.4	53.9	59.7	56.9	53.7	52.2	53.6	65.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	38.2	39.8	42.9	36.6	38.8	41.7	42.1	39.4	30.8
SUPPORTS MIGRANTS									
Yes	25.8	25.2	25.4	26.4	24.0	28.6	30.9	22.1	35.2
No	34.5	37.0	34.7	36.0	36.0	28.6	27.1	30.8	41.9
It is hard to say / Refusal	39.6	37.8	39.8	37.5	40.0	42.8	42.0	47.1	22.9
ADVOCATES FOR THE LEGALIZATION OF LIGHT DRUGS, PROSTITUTION									
Yes	5.7	4.9	3.4	7.7	3.5	5.8	7.2	10.2	10.0
No	79.9	81.2	80.8	79.2	81.2	80.2	75.7	82.4	79.3
It is hard to say / Refusal	14.4	13.9	15.8	13.1	15.4	14.0	17.2	7.4	10.7

In the *Table 1.5.5-7* the data are given among the groups of population by the type of settlement, age, and occupation.

Table 1.5.5



Will you use information received from the media that is constantly promoting...?

(% among respondents of the corresponding group)

100% in the column	Type of settlement			
	Village	Town / urban-type settlement	City	Big city
ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MESSAGES (I.E. MESSAGES CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE)				
Yes	3.6	1.0	3.8	4.2
No	72.5	73.8	84.7	71.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	23.9	25.2	11.5	24.2
XENOPHOBIC STATEMENTS (I.E. STATEMENTS IN WHICH SOMEBODY ELSE'S POINT OF VIEW IS PERCEIVED AS UNPLEASANT)				
Yes	2.6	2.3	5.6	3.5
No	70.8	68.5	81.6	68.2
It is hard to say / Refusal	26.5	29.1	12.8	28.3
ADVOCATES FOR CENSORSHIP				
Yes	20.1	23.1	29.7	21.8
No	48.7	41.5	54.1	48.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	31.2	35.3	16.2	30.1
SUPPORTS RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO RUSSIAN MEDIA AND WEBSITES				
Yes	20.1	16.9	26.0	18.2
No	49.8	50.4	55.7	50.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	30.1	32.7	18.2	31.7
SUPPORTS LGBT				
Yes	1.9	1.1	7.9	6.4
No	54.5	53.1	69.3	52.5
It is hard to say / Refusal	43.7	45.8	22.8	41.0
SUPPORTS MIGRANTS				
Yes	28.1	18.2	34.3	22.9
No	32.3	37.7	32.0	34.8
It is hard to say / Refusal	39.6	44.1	33.7	42.3
ADVOCATES FOR THE LEGALIZATION OF LIGHT DRUGS, PROSTITUTION				
Yes	4.2	2.7	11.7	7.6
No	77.7	77.4	78.3	74.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	18.1	19.9	10.0	18.3

Table 1.5.6



Will you use information received from the media that is constantly promoting...?

(% among respondents of the corresponding group)

100% in the column	AGE					
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MESSAGES (I.E. MESSAGES CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE)						
Yes	3.6	4.5	2.0	3.6	5.1	2.1
No	69.1	79.7	75.2	72.7	73.4	67.0
It is hard to say / Refusal	27.3	15.8	22.8	23.8	21.5	30.8
XENOPHOBIC STATEMENTS (I.E. STATEMENTS IN WHICH SOMEBODY ELSE'S POINT OF VIEW IS PERCEIVED AS UNPLEASANT)						
Yes	4.1	3.1	2.1	3.1	3.5	3.6
No	68.1	74.5	73.5	70.6	69.5	62.2
It is hard to say / Refusal	27.8	22.4	24.5	26.3	27.0	34.1
ADVOCATES FOR CENSORSHIP						
Yes	23.8	23.3	22.8	18.4	24.2	19.0
No	40.0	52.6	49.6	52.3	46.8	44.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	36.3	24.1	27.6	29.3	28.9	36.4
SUPPORTS RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO RUSSIAN MEDIA AND WEBSITES						
Yes	18.8	20.8	18.2	21.4	21.4	13.7
No	45.6	56.1	52.2	51.2	48.2	48.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	35.7	23.1	29.6	27.4	30.4	38.1
SUPPORTS LGBT						
Yes	5.2	6.0	4.0	4.8	2.6	2.3
No	51.0	56.1	55.8	53.8	62.0	48.2
It is hard to say / Refusal	43.8	37.9	40.1	41.4	35.4	49.5
SUPPORTS MIGRANTS						
Yes	28.2	25.4	24.9	25.7	23.4	20.3
No	27.5	37.3	35.7	32.4	38.7	33.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	44.3	37.3	39.4	41.9	37.9	46.1
ADVOCATES FOR THE LEGALIZATION OF LIGHT DRUGS, PROSTITUTION						
Yes	7.8	7.8	6.3	4.7	6.3	2.9
No	72.7	77.3	73.9	78.0	79.5	75.2
It is hard to say / Refusal	19.5	15.0	19.7	17.3	14.2	21.9

Table 1.5.7


Will you use information received from the media that is constantly promoting...?

(% among respondents of the corresponding group)

100% in the column	OCCUPATION							
	Worker	Public servant	Specialist	Self-employed, entrepreneur	Housewife	Retired	Student	Unemployed
ANTI-DEMOCRATIC MESSAGES (I.E. MESSAGES CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE)								
Yes	4.7	5.1	2.0	2.3	3.4	3.5	3.1	4.2
No	74.1	74.3	80.6	73.7	76.6	69.6	67.6	77.3
It is hard to say / Refusal	21.3	20.7	17.3	24.0	20.0	26.9	29.3	18.5
XENOPHOBIC STATEMENTS (I.E. STATEMENTS IN WHICH SOMEBODY ELSE'S POINT OF VIEW IS PERCEIVED AS UNPLEASANT)								
Yes	1.3	6.0	2.8	4.6	3.1	3.2	5.3	4.6
No	73.5	71.7	77.3	67.0	74.3	65.1	63.9	73.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	25.2	22.3	19.9	28.4	22.6	31.8	30.8	21.7
ADVOCATES FOR CENSORSHIP								
Yes	24.4	19.1	18.8	20.3	24.3	21.2	23.9	28.4
No	45.3	53.4	59.4	47.9	48.4	44.7	42.9	43.7
It is hard to say / Refusal	30.3	27.5	21.8	31.8	27.2	34.1	33.2	27.9
SUPPORTS RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO RUSSIAN MEDIA AND WEBSITES								
Yes	20.2	22.9	25.2	21.0	16.0	16.8	23.8	14.9
No	49.0	50.8	51.8	49.6	52.1	49.1	45.4	59.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	30.9	26.2	23.0	29.4	31.9	34.1	30.7	25.5
SUPPORTS LGBT								
Yes	3.4	6.2	8.6	5.3	4.7	2.6	3.1	2.9
No	54.1	52.4	58.2	54.1	56.3	53.4	48.1	68.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	42.4	41.4	33.1	40.7	39.0	44.0	48.8	29.0
SUPPORTS MIGRANTS								
Yes	25.6	27.2	29.4	20.0	24.8	22.2	21.5	30.8
No	33.5	32.7	35.7	30.6	37.7	35.7	22.0	36.5
It is hard to say / Refusal	41.0	40.1	35.0	49.5	37.5	42.0	56.6	32.7
ADVOCATES FOR THE LEGALIZATION OF LIGHT DRUGS, PROSTITUTION								
Yes	6.9	11.0	5.3	10.2	1.8	4.5	12.6	5.2
No	77.4	70.6	80.1	71.0	79.3	77.1	65.3	84.2
It is hard to say / Refusal	15.6	18.4	14.6	18.7	18.9	18.4	22.1	10.6



