

EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE POLICY IN THE FIELD OF
INFORMATION
RESULTS OF THE ALL-UKRAINIAN OPINION POLL
CONDUCTED BY THE KYIV INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY (KIIS) AT THE REQUEST
OF DETECTOR MEDIA NGO

ANALYTICAL REPORT



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF DENMARK
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
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METHODOLOGY OF THE POLL



The all-Ukrainian opinion poll was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) at the request of Detector Media NGO in September 2018. In the course of the study, adult residents of Ukraine (aged 18 or older) were asked to give their opinion on the effectiveness of state policy in the field of information security on the threshold of 2019 election campaigns. The main stages of the study included drawing up a questionnaire and accompanying tools, preparing a sample, conducting interviews with respondents, monitoring the quality of work performed, entering data and checking it for logical errors, preparing a final data set, univariate and bivariate distributions tables, and an analytical report.

A stratified four-phase sampling which is random in each phase was developed for the poll. The sampling represents adult population which permanently resides in Ukraine, does not do military service, and is not in prisons or medical institutions (hospitals, nursing homes). The sampling did not include territories that are temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities, that is, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

First, the population of Ukraine was stratified according to the regions (24 regions and Kyiv), and then the population of each region was additionally stratified into urban (cities and urban type settlements) and rural population (except for Kyiv, where the entire population is urban). That is, the population of Ukraine was divided into 49 strata. In proportion to the size of adult population, it was determined how many interviews must be conducted in each stratum, as well as the number of settlements in every stratum in which polls must be conducted. In case of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, only the population of territories controlled by the Ukrainian authorities was used for stratification.

After stratification, specific points where interviewers were supposed to work were selected. At the first stage, settlements were selected within each stratum. Urban settlements were selected with a probability proportional to the size of the adult population in a settlement. Within the strata of the rural population, we first selected districts (with a probability proportional to the size of the adult rural population in a district), and then

villages were selected randomly within a particular district. At the second stage, polling stations were selected within each settlement. At the third stage, the first address – street, house number, and, in the case of multistory buildings, number of the apartment where interviewers began the poll – was selected for every polling station. At the fourth stage, respondents were selected and interviewed using the modified route sampling method.

The poll was conducted in the form of personal interviews with the use of tablets, in the houses where respondents live.

As a result of the use of sampling which is random in each phase, women and older people are a little overrepresented in the final data set. In order to restore correct proportions, special statistical "scales" were constructed.

The data are given both for entire Ukraine and for the four macro regions of Ukraine separately. Macro-region composition: *Western* macro-region - Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi, Chernivtsi regions; *Central* macro-region — Vinnytsya, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kyiv regions, Kyiv; *Southern* macro-region — Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa regions; *Eastern* macro-region — Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv regions.

Information was collected in the period from September 8 to September 23, 2018. A total of 2,026 interviews were conducted with respondents who live in 110 settlements in Ukraine.

For 2,026 respondents, sampling error (with a probability of 0.95 and a design effect of 1.5) does not exceed:

- 3.3% for figures close to 50%,
- 2.8 % for figures close to 25 or 75%;
- 2.0 % for figures close to 12 or 88 %;
- 1.4 % for figures close to 5 or 95 %;
- 0.7% for figures close to 1 or 99%.



INTERPRETATIONS OF TOPICAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EVENTS

- In the course of the poll, respondents were asked to consider 15 different topical social and political events and to choose one of the two interpretations of such an event. Interpretations were selected in such a way that one of them reflected a pro-state position, whereas the second one reflected messages promoted by the opposition within the country and / or Russian propaganda. The spectrum of interpretations is obviously much wider in itself, and the obtained results can not be interpreted as unambiguous and consistent defending of a particular position. The respondents were *more likely* to chose the narrative which they shared more, all the more so, because the suggested interpretations already set the limits of understanding for the respondent (greatly simplifying the events under consideration). At the same time, the results are valuable because they help understand which interpretations ordinary citizens of the country *tend* to choose.
- **First of all, there is a low level of crystallization of the population's attitude with regard to the majority of issues under consideration.** That is, there is a significant number of those who have not formed their opinion. The views and opinions of the population on the fight against corruption, economic situation, and cooperation with the IMF are the most crystallized of all (at least 77% have a definite opinion on these issues). As for the majority of the remaining issues, there is rather an average level of crystallization, with 50-66% of people who formed their opinion. On average, every respondent said that he / she had not formed an opinion on 5.5 out of 15 questions. 65% of the respondents answered that they did not decide which interpretation they shared more to at least 4 out of the 15 questions.
- At the same time, secondly, **there is no consensus in the society on the absolute majority of the events under consideration. Only in the case of the economic situation, the fight against corruption, and cooperation with the IMF, there is likely to be a consensus, and, more specifically, in a negative form**, where the overwhelming majority of the population consider the economy to be in decline (60%), do not consider cooperation with the IMF to be expedient (65%), and believe that the authorities are not interested in combating corruption (73.5%). An absolute minority of the population share the opposite interpretations.

