

EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE POLICY IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION SECURITY ON THE THRESHOLD OF ELECTIONS:

RESULTS OF THE ALL-UKRAINIAN OPINION POLL CONDUCTED
BY THE KYIV INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY (KIIS)
AT THE REQUEST OF DETECTOR MEDIA NGO

MAIN RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF DENMARK
Danida

METHODOLOGY OF THE POLL

The all-Ukrainian opinion poll was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) at the request of Detector Media NGO in September 2018. In the course of the study, adult residents of Ukraine (aged 18 or older) were asked to give their opinion on the effectiveness of state policy in the field of information security on the threshold of 2019 election campaigns. The main stages of the study included drawing up a questionnaire and accompanying tools, preparing a sample, conducting interviews with respondents, monitoring the quality of work performed, entering data and checking it for logical errors, preparing a final data set, univariate and bivariate distributions tables, and an analytical report.

A stratified four-phase sampling which is random in each phase was developed for the poll. The sampling represents adult population which is permanently residing in Ukraine, does not do military service, and is not in prisons or medical institutions (hospitals, nursing homes). The sampling did not include territories that are temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities, that is, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

First, the population of Ukraine was stratified according to the regions (24 regions and Kyiv), and then the population of each region was additionally stratified into urban (cities and urban type settlements) and rural population (except for Kyiv, where the entire population is urban). That is, the population of Ukraine was divided into 49 strata. In proportion to the size of adult population, it was determined how many interviews must be conducted in each stratum, as well as the number of settlements in every stratum in which polls must be conducted. In case of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, only the population of territories controlled by the Ukrainian authorities was used for stratification.

After stratification, specific points where interviewers were supposed to work were selected. At the first stage, settlements were selected within each stratum. Urban settlements were selected with a probability proportional to the size of the adult population in a settlement. Within the strata of the rural population, we first selected districts (with a probability proportional to the size of the adult rural population in a district), and then villages were selected randomly within a particular district. At the second stage, polling stations were selected within each settlement. At the third stage, the first address - street, house number, and, in the case of multistory buildings, number of apartment where interviewers began the poll - was selected for every polling station. At the fourth stage, respondents were selected and interviewed using the modified route sampling method.

The poll was conducted in the form of personal interviews with the use of tablets, in the houses where respondents live.

As a result of the use of sampling which is random in each phase, women and older people are a little overrepresented in the final data set. In order to restore correct proportions, special statistical "scales" were constructed.

The data are given both for entire Ukraine and for the four macro regions of Ukraine separately. Macro-region composition: *Western* macro-region - Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi regions; *Central* macro-region — Vinnytsya, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kyiv regions, Kyiv; *Southern* macro-region — Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa regions; *Eastern* macro-region — Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv regions.

Information was collected from September 8 to September 23, 2018. A total of 2,026 interviews were conducted with respondents who live in 110 settlements in Ukraine.

For 2,026 respondents, sampling error (with a probability of 0.95 and a design effect of 1.5) does not exceed:

- 3.3% for figures close to 50%,
- 2.8 % for figures close to 25 or 75%;
- 2.0 % for figures close to 12 or 88 %;
- 1.4 % for figures close to 5 or 95 %;
- 0.7% for figures close to 1 or 99.

MAIN RESULTS OF THE POLL

THE BIGGEST THREATS FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE. SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORITIES

- The overwhelming **majority of Ukrainians see more threats to Ukraine's independence in internal reasons rather than in external ones: 57 % of respondents consider corruption in the authorities to be a top-threat** (chart 1.1.1). Almost half as many respondents (32%) mention the hybrid war on the part of Russia. Populism among politicians (24%), the influence of oligarchs (23%), the absence of new faces (22.5%), and emigration (19%) are also among the top threats. In all regions, at least 53% spoke about corruption, whereas Russia's actions were mentioned by not more than a third of respondents (24-36.5% in the West and in the Center, 25-27% in the South and East)

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY AND BRINGING PEACE IN THE DONBASS