SECTION II

MEDIA LITERACY

21

Evaluation of own ability to detect fakes

Slightly more than half of Ukrainians (52%) believe that they are, in most cases, able to **distinguish quality information** from misinformation and fakes on their own (in February 2018, this figure was equal to 53%) (Chart 2.1.1). On the contrary, a quarter of Ukrainians (26.5%) believe that they cannot distinguish such information at all, or can only do this in a minority of cases (in February 2018, this figure was equal to 31%).

As for the criteria for identifying fakes, respondents most often mentioned trust in the media which provided the information (for 27% of residents of Ukraine, it is one of the main criteria) and the mention of the author (25.5%). In general, about 58% of respondents mentioned at least one criterion they use to determine whether information is fake.

Chart 2.1.1




Do you think that you are able to distinguish quality information from misinformation and fakes on your own?

Which criteria do you use to detect fake information? Up to 3 answers.

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)

● It's hard to say
● No
● Most often no
● Most often yes
● Yes

■ February 19
■ February 18




Most users of all social networks are convinced of their ability to detect fakes (*Chart 2.1.2*).

Chart 2.1.2



Do you think that you are able to distinguish quality information from misinformation and fakes on your own?

(% among respondents who actively use a certain social network to receive information about events that take place in Ukraine in general, in the Donbas, and in the world)



Younger respondents are more confident of their ability to detect fakes: Among persons under 40, 59-62% said that they can detect fake, whereas among persons aged 40-69, this figure is 47-51%, and among persons aged 70 and older, it is 34% (Table 2.1.1). As for various occupations, young students are most confident of their abilities: 68% of them



believe that in most cases they can detect fakes (in, particular, 45% think that they always detect fakes). The retired are the least confident of all (41%).

Table 2.1.1



Do you think that you are able to distinguish quality information from misinformation and fakes on your own?

(% among respondents of the corresponding group)

100% in a line	Yes	Most often yes	Most often no	No	It is hard to say / Refusal
AGE GROUPS					
- 18-29 years old (n=352)	26.9	32.3	11.5	9.4	19.9
- 30-39 years old (n=376)	25.7	36.6	11.8	10.7	15.3
- 40-49 years old (n=318)	18.3	30.8	16.4	15.9	18.6
- 50-59 years old (n=387)	17.2	34.1	12.8	13.5	22.5
- 60-69 years old (n=308)	21.5	25.3	13.4	16.8	23.0
- 70+ (n=301)	14.0	20.4	8.6	20.8	36.2
OCCUPATION					
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=323)	19.5	36.8	11.3	11.1	21.4
- public servant (n=191)	24.4	29.3	16.8	9.9	19.6
- specialist (n=280)	19.3	39.9	13.9	10.3	16.7
- self-employed, entrepreneur, farmer (n=123)	29.7	29.7	8.5	16.2	16.0
- housewife (n=177)	22.9	28.5	17.1	13.2	18.3
- retired (n=690)	17.1	24.1	11.7	18.5	28.5
- student (n=63)	44.6	23.1	11.3	7.7	13.3
- unemployed (n=112)	22.0	33.9	10.2	20.1	13.8




A total of 60% of the population also performed at least one action to distinguish information from misinformation (Chart 2.1.3). Relatively the most popular practice is to read media which belong to different owners (37% of Ukrainians use this method). Less common practices include visiting websites and social networks of state institutions (16%), search for acquaintances in the relevant field (15%), reading foreign media (11%), reading foreign media (11%).

Chart 2.1.3



How do you distinguish information from misinformation? Up to 3 answers.

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)



2.2

Receiving information about fighting fakes and misinformation


There is a **low interest** in television and radio programs and video blogs aimed at **combating fakes**, informational manipulations, and Kremlin misinformation (Chart 2.2.1). In general, 10% of respondents mentioned that they watched some programs aimed at combating misinformation during the last month. At the same time, **only 15% of Ukrainians would like to watch/listen to such television or radio programs or video blogs.**

Chart 2.2.1




Did you watch or listen to television and radio programs or video blogs aimed at combating fakes, informational manipulations, and Kremlin misinformation during the last month?

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)



Would you like to watch/listen to such television and radio programs or video blogs?

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)




Even among those respondents who believe that they most often cannot detect fakes, or cannot do this at all, not more than a quarter are interested in such programs (Chart 2.2.1).

Chart 2.2.1



Would you like to watch/listen to such television and radio programs or video blogs?

(% among the respondents depending on their valuation of own ability to detect fakes)



BLOG




The data in *Chart 2.2.3* are given in a regional context.

Chart 2.2.3




Did you watch or listen to television and radio programs or video blogs aimed at combating fakes, informational manipulations, and Kremlin misinformation during the last month?

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)



Would you like to watch/listen to such television and radio programs or video blogs?

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)





There is an approximately equal interest in such programs among various age groups and occupations (*Table 2.2.1*).

Table 2.2.1



Would you like to watch/listen to such television and radio programs or video blogs?

(% among respondents of the corresponding group)

100% in a line	Yes	No	It is hard to say / Refusal
AGE GROUPS			
- 18-29 years old (n=352)	17.5	64.9	17.6
- 30-39 years old (n=376)	14.7	68.6	16.8
- 40-49 years old (n=318)	18.0	66.1	16.0
- 50-59 years old (n=387)	16.1	64.6	19.3
- 60-69 years old (n=308)	18.2	56.8	25.0
- 70+ (n=301)	7.3	70.0	22.6
OCCUPATION			
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=323)	15.1	68.8	16.1
- public servant (n=191)	21.1	61.9	17.1
- specialist (n=280)	18.1	57.8	24.1
- self-employed, entrepreneur, farmer (n=123)	12.2	71.8	16.0
- housewife (n=177)	17.9	69.4	12.7
- retired (n=690)	13.6	62.8	23.6
- student (n=63)	15.5	72.5	11.9
- unemployed (n=112)	17.9	64.2	17.8


Among those who are interested in such programs, most people watch 1+1 TV channel (59%) (Chart 2.2.4). It is followed by Ukraine (44.5%), Inter (37%), ICTV (36%), STB (33%), and 112 (28%).