- On the other hand, **there is a tendency towards a consensus on the fact that Oleh Sentsov is a political prisoner** (55 % vs. 4 % who have another opinion), **that it is Russia that does not comply with Minsk agreements** (52 % vs. 10 %), and **that Ukraine was right to start legal proceedings against Gazprom** (49 % vs. 18 %). At the same time, we should take into account the significant proportion of those who have not formed an opinion on these issues.
- As for the rest of the questions, 12-39% of respondents chose a particular interpretation. That is, on the one hand, there is a significant number of those who do not have a definite opinion. On the other hand, at best, there is only a relative difference between the two interpretations.
- Thirdly, the difference in interpretations in different regions is the most prominent with regard to the Minsk agreements performance, the Gazprom trial, crimes committed by far-right organizations, Oleh Sentsov case, tomos, the alleged promotion of the exacerbation of the situation in the Donbas by the President, the President's initiative to join the EU / NATO. That is, **the top issues of the "regional split" were primarily related to the interpretations of the conflict with Russia**, and to a lesser extent, these were other issues. **The respondents were most unanimous with regard to economic issues, corruption, and cooperation with the IMF.**

PRO-STATE VS. PRO-OPPOSITION / PRO-RUSSIAN INTERPRETATIONS: INDEX

- Respondents' answers to 15 topical questions can be used to form a general index of *pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian vs. pro-state* interpretations, as well as separate indices that are only related to the interpretation of events in the context of the conflict with Russia / interpretations of events in the context of the economy, corruption, and domestic politics.
The indices vary from 0 to 100, where 100 is the most pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation.
- In general, the average **index is 49.8, which means that there is an almost uniform mixture of pro-state and pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations among the population**. At the same time, 40.5% of respondents received a score of 41-60, which corresponds to a partly pro-state, partly pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation of events. Only 5% and 7% of respondents received extreme scores, which are indicative of a consistent pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian opinion (81-100) or a consistent pro-state opinion (0-20) respectively.
- **In the case of a conflict with Russia, the average index is 40.4, that is, there is a tendency, albeit a slight one, towards pro-state interpretations**. At the same time, 51% of respondents received a score which is rather indicative of supporting pro-state statements, whereas the score of 16% of the respondents was indicative of supporting opposition and / or Russian propaganda statements.
- **The picture is different in the issues of economy, corruption, and domestic policy – the average score is 63.4, that is, there is a tendency towards pro-opposition**. At the same time, 52% of respondents have a pro-opposition score,

and 14% have a pro-state score (in this case, it can also be interpreted as a pro-governmental score).

- There is a rather pronounced tendency towards the increase of pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian sentiment from the West to the East. On the whole, the index increases from 44.7% to 56.1%. In the case of the conflict with Russia, it increases from 34% to 48.1%, whereas in other cases, the increase is from 60.5% to 67.7%.
- As for the Russia's index in the West, the proportion of residents with pro-Russian sentiment is 9%. In the Center, this figure reaches 15%, in the South it is up to 20%, and in the East it reaches 28%. Accordingly, in the West, 68% share pro-state interpretations of events related to the conflict with Russia, whereas in the Center, 54% share such events, and in the South and East, this figure is 36-38%.
- In general, in five statements out of 15, an "average" respondent has a pro-state position, in five statements they have a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian position, and in another five cases they have not formed an opinion yet. On average, in the West and in the Center, there are more people who share pro-state interpretations, whereas in the South and in the Center more people share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian ones.