- The overwhelming majority of citizens (63.5-74%) are quite right to qualify foreign policy and security as the scope of President's responsibility. At the same time, **a quarter to a half of citizens consider the President to be responsible for the areas where his constitutional powers are more limited. In particular, 47% consider the President to be responsible for corruption, which is the key issue for Ukraine.** Every third respondent (31%) also considers the head of state to be responsible for the economic reforms.
- Except for the President, people most often hold the government/prime minister responsible. They were particularly often held responsible for economic reforms (52%), increase in tariffs (56%, with 24.5% holding the President responsible), and decentralization (37%, with 27% of those who mentioned the President). In general, majority of respondents held the President / government / prime minister responsible for virtually all areas, except for security (where 45% mentioned law enforcement agencies).
- If we speak separately about the war on the Donbas, **most Ukrainians** (almost a half, **46%**) believe that bringing peace **depends personally on Petro Poroshenko**. A smaller number of people (**43 %**) mentioned **Vladimir Putin**. Another 30% were talking about Ukrainian authorities in general, and 16.5% mentioned Russian authorities in general. **A total of 74% of Ukrainians at least partly believe that peace depends on Ukraine, 59% believe this depends on Russia, and 8% think it depends on the West.** Even in the West and in the Center, approximately the same number of people hold Petro Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin responsible, while Ukrainian authorities are mentioned more often than the Russian authorities.
- Only 13% of Ukrainians believe that Russia is interested in bringing peace in the Donbas. 56% disagree with this, and another 30% still have not decided. **In the meantime, only 14% of Ukrainians believe that the Ukrainian authorities should make concessions to Vladimir Putin in order to restore peace (53-**

56% do not agree with this). Only 14-18% of Ukrainian citizens agree that territories and part of independence must be sacrificed to bring peace (56% do not think like this). Another 26.5-33% hesitated to answer. At the same time, it is unexpected that the number of those who are willing to sacrifice territories / independence to bring peace decreases from 23% to 10% from West to East.

- In general, in terms of information on the situation in the Donbas, **the biggest number of Ukrainians primarily trust volunteers (27%), representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (23%), and residents of the front-line territories (19%), followed by the Ukrainian state-owned media (13.7%), Ukrainian bloggers (11.4%), and Ukrainian private media (10.4%).**

TOMOS

- **Only 28.5% of Ukrainians say they know what tomos is.** Among those who know this, most people (42%) learned it from the media.
- In the West of Ukraine 43% know what tomos is, whereas in the Center this figure is 30%, and in the South and East, it is only 16-18%.

TV CHANNELS AND POPULAR PERSONS

- Only 50% of respondents can name a television channel that, in their opinion, promotes interpretations shared by the participant of the poll. On the contrary, even less people (32%) can say which channel promotes opposing interpretations. **Speaking of favorite channels, "1+1" (20%), Inter (16%), and "Ukraine" (16%) were mentioned most often.** ICTV (11%), 112 (10%), STB (8%) were mentioned somewhat less often. The others were called even less often, for example, 5% mentioned NewsOne.
- All respondents were asked a direct question about TV channels which, in their opinion, promote certain statements / interpretations (regardless of whether they watch these TV channels or not). **Taking into account all statements, not more than a third of respondents relate them to a particular TV channel. This is indicative of a low level of crystallization of the image of certain TV channels at the level of the entire society.** On the whole, only in the case of "1+1" there is a rather noticeable tendency that this channel is more often associated with the promotion of **pro-Ukrainian** interpretations of topical events.
- **If we talk about a conflict with Russia, people who are more likely to share pro-state interpretations of events are mostly those who watch: "1+1" (31 % vs. 7 % among those who rather share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations), ICTV (16 % vs. 5.5 %), STB (12 % vs. 4 %).** As for **people who are more likely to share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations**, these are mostly those who watch: **"Inter" (21 % vs. 15 % of those who rather share pro-state interpretations), 112 (16 % vs. 10 %), NewsOne (12 % vs. 2.5 %), Russian channels (5 % vs. 0.2 %).**
- **Only 49% of respondents can name at least one politician or popular person who promotes interpretations of events a respondent agrees with.**

At the same time, as for the general population, the maximum figure does not exceed 11%. On the whole, judging by this figure, Yulia Tymoshenko (11%), Anatoliy Hrytsenko (11%), Oleh Lyashko (9%), Svyatoslav Vakarchuk (8%), Vadym Rabinovych (7%), Petro Poroshenko (6%), Yuriy Boyko (5%), Andriy Sadovyi (5%), Volodymyr Hroysman (5%), and Yevhen Murayev (4.5%) are the top activists at the level of Ukraine.

SOCIAL NETWORKS

- **18 % of Ukrainians now use at least one Russian social network.** At the same time, when asked about a network they use most often, 7% of all respondents mentioned one of the Russian networks. People in the West use Russian social networks the least often (13%). In other regions this figure is 18-23% of the population.