Chart 2.2.4



Which Ukrainian TV channels do you watch most often / do you trust most?

(% among respondents who are interested in such programs, n=230)






The *Chart 2.2.5* contains information about which online media those who are interested in such programs use.

Chart 2.2.5



Which online media do you read most often?

(% among respondents who are interested in such programs, n=230)






As for social networks, 78% use Facebook, 32% use Instagram (Chart 2.2.6).

Chart 2.2.6



Which social networks do you use to receive information about the state of affairs in Ukraine and abroad?

(% among respondents who are interested in such programs and actively use social networks, n=82)





SECTION III

INTERPRETATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT IN THE EAST AND THE ANNEXATION OF THE CRIMEA

3.1

Interpretations of topical events in the context of the conflict with Russia

In the issues which are topical for Ukraine, there is still no consensus among the public. Over the past year, **the share of those who believe that it was the separatists and Russia that started the war decreased from 52% to 48.5%** (Table 3.2.1). The share of those who believe that it was Ukraine that started the war is 17% (versus 15% in February 2018). **At the same time, one in three Ukrainians (35%) "cannot form their opinion" as to the question of who started the war.** Over the past year, the number of people who believe that Ukrainian-speaking citizens and patriots are persecuted in the Crimea and the "DNR" / "LNR" also decreased from 43% to 38%. On the contrary, the number of Ukrainians who believe that ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking citizens are persecuted in Ukraine increased from 10% to 15.5%.

As for the conflict in the Kerch Strait, **44% of Ukrainians believe that Russian border guards attacked Ukrainian sailors.** In contrast, 19% believe that Ukrainian sailors provoked them. Another 37% of Ukrainians "do not have a definite opinion" on this issue. At the same time, when asked about the martial law **51% of the respondents answered that there were no real grounds for the martial law, since there was no aggression on the part of Russia, and the law was just favorable to Ukrainian politicians in their preparation for the elections.** 24% of the respondents consider its introduction reasonable.

There is also no consensus on Tomos: **39% of Ukrainians believe that the obtainment of Tomos was a necessary and important step towards strengthening the independence of the Ukrainian state.** On the contrary, **33% believe that the obtainment of Tomos was a mistake and drove a wedge between Ukrainians who belong to different denominations.**

In the West and in the Center there is a tendency for more pro-Ukrainian interpretations of topical events, whereas in the South and East, the share of those who "do not have a definite opinion" yet is higher. In addition, pro-Ukrainian / pro-Russian interpretations are, at best, equally widespread, and in some cases it is pro-Russian interpretations that predominate. For example, in the West and in the Center, 62-65% of the respondents said that responsibility for the start of the war lies with Russia, 10-12.5% said that it lies with



Ukraine, and a quarter do not have a definite opinion on this issue. In the South, the share of those who "do not have a definite opinion" yet reaches 47%. At the same time, 30% of the respondents there said that responsibility lies with Russia, whereas 23% said that it lies with Ukraine. In the East, the share of those who "do not have a definite opinion" yet reaches 55%. And in this region there are already twice as many people who said that responsibility lies with Ukraine – 31% versus 14.5% of those who said that it lies with Russia.

Table 3.2.1



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion
(in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option
"It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")

(% among all respondents)




February 2018




February 2019


WHO STARTED THE WAR




PERSECUTION OF UKRAINIAN-SPEAKING OR RUSSIAN-SPEAKING PEOPLE



OBTAINMENT OF TOMOS



THE CONFLICT IN THE KERCH STRAIT



THE MARTIAL LAW




Table 3.1.2



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion
(in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option "It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")
(% among all respondents)



100% in the column	% of respondents from the macro-region			
	West (n=571)	Center (n=712)	South (n=489)	East (n=270)
WHO STARTED THE WAR				
Separatists and Russia started the war	61.7	64.9	30.4	14.5
Ukrainian government and oligarchs started the war	12.5	9.7	22.8	30.8
It is hard to say / Refusal	25.9	25.3	46.8	54.7
PERSECUTION OF UKRAINIAN-SPEAKING OR RUSSIAN-SPEAKING PEOPLE				
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in the Crimea and in the territories controlled by the "DNR/LNR"	61.0	47.1	15.7	13.5
Ethnic Russians, Russian-speaking citizens, and dissenters are persecuted in Ukraine	8.0	16.4	17.2	24.7
It is hard to say / Refusal	31.0	36.4	67.2	61.8
OBTAINMENT OF TOMOS				
Obtainment of Tomos was a necessary and important step towards strengthening the independence of the Ukrainian state	56.0	47.2	19.9	17.8
Obtainment of Tomos was a mistake and drove a wedge between Ukrainians who belong to different denominations	23.9	27.4	43.5	44.5
It is hard to say / Refusal	20.1	25.4	36.6	37.8
THE CONFLICT IN THE KERCH STRAIT				
Russian border guards insidiously attacked Ukrainian sailors in the Kerch Strait	58.3	56.8	26.2	19.5
Actions of Ukrainian sailors provoked an attack of Russian border guards in the Sea of Azov	12.5	14.3	24.9	32.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	29.2	29.0	48.9	47.9
THE MARTIAL LAW				
The martial law was a reasonable precaution and the right reaction of the Ukrainian government to the strengthening of Russian aggression on the border	38.7	29.3	12.5	3.6
There were no real grounds for the martial law, since there was no aggression on the part of Russia, and the law was just favorable to Ukrainian politicians in their preparation for the elections	38.2	45.1	66.3	69.2
It is hard to say / Refusal	23.1	25.7	21.2	27.2

As we can see from *Table 3.1.3*, interpretations of events practically do not depend on the respondents' age.