TV CHANNELS AND INTERPRETATION OF TOPICAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EVENTS

- Only 50% of respondents can name a television channel which, in their opinion, promotes interpretations shared by the participants of the poll. On the contrary, even less people (32%) can say which channel promotes opposing interpretations. **Speaking of favorite channels, "1+1" (20%), Inter (16%), and "Ukraine" (16%) were mentioned most often.** ICTV (11%), 112 (10%), and STB (8%) were mentioned somewhat less often. The others were mentioned even less often, for example, 5% mentioned NewsOne.
- All the respondents were asked a direct question about TV channels which, in their opinion, promote certain statements / interpretations (regardless of whether they watch these TV channels or not). **Taking into account all statements, not more than a third of respondents relate them to a particular TV channel. This is indicative of a low level of crystallization of the image of certain TV channels at the level of the entire society.** On the whole, only in the case of "1+1" there is a rather noticeable tendency that this channel is more often associated with the promotion of **pro-Ukrainian** interpretations of topical events.
- **If we talk about a conflict with Russia, people who are more likely to share pro-state interpretations of events are mostly those who watch: "1+1" (31 % vs. 7 % among those who rather share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations), ICTV (16 % vs. 5.5 %), STB (12 % vs. 4 %).** As for **people who are more likely to share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations**, these are mostly those who watch: **Inter** (21% vs. 15% of those who rather share

pro-state interpretations), **112** (16% vs. 10%), **NewsOne** (12% vs. 2.5%), **Russian channels** (5% vs. 0.2%).

POLITICIANS AND POPULAR PERSONS, INTERPRETATION OF TOPICAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EVENTS

- **Only 49% of respondents can name at least one politician or popular person who promotes interpretations of events a respondent agrees with.** At the same time, as for the general population, the maximum figure does not exceed 11%. On the whole, judging by this figure, Yulia Tymoshenko (11%), Anatoliy Hrytsenko (11%), Oleh Lyashko (9%), Svyatoslav Vakarchuk (8%), Vadym Rabinovych (7%), Petro Poroshenko 6%), Yuriy Boyko (5%), Andriy Sadovyi (5%), Volodymyr Hroisman (5%), and Yevhen Murayev (4.5%) are the top activists at the level of Ukraine.
- The connection between certain interpretations and trust to individual politicians / popular persons was studied similarly to the TV channels. Among those who are more likely to share pro-state interpretations of the conflict with Russia, there are more people who believe that statements shared by the respondents themselves are promoted by such politicians and popular persons as Anatoliy Hrytsenko (16% vs. 6% among those who are more likely to be pro-Russian orientated), Petro Poroshenko (10% vs. 1%), Svyatoslav Vakarchuk (11.5% vs. 4%), Andriy Sadovyi (8% vs. 2%), Oleh Tyahnybok (5% vs. 1%). On the contrary, among those who are more likely to share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations, there are slightly more people who mentioned Yuriy Boyko (15% vs. 2%), Vadym Rabinovych (17% vs. 3%), Yevhen Murayev (13% vs. 2%), Oleksandr Vilkul (6.5% vs. 1%), Anatoliy Shariy (5.9% vs. 0.2%) and Mykhailo Dobkin (5% vs. 0.2%).
- As for the index with regard to other issues (economy, corruption, domestic politics), those who share pro-state interpretations were more likely to mention Anatoliy Hrytsenko (15% vs. 9.5%), Petro Poroshenko (26% vs. 1%), Svyatoslav Vakarchuk (13% vs. 7%), Volodymyr Hroisman (14% vs. 2%), Mustafa Nayem (8% vs. 2%), and Arsen Avakov (5% vs. 0.5%).
- Among those who are more likely to share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations, there are slightly more people who mentioned Vadym Rabinovych (9.5% vs. 3%).

THE BIGGEST THREATS FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE. SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORITIES

- The overwhelming **majority of Ukrainians see more threats to Ukraine's independence in internal reasons rather than in external ones: 57 % of the respondents consider corrupt government officials to be the biggest threat** (chart 1.1.1). Almost half as many respondents (32%) mentioned the hybrid war on the part of Russia. Populism among politicians (24%), the influence of oligarchs (23%), the absence of new people (22.5%), and emigration (19%) are also among the top threats. In all regions, at least 53% spoke about corruption, whereas

Russia's actions were mentioned by not more than a third of the respondents (24-36.5% in the West and in the Center, 25-27% in the South and in the East)

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY AND BRINGING PEACE IN THE DONBAS