THE RETURN OF VIKTOR MEDVEDCHUK TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS, IN PARTICULAR, IN THE MEDIA CONTEXT

- About half of respondents (52%) could not answer the question of who promotes the return of Viktor Medvedchuk to public affairs most actively. The biggest number of people believe that it is "the Kremlin" (21%), Ukrainian oligarchs (15%), and Viktor Yanukovych's "family" (12%). Fewer people mentioned Petro Poroshenko (5.5%) and Yulia Tymoshenko (3%).
- Viktor Medvedchuk is primarily perceived as a man whose daughter's godfather is Vladimir Putin - this is the opinion of 35% of Ukrainians. There are 39.5-41% of such people in the West and in the Center, whereas in the South and East, this figure is 23-27.5%. Another 13% perceive Viktor Medvedchuk as a representative of the Minsk Tripartite Contact Group (TCG), and 10% perceive him as the former head of the Leonid Kuchma presidential administration (in the case of these characteristics, regional differences are more even). At the same time, it is should be noted that perception of Viktor Medvedchuk as the one who effectively manages to get captive Ukrainians out of prisons increases from 1% to 9% from West to East.
- Viktor Medvedchuk is perceived more positively by the respondents who "like" the NewsOne channel (and to a lesser extent this concerns the "112" channel). First of all, 49% of the respondents who do not think that any of these channels promotes their opinion were unable to answer the question about Viktor Medvedchuk. As for those who watch NewsOne / "112", only a quarter could not answer this question. Secondly, there are more people who perceive Viktor Medvedchuk in a more neutral and positive way among those who watch NewsOne / "112".

INTERPRETATIONS OF TOPICAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EVENTS

- In the course of the poll, respondents were asked to consider 15 different topical social and political events and to choose one of the two interpretations of such an event. Interpretations were selected in such a way that one of them reflected a pro-state position, whereas the second one reflected messages promoted by the opposition within the country and / or Russian propaganda. The spectrum of interpretations is obviously much wider in itself, and the obtained results can not be interpreted as unambiguous consistent defending of a particular position. The respondents were *more likely* to choose the narrative which they shared more, all the more so, because the suggested interpretations already set the limits of understanding for the respondent (greatly simplifying the events under consideration). At the same time, the results are valuable because they help understand which interpretations ordinary citizens of the country *tend* to choose.
- **First of all, there is a low level of crystallization of the population's attitude with regard to the majority of issues under consideration.** That is, there is a significant number of those who have not formed their opinion. The views and opinions of the population on the fight against corruption, the economic situation, and cooperation with the IMF are the most crystallized of all (at least 77% have a definite opinion on these issues). As for the majority of the remaining issues, there is rather an average level of crystallization, with 50-66% of people who formed their opinion. On average, every respondent said that he / she had not formed an opinion on 5.5 out of 15 questions. 65% of the respondents answered that they did not decide which interpretation they shared more to at least 4 out of the 15 questions.
- At the same time, secondly, **there is no consensus in the society on the absolute majority of the events under consideration. Only in the case of the economic situation, the fight against corruption, and cooperation with the IMF, there is likely to be a consensus, and, more specifically, in a negative form**, where the overwhelming majority of the population consider the economy to be in decline (60%), do not consider cooperation with the IMF to be expedient (65%), and believe that the authorities are not interested in combating corruption (73.5%). An absolute minority of the population share the opposite interpretations.
- On the other hand, **there is a tendency towards a consensus on the fact that Oleg Sentsov is a political prisoner (55 % vs. 4 % who have another opinion), that it is Russia that does not comply with Minsk agreements (52 % vs. 10 %), and that Ukraine was right to start legal proceedings against Gazprom (49 % vs. 18 %).** At the same time, we should take into account the significant proportion of those who have not formed an opinion on these issues.
- As for the rest of the questions, 12-39% of respondents chose a particular interpretation. That is, on the one hand, there is a significant number of those who do not have a definite opinion. On the other hand, at best, there is only a relative difference between the two interpretations.
- Thirdly, the difference in interpretations in different regions is the most prominent with regard to the Minsk agreement performance, the Gazprom trial, crimes committed by far-right organizations, Oleg Sentsov case, tomos, the alleged promotion of the exacerbation of the situation in the Donbas by the President, the