Table 3.1.3



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion (in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option "It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")

(% among respondents of a certain age)

100% in the column	% of respondents aged					
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
WHO STARTED THE WAR						
Separatists and Russia started the war	44.4	49.4	50.4	52.8	45.5	47.9
Ukrainian government and oligarchs started the war	15.9	18.7	15.1	16.7	17.7	15.3
It is hard to say / Refusal	39.7	31.9	34.5	30.5	36.8	36.8
PERSECUTION OF UKRAINIAN-SPEAKING OR RUSSIAN-SPEAKING PEOPLE						
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in the Crimea and in the territories controlled by the "DNR/LNR"	38.8	41.2	38.0	41.5	35.1	33.4
Ethnic Russians, Russian-speaking citizens, and dissenters are persecuted in Ukraine	15.5	17.5	16.7	14.5	16.8	10.7
It is hard to say / Refusal	45.7	41.3	45.3	44.0	48.0	55.9
OBTAINMENT OF TOMOS						
Obtainment of Tomos was a necessary and important step towards strengthening the independence of the Ukrainian state	32.1	37.4	40.9	43.4	42.4	36.8
Obtainment of Tomos was a mistake and drove a wedge between Ukrainians who belong to different denominations	31.1	34.1	32.0	32.6	35.6	31.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	36.8	28.5	27.2	24.0	22.0	31.6
THE CONFLICT IN THE KERCH STRAIT						
Russian border guards insidiously attacked Ukrainian sailors in the Kerch Strait	41.0	45.0	48.0	46.3	43.8	41.7
Actions of Ukrainian sailors provoked an attack of Russian border guards in the Sea of Azov	20.6	19.0	16.0	20.6	21.0	16.2
It is hard to say / Refusal	38.4	36.0	35.9	33.1	35.2	42.0
THE MARTIAL LAW						
The martial law was a reasonable precaution and the right reaction of the Ukrainian government to the strengthening of Russian aggression on the border	21.6	23.8	25.0	27.0	24.3	22.6
There were no real grounds for the martial law, since there was no aggression on the part of Russia, and the law was just favorable to Ukrainian politicians in their preparation for the elections	51.6	56.3	52.7	48.8	52.2	47.9
It is hard to say / Refusal	26.8	19.9	22.3	24.2	23.4	29.5

Among those who most often receive information from Ukrainian television (in general), Ukrainian websites and social networks, the moods are quite similar (Table 3.1.4). The results of those who often receive information from relatives, friends, etc. were somewhat different: among these re-

spondents there are fewer people who share pro-Ukrainian interpretations and more people who share pro-Russian interpretations. However, it must be taken into account that in the South and in the East there are more people who receive information from this source.

Table 3.1.4



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion (in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option "It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")

(% of respondents who receive information from the corresponding sources)

100% in the column	Ukrainian television	Ukrainian websites	Social networks	Relatives, friends, etc.
WHO STARTED THE WAR				
Separatists and Russia started the war	51.4	51.5	47.3	36.7
Ukrainian government and oligarchs started the war	15.6	17.4	15.5	29.2
It is hard to say / Refusal	33.0	31.1	37.2	34.0
PERSECUTION OF UKRAINIAN-SPEAKING OR RUSSIAN-SPEAKING PEOPLE				
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in the Crimea and in the territories controlled by the "DNR/LNR"	39.3	45.1	40.6	28.3
Ethnic Russians, Russian-speaking citizens, and dissenters are persecuted in Ukraine	14.6	12.6	14.8	19.9
It is hard to say / Refusal	46.1	42.3	44.7	51.7
OBTAINMENT OF TOMOS				
Obtainment of Tomos was a necessary and important step towards strengthening the independence of the Ukrainian state	41.4	42.1	37.1	37.3
Obtainment of Tomos was a mistake and drove a wedge between Ukrainians who belong to different denominations	31.4	32.9	34.0	36.4
It is hard to say / Refusal	27.1	25.0	28.9	26.3
THE CONFLICT IN THE KERCH STRAIT				
Russian border guards insidiously attacked Ukrainian sailors in the Kerch Strait	48.4	49.0	44.9	35.9
Actions of Ukrainian sailors provoked an attack of Russian border guards in the Sea of Azov	16.8	19.0	18.1	22.4
It is hard to say / Refusal	34.9	31.9	37.1	41.7
THE MARTIAL LAW				
The martial law was a reasonable precaution and the right reaction of the Ukrainian government to the strengthening of Russian aggression on the border	23.9	26.9	20.0	17.7
There were no real grounds for the martial law, since there was no aggression on the part of Russia, and the law was just favorable to Ukrainian politicians in their preparation for the elections	52.4	57.8	56.0	58.4
It is hard to say / Refusal	23.7	15.3	24.0	23.9

The data in Table 3.1.5 are given among those who watch top Ukrainian TV channels. In general, viewers of different channels have quite similar attitudes. **Viewers of NewsOne, who share pro-Ukrainian interpretations of events to a much lesser extent, stand out**

most of all. There is also a tendency for less pronounced pro-Ukrainian interpretations among the viewers of Inter channel (even though this is less noticeable than in the case of NewsOne). Viewers of Channel 5 share pro-Ukrainian interpretations most often of all.

Table 3.1.5



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion
(in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option
"It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")
 (% of respondents who mentioned the corresponding channel as one
 of the top 5 channels they watch most often)

100% in the column	1+1	Ukraine	Inter	ICTV	STB	112 Ukraine	Novyi Kanal	NewsOne	Channel 5
WHO STARTED THE WAR									
Separatists and Russia started the war	52.6	48.1	42.8	53.3	48.3	46.5	53.0	32.1	67.9
Ukrainian government and oligarchs started the war	14.5	17.1	18.6	17.5	17.8	18.1	17.1	23.2	9.9
It is hard to say / Refusal	32.8	34.8	38.6	29.1	34.0	35.3	29.9	44.8	22.1
PERSECUTION OF UKRAINIAN-SPEAKING OR RUSSIAN-SPEAKING PEOPLE									
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in the Crimea and in the territories controlled by the "DNR/LNR"	39.3	35.6	28.8	41.2	36.6	39.9	48.1	22.6	58.9
Ethnic Russians, Russian-speaking citizens, and dissenters are persecuted in Ukraine	14.3	15.3	17.0	14.5	14.5	19.3	14.2	32.6	7.4
It is hard to say / Refusal	46.4	49.1	54.2	44.3	48.9	40.7	37.8	44.7	33.8
OBTAINMENT OF TOMOS									
Obtainment of Tomos was a necessary and important step towards strengthening the independence of the Ukrainian state	42.7	39.0	30.6	42.6	37.2	42.4	40.5	26.3	65.4
Obtainment of Tomos was a mistake and drove a wedge between Ukrainians who belong to different denominations	31.8	31.4	41.3	29.5	33.5	40.0	30.5	51.1	19.3
It is hard to say / Refusal	25.5	29.6	28.0	27.8	29.4	17.6	29.0	22.5	15.3
THE CONFLICT IN THE KERCH STRAIT									
Russian border guards insidiously attacked Ukrainian sailors in the Kerch Strait	50.0	45.3	38.2	52.7	47.4	40.7	52.6	27.1	61.5
Actions of Ukrainian sailors provoked an attack of Russian border guards in the Sea of Azov	15.9	16.4	20.2	16.0	16.4	27.0	16.2	32.3	14.3
It is hard to say / Refusal	34.1	38.3	41.6	31.3	36.2	32.4	31.2	40.7	24.2
THE MARTIAL LAW									
The martial law was a reasonable precaution and the right reaction of the Ukrainian government to the strengthening of Russian aggression on the border	23.3	19.8	17.3	25.2	19.6	27.3	27.3	16.5	51.6
There were no real grounds for the martial law, since there was no aggression on the part of Russia, and the law was just favorable to Ukrainian politicians in their preparation for the elections	52.7	55.0	59.1	53.6	57.0	58.1	46.4	70.6	32.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	24.0	25.2	23.6	21.2	23.4	14.7	26.3	12.9	16.3