- The overwhelming majority of citizens (63.5-74%) are quite right to qualify foreign policy and security as the scope of President's responsibility. At the same time, **a quarter to a half of citizens consider the President to be responsible for the areas where his constitutional powers are more limited. In particular, 47% consider the President to be responsible for corruption, which is the key issue for Ukraine.** Every third respondent (31%) also considers the head of the state to be responsible for economic reforms.
- Except for the President, people most often hold the government/prime minister responsible. They were particularly often held responsible for economic reforms (52%), increase in tariffs (56%, with 24.5% holding the President responsible), and decentralization (37%, with 27% of those who mentioned the President). In general, the majority of respondents held the President / government / prime minister responsible for virtually all areas, except for security (where 45% mentioned law enforcement agencies).
- If we speak separately about the war in the Donbas, **most Ukrainians** (almost a half, **46%**) believe that peace **depends personally on Petro Poroshenko**. A smaller number of people (**43 %**) mentioned **Vladimir Putin**. Another 30% were talking about Ukrainian authorities in general, and 16.5% mentioned Russian authorities in general. **A total of 74% of Ukrainians at least partly believe that peace depends on Ukraine, 59% believe it depends on Russia, and 8% think it depends on the West.** Even in the West and in the Center, approximately the same number of people hold Petro Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin responsible, while Ukrainian authorities were mentioned even more often than the Russian authorities.
- Only 13% of Ukrainians believe that Russia is interested in bringing peace in the Donbas. 56% disagree with this, and another 30% are still undecided. **In the meantime, only 14% of Ukrainians believe that the Ukrainian authorities should make concessions to Vladimir Putin in order to restore peace (53-56% do not agree with this). Only 14-18% of Ukrainian citizens agree that territories and part of independence must be sacrificed in order to bring peace (56% do not think like this).** Another 26.5-33% hesitated to answer. **At the same time, it is unexpected that the number of those who are willing to sacrifice territories / independence for the sake of bringing peace decreases from 23% to 10% from the West to the East.**
- In general, in terms of information on the situation in the Donbas, **the largest number of Ukrainians primarily trust volunteers (27%), representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (23%), and residents of the front-line territories (19%), followed by the Ukrainian state-owned media (13.7%), Ukrainian bloggers (11.4%), and Ukrainian private media (10.4%).**

TOMOS

- **Only 28.5% of Ukrainians say they know what tomos is.** Among those who know this, most people (42%) learned it from the media.
- In the West of Ukraine 43% know what tomos is, whereas in the Center this figure is 30%, and in the South and East, it is only 16-18%.

SOCIAL NETWORKS

- **18 % of Ukrainians are currently using at least one Russian social network.** At the same time, when asked about a network they use most often, 7% of all the respondents mentioned one of the Russian networks. People in the West use Russian social networks the least often (13%). In other regions this figure is 18-23% of the population.

THE RETURN OF VIKTOR MEDVEDCHUK TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS, IN PARTICULAR, IN THE MEDIA CONTEXT

- About half of respondents (52%) could not answer the question of who promotes the return of Viktor Medvedchuk to public affairs most actively. The biggest number of people believe that it is "the Kremlin" (21%), Ukrainian oligarchs (15%), and Viktor Yanukovich's "family" (12%). Fewer people mentioned Petro Poroshenko (5.5%) and Yulia Tymoshenko (3%).
- Viktor Medvedchuk is primarily perceived as a man whose daughter's godfather is Vladimir Putin – this is the opinion of 35% of Ukrainians. There are 39.5-41% of such people in the West and in the Center, whereas in the South and East, this figure is 23-27.5%. Another 13% perceive Viktor Medvedchuk as a representative of the Minsk Tripartite Contact Group (TCG), and 10% perceive him as the former head of the Leonid Kuchma presidential administration (in the case of these characteristics, regional differences are more even). At the same time, it should be noted that perception of Viktor Medvedchuk as the one who effectively manages to get captive Ukrainians out of prisons increases from 1% to 9% from the West to the East.
- Viktor Medvedchuk is perceived more positively by the respondents who "like" NewsOne channel (and to a lesser extent this concerns "112" channel). First of all, 49% of the respondents who think that none of these channels promotes their opinion were unable to answer the question about Viktor Medvedchuk. As for those who watch NewsOne / "112", only a quarter could not answer this question. Secondly, there are more people who perceive Viktor Medvedchuk in a more neutral and positive way among those who watch NewsOne / "112".

SECTION I. INTERPRETATIONS OF TOPICAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EVENTS



1.1 Approaches which were used and section structure

Before proceeding to the analysis, we should outline the structure of the subsequent presentation of material.