President's initiative to join the EU / NATO. That is, **the top issues of the "regional split" were primarily related to the interpretations of the conflict with Russia**, and to a lesser extent, these were other issues. **The respondents were most unanimous with regard to economic issues, corruption, and cooperation with the IMF.**

PRO-STATE VS. PRO-OPPOSITION / PRO-RUSSIAN INTERPRETATIONS: INDEX

- Respondents' answers to 15 topical questions can be used to form a general index of *pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian vs. pro-state* interpretations.
as well as separate indices that are only related to the interpretation of events in the context of the conflict with Russia / interpretations of events in the context of the economy, corruption, and domestic politics.
The indices vary from 0 to 100, where 100 is the most pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation.
- In general, the average **index is 49.8, which means that there is an almost uniform mixture of pro-state and pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations among the population.** At the same time, 40.5% of respondents received a score of 41-60, which corresponds to a partly pro-state, partly pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation of events. Only 5% and 7% of respondents received extreme scores, which are indicative of consistent pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian opinion (81-100) or consistent pro-state opinion (0-20) respectively.
- **In the case of a conflict with Russia, the average index is 40.4, that is, there is a tendency, albeit a slight one, towards pro-state interpretations.** At the same time, 51% of respondents received a score which is rather indicative of supporting pro-state statements, whereas the score of 16% of respondents was indicative of supporting opposition and / or Russian propaganda statements.
- **The picture is different in the issues of economy, corruption, and domestic policy - the average score is 63.4, that is, there is a tendency towards pro-opposition.** At the same time, 52% of respondents have a pro-opposition score, and 14% have a pro-state score (in this case, it can also be interpreted as pro-governmental).
- **There is a rather pronounced tendency towards the increase of pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian sentiment from West to East. On the whole, the index increases from 44.7% to 56.1%. In the case of the conflict with Russia, it increases from 34% to 48.1%, whereas in other cases, the increase is from 60.5% to 67.7%.**
- As for the Russia's index in the West, the proportion of residents with pro-Russian sentiment is 9%. In the Center, this figure reaches 15%, in the South it is up to 20%, and in the East it reaches 28%. Accordingly, **in the West 68% share pro-state interpretations of events related to the conflict with Russia, whereas in the Center, 54% share such interpretations of events, and in the South and East, this figure is 36-38%.**

- In general, in five statements out of 15, an "average" respondent has a pro-state position, in five statements they have a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian position, and in another five cases they have not formed an opinion yet. On average, in the West and in the Center, there are more people who share pro-state interpretations, whereas in the South and in the Center more people share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian ones.

POLITICIANS AND POPULAR PERSONS, INTERPRETATION OF TOPICAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EVENTS

- The connection between certain interpretations and trust to individual politicians / popular persons was studied similarly to the TV channels. Among those who are more likely to share pro-state interpretations of the conflict with Russia, there are more people who believe that the statements shared by the respondent themselves are promoted by such politicians and popular persons as Anatoliy Hrytsenko (16% vs. 6% among those who are more likely to be pro-Russian orientated), Petro Poroshenko (10% vs. 1%), Svyatoslav Vakarchuk (11.5% vs. 4%), Andriy Sadovyi (8% vs. 2%), Oleh Tyahnybok (5% vs. 1%). On the contrary, among those who are more likely to share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations, there are slightly more people who mentioned Yuriy Boyko (15% vs. 2%), Vadim Rabinovych (17% vs. 3%), Yevheniy Murayev (13% vs. 2%), Oleksandr Vilkul (6.5% vs. 1%), Anatoliy Shariy (5.9% vs. 0.2%) and Mykhailo Dobkin (5% vs. 0.2%).
- As for the index with regard to other issues (economy, corruption, domestic politics), those who share pro-state interpretations were more likely to mention Anatoliy Hrytsenko (15% vs. 9.5%), Petro Poroshenko (26% vs. 1%), Svyatoslav Vakarchuk (13% vs. 7%), Volodymyr Hroisman (14% vs. 2%), Mustafa Nayem (8% vs. 2%), and Arsen Avakov (5% vs. 0.5%).
- Among those who are more likely to share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations, there are slightly more people who mentioned Vadym Rabinovych (9.5% vs. 3%).

The full text of the presented analytical research "Effectiveness of the state policy in the field of information security on the threshold of elections", you could see on the "[Detector Media](#)" in the section "[Research DM](#)"