The data in *Table 3.1.6* are given in the context of those who watch a certain talk show. As we can see, those who watch "Pulse" and "Ukrainian Format" also share pro-Ukrainian interpretations of topical events to a lesser extent.

Table 3.1.6



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion (in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option "It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")

(% among respondents who watch a certain talk show)

100% in the column	Freedom of Speech	Right to Power	Pulse	Ukrainian Format	People Are Against	Echo of Ukraine
WHO STARTED THE WAR						
Separatists and Russia started the war	62.5	62.7	41.6	48.1	62.3	60.0
Ukrainian government and oligarchs started the war	12.8	14.1	17.0	17.1	16.4	15.2
It is hard to say / Refusal	24.7	23.2	41.3	34.8	21.4	24.8
PERSECUTION OF UKRAINIAN-SPEAKING OR RUSSIAN-SPEAKING PEOPLE						
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in the Crimea and in the territories controlled by the "DNR/LNR"	51.6	48.4	30.5	34.1	52.5	48.6
Ethnic Russians, Russian-speaking citizens, and dissenters are persecuted in Ukraine	11.7	13.1	21.5	21.8	14.5	14.4
It is hard to say / Refusal	36.7	38.5	48.0	44.1	33.0	37.1
OBTAINMENT OF TOMOS						
Obtainment of Tomos was a necessary and important step towards strengthening the independence of the Ukrainian state	56.2	61.3	40.3	35.2	60.0	55.5
Obtainment of Tomos was a mistake and drove a wedge between Ukrainians who belong to different denominations	23.1	19.3	42.8	43.8	31.6	28.5
It is hard to say / Refusal	20.8	19.4	16.9	21.0	8.3	16.0
THE CONFLICT IN THE KERCH STRAIT						
Russian border guards insidiously attacked Ukrainian sailors in the Kerch Strait	57.4	57.6	38.0	40.8	54.2	49.5
Actions of Ukrainian sailors provoked an attack of Russian border guards in the Sea of Azov	15.6	14.5	16.7	19.5	17.3	20.3
It is hard to say / Refusal	27.0	27.8	45.3	39.7	28.5	30.2
THE MARTIAL LAW						
The martial law was a reasonable precaution and the right reaction of the Ukrainian government to the strengthening of Russian aggression on the border	35.0	30.6	21.7	21.5	31.1	34.4
There were no real grounds for the martial law, since there was no aggression on the part of Russia, and the law was just favorable to Ukrainian politicians in their preparation for the elections	46.8	46.2	63.2	59.5	55.0	45.8
It is hard to say / Refusal	18.2	23.2	15.1	19.0	13.9	19.7

The data in *Table 3.1.7* are given in the context of those who read certain websites. Those who read Strana.ua share pro-Ukrainian interpretations of events least of all, whereas those who read UNIAN share such interpretations most of all.

Table 3.1.7



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion (in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option "It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")

(% of respondents who mentioned the corresponding website as one of the top 5 websites they read most often)

100% in the column	Obozrevatel.com	Korrespondent.net	Segodnya.ua	Unian.net	Pravda.com.ua	Politeka.net	Gordonua.com	Strana.ua
WHO STARTED THE WAR								
Separatists and Russia started the war	59.5	56.3	50.4	71.9	64.3	50.4	64.4	39.3
Ukrainian government and oligarchs started the war	14.0	14.3	14.5	15.6	12.3	23.8	13.6	32.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	26.5	29.5	35.0	12.5	23.4	25.8	22.0	28.1
PERSECUTION OF UKRAINIAN-SPEAKING OR RUSSIAN-SPEAKING PEOPLE								
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in the Crimea and in the territories controlled by the "DNR/LNR"	47.5	45.1	34.5	66.7	63.1	43.5	51.4	37.5
Ethnic Russians, Russian-speaking citizens, and dissenters are persecuted in Ukraine	16.3	17.0	15.4	12.9	7.9	16.5	21.7	28.0
It is hard to say / Refusal	36.3	37.8	50.1	20.4	29.0	40.0	26.9	34.5
OBTAINMENT OF TOMOS								
Obtainment of Tomos was a necessary and important step towards strengthening the independence of the Ukrainian state	55.4	42.5	35.5	65.6	56.3	41.5	55.2	40.5
Obtainment of Tomos was a mistake and drove a wedge between Ukrainians who belong to different denominations	31.2	39.4	38.9	18.1	30.7	42.7	30.0	49.3
It is hard to say / Refusal	13.4	18.1	25.6	16.4	13.0	15.8	14.8	10.2
THE CONFLICT IN THE KERCH STRAIT								
Russian border guards insidiously attacked Ukrainian sailors in the Kerch Strait	51.3	47.4	43.0	70.0	64.3	53.7	63.3	42.7
Actions of Ukrainian sailors provoked an attack of Russian border guards in the Sea of Azov	20.1	25.3	23.8	12.6	13.5	25.0	14.7	34.0
It is hard to say / Refusal	28.7	27.3	33.2	17.4	22.2	21.3	22.0	23.4
THE MARTIAL LAW								
The martial law was a reasonable precaution and the right reaction of the Ukrainian government to the strengthening of Russian aggression on the border	26.3	25.4	14.7	34.0	31.2	19.4	30.2	26.0
There were no real grounds for the martial law, since there was no aggression on the part of Russia, and the law was just favorable to Ukrainian politicians in their preparation for the elections	52.4	60.1	65.9	46.6	49.7	68.3	55.9	63.7
It is hard to say / Refusal	21.3	14.4	19.4	19.3	19.1	12.3	13.9	10.2



3.2

Policy on the regulation of the information sphere

Despite the obvious "problems" in the formation of a consensus view of the society on topical events, **the population of Ukraine rather has a negative attitude towards regulation of the information sphere by means of bans**, while in comparison with the last year **there are tendencies for the spread of a negative attitude** (Table 3.2.1). Thus, **49.5% consider the ban on Russian TV channels to be a mistake** (in February 2018, this figure was 44%), whereas 32% believe that it was the right step (versus 37% the last year). **55.5% do not support the ban on certain Russian films and artists** (versus 53% the last year), whereas 27% support this ban (versus 29%). With regard to **Russian social networks**, **49% consider such actions erroneous** (versus 46% the last year), 29% think that this was the right thing to do (in February 2018, this figure was 30%).