In order to study how the population of Ukraine interpret topical social and political events, respondents listened to 15 pairs of interpretations of various events which were related both to foreign and domestic politics in Ukraine. Respondents could choose one of the two interpretations of every event: the one that can be described as a pro-state interpretation, or the one that can be described as a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian one. Distribution of responses for every event can be analyzed both separately and by summarizing respondents' answers to different events and forming more general indices.

Next, first of all, we will consider a question of how crystallized people's thoughts on particular events are. In our case, crystallization shall be understood as the fact that a person has their own position, which is evidenced by the fact that they chose one of the two interpretations (instead of insisting that an interviewer checks the "undecided" option).

Secondly, distributions of responses for every event will be considered among respondents in general and among different groups (with a special emphasis on interregional differences).

Thirdly, respondents' answers to these 15 events will be summarized to form three indices for more convenient and visual generalizations.

Fourthly, we will analyze the connection between the channels / politicians / popular persons which respondents "like" and the interpretations such respondents share.

It should also be emphasized that the spectrum of interpretations of the events under consideration is obviously much wider in itself, and the obtained results can not be interpreted as unambiguous and consistent defending of a particular interpretation. The respondents were *more likely* to chose the narrative which they shared more, all the more so, because the suggested interpretations already set the limits of understanding for the respondents (greatly simplifying the events

under consideration). At the same time, the results are valuable, because they help understand which interpretations ordinary citizens of the country *tend* to choose.

1.2 Crystallization of thoughts and views of the Ukrainian population on topical social and political events

Views and opinions of the population on the **fight against corruption, the economic situation, and cooperation with the IMF are most crystallized of all** (at least 77% have a definite opinion on these issues, table 1.2.1).

At the same time, thoughts on **tomos, the arrest of Nadiya Savchenko, staging of the murder of Arkadiy Babchenko, change of the ATO into the United Forces Operation, and Donald Trump's assistance to Ukraine** are the **least crystallized** (46-49.5% have a definite opinion on these issues).

As for the other questions, we can see an average level of crystallization, where, on the one hand, the majority (50-66%) have a definite opinion, but, on the other hand, a significant proportion of the population (from one third to one half) are undecided.

Out of the 15 questions that were discussed with the respondents, **on average, in 5.5 cases, respondents answered "it is hard to say"**, and 65% of respondents gave an answer "it is hard to say" to at least four questions (at the same time, 29% gave such an answer to at least eight questions).

Table 1.2.1

% of respondents who have a definite opinion on a particular issue (selected one of the proposed interpretation options)

(% among *all* the respondents)

100% in the column	Ukraine in general	Among the residents of...			
		West	Center	South	East
High level of crystallization:					
Fighting corruption	85.9	85.6	83.4	89.3	86.7
Economic situation	81.0	81.8	79.1	80.7	85.0
Cooperation with the IMF	76.6	78.2	72.8	79.1	79.0
Average level of crystallization:					
Gazprom trial	66.4	78.8	64.9	57.4	62.1
President's position on the freedom of speech	65.9	66.8	58.8	70.3	74.3
President's initiative to join the EU / NATO	64.7	69.0	64.2	61.6	63.4
Minsk agreements performance by Ukraine / Russia	62.5	78.3	64.3	50.4	48.6
Oleh Sentsov case	58.2	69.1	60.0	53.1	40.7
Promotion of the exacerbation of the situation in the Donbas by the President	55.1	59.2	48.8	55.1	63.3
Negotiations between Ukraine and the "DNR" / "LNR"	54.0	56.4	55.5	51.5	49.6
Crimes committed by far-right organizations	50.3	60.1	49.8	38.7	53.6
Low level of crystallization:					

Tomos	49.5	62.5	54.8	34.7	36.8
Arrest of Nadiya Savchenko and staging of the murder of Arkadiy Babchenko	47.5	54.6	47.7	41.5	43.5
Change of the ATO into the United Forces Operation	46.5	51.8	54.7	29.4	46.8
Donald Trump's assistance to Ukraine	45.8	46.8	46.7	39.8	52.7

1.3 Interpretation of topical social and political events by the population

There is no consensus in the society on the absolute majority of the events under consideration.

Only in the case of the economic situation, fight against corruption, and cooperation with the IMF, there is likely to be a consensus, and, more specifically, in a negative form, where the overwhelming majority of the population consider the economy to be in decline (60%), do not consider cooperation with the IMF to be expedient (65%), and believe that the authorities are not interested in combating corruption (73.5%). An absolute minority of the population share the opposite interpretations.

On the other hand, in the pro-state form of interpretation, there is a tendency towards a consensus on the fact that Oleh Sentsov is a political prisoner (55 % vs. 4 % who have another interpretation), that it is Russia that does not comply with Minsk agreements (52 % vs. 10 %), and that Ukraine was right to start legal proceedings against Gazprom (49 % vs. 18 %). At the same time, we should take into account a significant proportion of those who have not formed an opinion on these issues.

As for the rest of the questions, 12-39% of respondents chose a particular interpretation. That is, on the one hand, there is a significant number of those who do not have a definite opinion. On the other hand, at best, there is only a relative difference between the two interpretations. **Therefore, they can be divided into the following three groups:**

- the one where a pro-state interpretation prevails (change of the ATO into the United Forces Operation, the alleged promotion of the exacerbation of the situation in the Donbas by the President, Donald Trump's assistance to Ukraine, tomos, crimes committed by far-right organizations);
- the one where a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation prevails (peace in the Donbas is only possible in case of direct negotiations between Kyiv and the unrecognized republics, the fact that the President encroaches on the freedom of speech);
- the one where a share of those who support pro-state and pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations is approximately equal (President's initiative to join the EU / NATO, arrest of Nadiya Savchenko, and Arkadiy Babchenko case).

Table 1.3.1

Which of the following statements do you personally share?

(% among *all* the respondents)

Pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation	%	%	Pro-state (pro-governmental) interpretation
Prevalence of a pro-state interpretation in case of high uncertainty			

Pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation	%	%	Pro-state (pro-governmental) interpretation
Oleh Sentsov is a terrorist and a radical who was caught red-handed by the Russian intelligence agencies in the Crimea	3.6	54.6	Oleh Sentsov is a political prisoner whose case was falsified by the Russian intelligence agencies in the Crimea
Ukraine does not comply with the Minsk agreements, because it does not want to end the war in the Donbas	10.2	52.4	Russia does not comply with the Minsk agreements, because it uses the war in the Donbas to weaken Ukraine
Ukraine made a mistake when it began legal proceedings against Russia for gas. As a result, the state will lose revenue from the transit of gas to Europe.	17.7	48.7	Ukraine was right to start legal proceedings against Gazprom. The fact that we won the case proved that Russia had offered unfavorable gas agreements
Relative prevalence of a pro-state interpretation in case of high uncertainty			
Change of the Anti-Terrorist Operation into the United Forces Operation in the Donbas is a sign of Ukraine's preparation for an assault on "unrecognized republics"	11.9	34.6	Change of the Anti-Terrorist Operation into the United Forces Operation in the Donbas was caused by the need to restrain Russian aggression
President Petro Poroshenko will provoke a new war in the Donbas in order to call off presidential elections	22.7	32.4	Accusations that Poroshenko will call off the elections should be considered with caution, as they are made by political rivals
US President Trump will "exchange" Ukraine for Putin's concessions in other important issues	15.6	30.2	US President Trump will not reduce the assistance to Ukraine in the war with Russia
Tomos is President Poroshenko's pre-election game, which will provoke a new confrontation in the society	18.3	31.2	Promoting tomos of the autocephalous church is the right policy, which will make Ukraine more independent of Russia
Crimes committed by far-right organizations are covered by the president, the government, and intelligence agencies	20.5	29.8	Crimes under the guise of radical rhetoric are often committed by the Russian intelligence agencies
Parity of interpretations in case of high uncertainty			
Petro Poroshenko's initiative for Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO and the EU is nothing more than a pre-election trick	32.4	32.3	Petro Poroshenko's initiative for Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO and the EU is the right and long overdue decision
Arrest of Nadiya Savchenko and staging of the murder of Arkadiy Babchenko are an attempt of intelligence agencies to divert public attention from Petro Poroshenko's failures	23.0	24.5	Arrest of Nadiya Savchenko and staging of the murder of Arkadiy Babchenko are serious evidence of Russia's intentions to disrupt the situation in Ukraine
Relative prevalence of a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation in case of high uncertainty			
Peace in the Donbas is only possible in case of direct negotiations between Kyiv and the unrecognized republics	34.8	19.2	Direct negotiations with the separatists are a step towards peace under Russia's terms
President of Ukraine is pursuing and suppressing independent media and political opponents who criticize him	39.2	26.7	In his actions, the President of Ukraine largely respects the principles of freedom of speech
Relative prevalence of a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation			
Ukrainian economy is on the brink of a deep crisis and a decline in living standards	60.1	20.9	Situation in the Ukrainian economy is complicated, but it is unlikely that there will be a new crisis
Corruption could have been overcome a long time ago, if the authorities had not been protecting corruptionists	73.5	12.4	Fight against corruption is a long and complicated process which requires years for Ukraine to go through. But the first steps which are very important have already been

Pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation	%	%	Pro-state (pro-governmental) interpretation
			taken - all the necessary anti-corruption bodies have been created.
Ukraine should not increase the dependence on the International Monetary Fund and other lenders	65.2	11.5	Ukraine should comply with the requirements of the International Monetary Fund, in particular those regarding increase in tariffs, in order to get a loan and save the economy

Interpretations in table 1.3.2 are given in a regional context. In practically all cases, **there is a tendency towards reduction in the share of those who share a pro-state interpretation from the West to the East**, and, on the other hand, an increase in the number of those who share a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation of events.

The largest regional gap can be observed in the following cases (the West and the East are compared):

- **Minsk agreements performance** — a pro-state interpretation decreases from 71% to 32%, whereas a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation increases from 7.5% to 17% (with an increase from 22% to 51% in the share of those who are undecided);
- **Gazprom trial** — a pro-state interpretation decreases from 65 % to 33 %, whereas a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation increases from 14 % to 29.5 % (a share of those who are undecided increases from 21 % to 38 %);
- **crimes committed by far-right organizations** — a pro-state interpretation decreases from 43 % to 19 %, whereas a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation increases from 17 % to 35 %;
- **Oleh Sentsov case** — a pro-state interpretation decreases from 66 % to 36 %, whereas a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation practically does not change (3% vs. 5%), but a share of those who are undecided increases from 31% to 59%;
- **tomos** — a pro-state interpretation decreases from 45 % to 17 %, whereas a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation practically does not change (17 % vs. 19.5 %), but a share of those who are undecided increases from 37.5 % to 63 %;
- **promotion of the exacerbation of the situation in the Donbas by the President** — a pro-state interpretation decreases from 39 % to 27 %, whereas a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation increases from 20 % to 36.5 %;
- **President's initiative to join the EU / NATO** — a pro-state interpretation decreases from 40 % to 24 %, whereas a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation increases from 29 % to 39.5 %.

As we can see, **the top issues of the "regional split" were primarily related to the interpretations of the conflict with Russia**, and to a lesser extent, these were other issues.

We can also see that the respondents were most unanimous with regard to economic issues, corruption, and cooperation with the IMF.

Table 1.3.2

Which of the following statements do you personally share?

(% among *all* the respondents)

100% in the column	Ukraine in general	Among the respondents of the...			
		West	Center	South	East
Oleh Sentsov case					
Oleh Sentsov is a terrorist and a radical who was caught red-handed by the Russian intelligence agencies in the Crimea	3.6	3.4	3.7	3.1	4.8
Oleh Sentsov is a political prisoner whose case was falsified by the Russian intelligence agencies in the Crimea	54.6	65.7	56.3	50.0	35.9
It's hard to say / Refusal	41.8	30.9	40.0	46.9	59.3
Minsk agreements performance by Ukraine / Russia					
Ukraine does not comply with the Minsk agreements, because it does not want to end the war in the Donbas	10.2	7.5	10.2	9.6	16.7
Russia does not comply with the Minsk agreements, because it uses the war in the Donbas to weaken Ukraine	52.4	70.8	54.1	40.8	31.9
It's hard to say / Refusal	37.5	21.7	35.7	49.6	51.4
Gazprom trial					
Ukraine made a mistake when it began legal proceedings against Russia for gas. As a result, the state will lose revenue from the transit of gas to Europe	17.7	14.2	16.9	16.3	29.5
Ukraine was right to start legal proceedings against Gazprom. The fact that we won the case proved that Russia had offered unfavorable gas agreements	48.7	64.6	48.1	41.1	32.6
It's hard to say / Refusal	33.6	21.2	35.1	42.6	37.9
Change of the ATO into the United Forces Operation					
Change of the Anti-Terrorist Operation into the United Forces Operation in the Donbas is a sign of Ukraine's preparation for an assault on "unrecognized republics"	11.9	11.4	11.9	8.2	20.3
Change of the Anti-Terrorist Operation into the United Forces Operation in the Donbas was caused by the need to restrain Russian aggression	34.6	40.4	42.8	21.2	26.5
It's hard to say / Refusal	53.5	48.2	45.3	70.6	53.2
Promotion of the exacerbation of the situation in the Donbas by the President					
President Petro Poroshenko will provoke a new war in the Donbas in order to call off presidential elections	22.7	20.3	17.0	25.8	36.5
Accusations that Poroshenko will call off the elections should be considered with caution, as they are made by political rivals	32.4	38.8	31.8	29.2	26.8
It's hard to say / Refusal	44.9	40.8	51.2	44.9	36.7
Donald Trump's assistance to Ukraine					