At the same time, **the share of those who believe that there are too many pro-Kremlin propaganda media in Ukraine has grown from 33% to 38.5%**. In contrast, 30% (as many as in February 2018) think that there is infringement upon freedom of speech in Ukraine.

Table 3.2.1



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion (in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option "It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")

(% among all respondents)




February 2018



February 2019

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN UKRAINE


There are too many pro-Kremlin propaganda media in Ukraine, and there is a weak reaction of the state and the society to this






There is infringement upon freedom of speech in Ukraine



It is hard to say / Refusal



BANS ON RUSSIAN TV CHANNELS**BANS ON RUSSIAN FILMS AND ARTISTS****BANS ON RUSSIAN SOCIAL NETWORKS**

The data in *Table 3.2.2* are given in a regional context. In the West and in the Center, the prevailing opinion is that there are too many pro-Kremlin propaganda media in Ukraine (51-54% of respondents had such an opinion), and only 20% think that there is infringement upon freedom of speech. On the contrary, in the South and East, there is the opposite situation: more people think that there is rather infringement upon freedom of speech (43-53%) than the excessive influence of pro-Kremlin propaganda media (8-21%).



At the same time, even in the West and in the Center there are completely different opinions on the policy of bans. In the West, 41-47% support certain types of bans, but the share of those who do not support them is also considerable – 30-39%. In the Center, 35-42% support certain bans, whereas 40-47% do not support them. In the South and East, the absolute majority believes that bans on Russian TV channels, certain films / artists and social networks were a mistake.

Table 3.2.2



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion (in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option "It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")

(% among all respondents)



100% in the column	% of respondents from the macro-region			
	West (n=571)	Center (n=712)	South (n=489)	East (n=270)
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN UKRAINE				
There are too many pro-Kremlin propaganda media in Ukraine, and there is a weak reaction of the state and the society to this	54.2	50.6	21.3	8.8
There is infringement upon freedom of speech in Ukraine	19.7	19.6	43.1	53.0
It is hard to say / Refusal	26.1	29.9	35.6	38.2
BANS ON RUSSIAN TV CHANNELS				
Bans on Russian TV channels in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	46.6	41.8	15.4	10.2
Bans on Russian TV channels in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	33.5	39.7	69.3	69.3
It is hard to say / Refusal	19.9	18.5	15.3	20.5
BANS ON RUSSIAN FILMS AND ARTISTS				
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	41.4	36.0	10.0	7.3
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	39.1	47.4	74.9	72.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	19.5	16.7	15.1	20.0
BANS ON RUSSIAN SOCIAL NETWORKS				
Bans on Russian social networks in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	45.2	35.4	12.8	10.2
Bans on Russian social networks were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	29.8	42.1	69.2	67.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	24.9	22.6	18.0	22.2

As we can see from *Table 3.2.3*, the data practically do not depend on the respondents' age.


Table 3.2.3



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion (in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option "It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")

(% among respondents of a certain age)

100% in the column	% of respondents aged					
	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN UKRAINE						
There are too many pro-Kremlin propaganda media in Ukraine, and there is a weak reaction of the state and the society to this	41.6	39.9	38.3	41.5	34.7	32.5
There is infringement upon freedom of speech in Ukraine	27.5	31.3	30.5	29.8	36.2	24.7
It is hard to say / Refusal	30.9	28.8	31.2	28.7	29.1	42.9
BANS ON RUSSIAN TV CHANNELS						
Bans on Russian TV channels in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	28.5	36.5	29.8	35.7	30.0	31.4
Bans on Russian TV channels in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	49.5	46.7	52.1	51.2	51.8	45.4
It is hard to say / Refusal	22.0	16.8	18.2	13.1	18.2	23.2
BANS ON RUSSIAN FILMS AND ARTISTS						
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	25.6	29.5	26.2	31.2	22.6	25.6
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	53.4	54.8	57.1	52.9	61.2	54.3
It is hard to say / Refusal	21.0	15.6	16.7	15.9	16.2	20.1
BANS ON RUSSIAN SOCIAL NETWORKS						
Bans on Russian social networks in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	23.4	31.4	28.1	34.6	28.0	27.3
Bans on Russian social networks were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	57.3	51.0	51.0	47.6	47.3	36.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	19.3	17.6	21.0	17.8	24.6	36.6



In general, there is a similar attitude towards these issues among users of various sources of information (*Table 3.2.4*). However, there is a tendency that those who receive information from relatives, friends, etc. are more likely to think that there is infringement upon freedom of speech in Ukraine and more likely to consider bans on Russian TV channels, certain Russian films / artists, and social networks to be a mistake.

Table 3.2.4



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion (in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option "It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")

(% of respondents who receive information from the corresponding sources)

100% in the column	Ukrainian television	Ukrainian websites	Social networks	Relatives, friends, etc.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN UKRAINE				
There are too many pro-Kremlin propaganda media in Ukraine, and there is a weak reaction of the state and the society to this	39.6	44.4	41.3	29.3
There is infringement upon freedom of speech in Ukraine	29.2	30.4	29.6	43.8
It is hard to say / Refusal	31.1	25.2	29.1	26.9
BANS ON RUSSIAN TV CHANNELS				
Bans on Russian TV channels in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	34.9	38.0	34.6	23.5
Bans on Russian TV channels in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	48.4	48.3	51.7	61.9
It is hard to say / Refusal	16.7	13.8	13.7	14.6
BANS ON RUSSIAN FILMS AND ARTISTS				
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	28.3	32.0	27.1	19.5
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	55.2	54.3	57.6	67.0
It is hard to say / Refusal	16.4	13.8	15.2	13.5
BANS ON RUSSIAN SOCIAL NETWORKS				
Bans on Russian social networks in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	31.1	33.7	29.4	23.4
Bans on Russian social networks were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	46.6	52.7	56.2	59.4
It is hard to say / Refusal	22.3	13.6	14.4	17.2

The data in *Table 3.2.5* are given among those who watch top Ukrainian TV channels. In general, viewers of different channels have quite similar attitudes. At the same time, those who watch NewsOne and (to a lesser extent) Inter and 112 are more likely to think that there is infringement upon freedom of speech and more likely not to support bans.

Table 3.2.5



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion (in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option "It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")

(% of respondents who mentioned the corresponding channel as one of the top 5 channels they watch most often)

100% in the column	1+1	Ukraine	Inter	ICTV	STB	112 Ukraine	Novyi Kanal	NewsOne	Channel 5
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN UKRAINE									
There are too many pro-Kremlin propaganda media in Ukraine, and there is a weak reaction of the state and the society to this	43.0	36.2	31.8	41.9	38.1	35.8	46.4	26.4	59.5
There is infringement upon freedom of speech in Ukraine	27.5	28.3	32.9	29.9	30.4	43.5	23.5	55.4	24.9
It is hard to say / Refusal	29.5	35.5	35.3	28.2	31.5	20.7	30.2	18.3	15.6
BANS ON RUSSIAN TV CHANNELS									
Bans on Russian TV channels in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	36.0	30.5	24.2	36.9	32.5	30.8	35.6	19.4	58.8
Bans on Russian TV channels in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	47.4	52.9	60.6	50.5	51.9	57.9	46.2	69.1	32.9
It is hard to say / Refusal	16.6	16.6	15.2	12.6	15.7	11.3	18.2	11.5	8.2
BANS ON RUSSIAN FILMS AND ARTISTS									
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	28.7	24.0	20.6	29.5	23.5	28.9	30.5	15.5	50.4
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	55.5	61.0	65.9	56.9	60.6	60.0	50.3	75.5	39.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	15.8	15.0	13.4	13.6	15.9	11.0	19.2	9.0	10.4
BANS ON RUSSIAN SOCIAL NETWORKS									
Bans on Russian social networks in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	33.2	27.3	22.9	33.1	27.4	30.6	31.1	17.4	56.4
Bans on Russian social networks were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	46.6	49.6	55.4	49.7	52.9	52.9	48.1	67.5	29.5
It is hard to say / Refusal	20.2	23.1	21.7	17.2	19.7	16.5	20.8	15.1	14.2



The data in *Table 3.2.6* are given in the context of those who watch a certain talk show. Those who watch "Pulse" and "Ukrainian Format" mentioned infringement upon freedom of speech in Ukraine more often and are more likely to think that the bans were a mistake.

Table 3.2.6



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion (in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option "It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")
(% among respondents who watch a certain talk show)

100% in the column	Freedom of Speech	Right to Power	Pulse	Ukrainian Format	People Are Against	Echo of Ukraine
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN UKRAINE						
There are too many pro-Kremlin propaganda media in Ukraine, and there is a weak reaction of the state and the society to this	47.1	49.0	30.4	33.3	46.4	44.4
There is infringement upon freedom of speech in Ukraine	31.3	22.1	44.7	41.0	32.8	30.9
It is hard to say / Refusal	21.6	28.9	24.9	25.7	20.8	24.7
BANS ON RUSSIAN TV CHANNELS						
Bans on Russian TV channels in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	43.6	47.9	27.2	32.5	46.2	44.1
Bans on Russian TV channels in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	44.0	40.2	61.5	55.0	47.6	44.9
It is hard to say / Refusal	12.4	11.9	11.3	12.4	6.2	11.0
BANS ON RUSSIAN FILMS AND ARTISTS						
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	35.5	37.6	22.2	26.1	35.8	33.8
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	52.1	51.0	62.8	63.5	51.4	51.8
It is hard to say / Refusal	12.4	11.4	15.0	10.4	12.8	14.4
BANS ON RUSSIAN SOCIAL NETWORKS						
Bans on Russian social networks in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	40.1	44.2	28.9	29.1	40.1	44.2
Bans on Russian social networks were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	40.6	37.2	51.8	53.1	42.3	36.0
It is hard to say / Refusal	19.2	18.6	19.3	17.7	17.6	19.8

The data in *Table 3.2.7* are given in the context of those who read certain websites.

Table 3.2.7



Please select one of the two opposite interpretations of the events or actions of the state, which reflects your personal opinion (in each pair of statements, choose one of the statements or the option "It is hard to say / I do not know" or "Refusal to answer")

(% of respondents who mentioned the corresponding website as one of the top 5 websites they read most often)

100% in the column	Obozrevatel.com	Korrespondent.net	Segodnya.ua	Unian.net	Pravda.com.ua	Politeka.net	Gordonua.com	Strana.ua
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN UKRAINE								
There are too many pro-Kremlin propaganda media in Ukraine, and there is a weak reaction of the state and the society to this	47.8	44.2	38.6	59.2	56.8	38.6	61.9	36.8
There is infringement upon freedom of speech in Ukraine	27.7	33.5	34.8	22.7	27.8	35.6	29.7	44.8
It is hard to say / Refusal	24.5	22.3	26.7	18.1	15.4	25.8	8.4	18.4
BANS ON RUSSIAN TV CHANNELS								
Bans on Russian TV channels in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	42.6	40.3	28.4	55.3	61.5	35.8	42.6	24.7
Bans on Russian TV channels in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	47.7	48.7	58.7	37.6	31.2	55.8	49.7	68.3
It is hard to say / Refusal	9.7	11.0	12.9	7.2	7.3	8.4	7.7	7.0
BANS ON RUSSIAN FILMS AND ARTISTS								
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	30.1	30.1	17.5	51.4	46.1	30.3	33.3	29.6
Bans on certain Russian films and artists in Ukraine were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	54.9	60.6	70.4	40.1	44.9	64.7	53.6	66.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	15.1	9.3	12.0	8.5	9.0	5.0	13.1	3.8
BANS ON RUSSIAN SOCIAL NETWORKS								
Bans on Russian social networks in Ukraine were a necessary step to protect the state	37.2	35.1	26.9	51.4	48.0	34.3	31.0	21.6
Bans on Russian social networks were a mistake and only led to the restriction on the rights of citizens	48.3	55.8	60.8	41.7	42.2	57.0	54.5	70.4
It is hard to say / Refusal	14.6	9.2	12.3	6.9	9.8	8.8	14.5	8.0



SECTION IV

UKRAINIAN TV SERIES AND FILMS

4.1

The practice of watching TV series

Two thirds of Ukrainians watch television series, of which **49% most often watch them on Ukrainian television** (in February 2018, 52.5% mentioned Ukrainian television) (*Chart 4.1.1*). Another 11% watch Western TV series online (versus 10% last year). At the same time, the share of those who watch Russian TV series online increased from 4% to 7%, whereas the share of those who watch them on Russian television increased from 3% to 4.5%.

In all regions, the majority of the population watch TV series, and most of them watch them on Ukrainian television (*Table 4.1.1*).

Chart 4.1.1



Where do you watch TV series most often? Up to 3 answers.

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)




Table 4.1.1



Where do you watch TV series most often?

(% among all respondents)



100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than 3 answers	% of respondents from the macro-region...			
	West (n=571)	Center (n=712)	South (n=489)	East (n=270)
Ukrainian television	54.6	50.0	39.6	51.0
Online (western TV series)	11.1	12.4	9.0	13.7
Online (Russian TV series)	3.3	7.7	9.3	8.5
Russian television	2.3	5.2	5.8	4.3
I do not watch TV series	28.0	31.9	44.4	33.6
It is hard to say / Refusal	7.8	5.0	3.9	2.5



4.2

TV series produced in Ukraine

The majority of the residents of Ukraine (56%) agree that over the past 3 years Ukrainian TV channels started broadcasting more TV series produced in Ukraine (Chart 4.2.1).

For nearly half of respondents, it is difficult to evaluate modern Ukrainian TV series. At the same time, those who can evaluate them based on various criteria, most often praise such characteristics as an interesting plot (46% be-


Chart 4.2.1



Do you agree that over the past three years Ukrainian TV channels started broadcasting more TV series produced in Ukraine?

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)

● Yes ● No ● It's hard to say / Refusal



lieve that modern Ukrainian TV series tell interesting stories, versus 9% of those who do not think so), the acting of Ukrainian actors (43% versus 9%), the European level of shooting (38.5% versus 12%) (Chart 4.2.2).

Less confidently, but more people still do not agree with such negative characteristics as the fact that there are a few interesting well-known actors (29% disagree with this, and 21% agree with this) in the Ukrainian TV series, that they are less interesting than European and American TV series (28% vs. 19%), that there are a few Russian actors in them – and this is bad (26% vs. 18%), that they are less interesting than Russian TV series (32% vs. 17%).


Chart 4.2.2



What do you think about modern TV series produced in Ukraine?

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)

● Yes ● No ● It's hard to say / Refusal



In Table 4.2.1, the data is given based on the evaluation of TV series by those who watch top Ukrainian TV channels.

Table 4.2.1



What do you think about modern TV series produced in Ukraine?

(% of respondents who mentioned the corresponding channel as one of the top 5 channels they watch most often)

100% in the column	1+1	Ukraine	Inter	ICTV	STB	112 Ukraine	Novyi Kanal	NewsOne	Channel 5
THEY TELL INTERESTING STORIES									
Agree	55.3	58.2	52.4	52.3	54.8	45.9	52.3	35.6	57.4
Disagree	8.3	8.3	9.2	11.9	10.1	7.1	9.9	11.5	10.9
It is hard to say / Refusal	36.3	33.5	38.5	35.8	35.1	46.9	37.9	52.9	31.7
THEY ARE FILMED QUALITATIVELY, ON A EUROPEAN LEVEL									
Agree	48.4	51.2	44.0	46.5	48.5	35.3	43.8	25.0	50.5
Disagree	12.4	10.9	12.9	13.1	12.1	15.3	14.4	14.6	8.4
It is hard to say / Refusal	39.3	37.9	43.1	40.4	39.4	49.4	41.8	60.4	41.2
THEY ARE LESS INTERESTING THAN RUSSIAN TV SERIES									
Agree	19.6	20.3	21.0	19.1	20.5	15.3	14.3	19.2	16.1
Disagree	36.9	37.9	33.6	36.9	37.3	30.6	41.4	15.5	42.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	43.4	41.8	45.5	43.9	42.2	54.2	44.3	65.3	41.8
THEY ARE LESS INTERESTING THAN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN TV SERIES									
Agree	21.9	19.2	20.2	19.1	22.4	19.2	26.3	27.2	19.4
Disagree	33.5	34.2	31.7	34.8	34.7	27.2	32.9	20.3	34.7
It is hard to say / Refusal	44.5	46.7	48.1	46.1	42.8	53.6	40.8	52.6	45.9
THERE ARE A FEW INTERESTING WELL-KNOWN ACTORS									
Agree	23.9	22.0	25.8	23.2	24.2	20.1	20.8	26.7	21.8
Disagree	34.9	35.6	30.3	34.5	34.2	32.6	34.6	19.4	37.5
It is hard to say / Refusal	41.3	42.4	43.9	42.2	41.6	47.3	44.6	53.9	40.7
I LIKE THE FACT THAT THEY PRIMARILY FEATURE UKRAINIAN ACTORS									
Agree	52.2	52.1	47.8	48.1	51.7	42.5	52.8	31.8	63.6
Disagree	9.5	8.8	9.4	11.7	10.1	11.0	10.1	12.1	2.2
It is hard to say / Refusal	38.4	39.1	42.8	40.3	38.3	46.5	37.1	56.1	34.3
I DO NOT LIKE THE FACT THAT THERE ARE A FEW WELL-KNOWN RUSSIAN ACTORS									
Agree	22.1	22.4	24.1	21.0	22.6	19.2	18.0	31.1	20.1
Disagree	30.1	30.4	25.9	31.3	29.6	27.1	32.4	19.7	34.1
It is hard to say / Refusal	47.7	47.2	50.0	47.6	47.8	53.6	49.6	49.2	45.8



4.3

Full-length films produced in Ukraine


One third of respondents (35%) said that over the last year they have watched at least one full-length feature film (or cartoon) produced in Ukraine (Chart 4.3.1). Among those who have watched such a film, the overwhelming majority (68%) watched it on TV.

Chart 4.3.1




Did you watch at least one full-length feature film (or cartoon) produced in Ukraine, over the last year?

(% among all respondents, n=2,042)



Where did you watch it? Up to 3 answers.

(% among all respondents who watched such films, n=711)







In the *Table 4.3.1* the data about films produced in Ukraine are given in a regional context and among certain age groups.

Table 4.3.1



Did you watch at least one full-length feature film (or cartoon) produced in Ukraine, over the last year?

(% among respondents of the corresponding group)

100% in a line	Yes	No	It is hard to say / Refusal
REGION			
 - West (n=571)	39.7	39.9	20.4
 - Center (n=712)	39.0	40.0	21.0
 - South (n=489)	30.5	49.1	20.4
 - East (n=270)	24.5	42.3	33.2
AGE GROUPS			
- 18-29 years old (n=352)	43.4	35.5	21.1
- 30-39 years old (n=376)	37.7	43.7	18.6
- 40-49 years old (n=318)	36.5	43.3	20.1
- 50-59 years old (n=387)	31.9	45.7	22.4
- 60-69 years old (n=308)	32.7	41.2	26.1
- 70+ (n=301)	24.6	46.7	28.7

NOTES

SWITZ



March 2019

ANALYTICAL REPORT