100% in the column	Ukraine in general	Among the respondents of the...			
		West	Center	South	East
US President Trump will "exchange" Ukraine for Putin's concessions in other important issues	15.6	17.8	14.1	17.2	12.1
US President Trump will not reduce the assistance to Ukraine in the war with Russia	30.2	29.0	32.6	22.6	40.6
It's hard to say / Refusal	54.2	53.2	53.3	60.2	47.3
Tomos					
Tomos of the autocephalous church is President Poroshenko's pre-election game, which will provoke a new confrontation in the society	18.3	17.2	21.3	14.8	19.5
Promoting tomos of the autocephalous church is the right policy, which will make Ukraine more independent of Russia	31.2	45.3	33.6	19.9	17.3
It's hard to say / Refusal	50.5	37.5	45.2	65.3	63.2
Crimes committed by far-right organizations					
Crimes committed by far-right organizations are covered by the president, the government, and intelligence agencies	20.5	17.0	17.5	20.8	34.8
Crimes under the guise of radical rhetoric are often committed by the Russian intelligence agencies	29.8	43.1	32.2	17.8	18.8
It's hard to say / Refusal	49.7	39.9	50.2	61.3	46.4
President's initiative to join the EU / NATO					
Petro Poroshenko's initiative for Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO and the EU is the right and long overdue decision	32.3	40.0	35.0	24.6	23.9
Petro Poroshenko's initiative for Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO and the EU is nothing more than a pre-election trick	32.4	29.0	29.2	37.0	39.5
It's hard to say / Refusal	35.3	31.0	35.8	38.4	36.6
Arrest of Nadiya Savchenko and staging of the murder of Arkadiy Babchenko					
Arrest of Nadiya Savchenko and staging of the murder of Arkadiy Babchenko are an attempt of intelligence agencies to divert public attention from Petro Poroshenko's failures	23.0	20.8	22.8	23.9	26.3
Arrest of Nadiya Savchenko and staging of the murder of Arkadiy Babchenko are serious evidence of Russia's intentions to disrupt the situation in Ukraine	24.5	33.8	24.9	17.6	17.1
It's hard to say / Refusal	52.5	45.4	52.3	58.5	56.5
Negotiations between Ukraine and the "DNR" / "LNR"					
Peace in the Donbas is only possible in case of direct negotiations between Kyiv and the unrecognized republics	34.8	29.9	35.0	38.7	36.8
Direct negotiations with the separatists are a step towards peace under Russia's terms	19.2	26.5	20.5	12.8	12.9
It's hard to say / Refusal	46.0	43.6	44.5	48.5	50.4
President's position on the freedom of speech					
President of Ukraine is pursuing and suppressing independent media and political opponents who criticize him	39.2	37.7	30.4	46.4	51.7
In his actions, the President of Ukraine largely respects the principles of freedom of speech	26.7	29.1	28.4	23.8	22.6

100% in the column	Ukraine in general	Among the respondents of the...			
		West	Center	South	East
It's hard to say / Refusal	34.1	33.2	41.2	29.7	25.7
Economic situation					
Ukrainian economy is on the brink of a deep crisis and a decline in living standards	60.1	59.3	58.3	65.4	56.3
Situation in the Ukrainian economy is complicated, but it is unlikely that there will be a new crisis	20.9	22.5	20.8	15.3	28.8
It's hard to say / Refusal	19.0	18.2	20.9	19.3	15.0
Fighting corruption					
Fight against corruption is a long and complicated process which requires years for Ukraine to go through.	12.4	10.6	13.7	13.0	11.6
Corruption could have been overcome a long time ago, if the authorities had not been protecting corruptionists	73.5	75.0	69.7	76.3	75.1
It's hard to say / Refusal	14.1	14.4	16.6	10.7	13.3
Cooperation with the IMF					
Ukraine should comply with the IMF requirements, in particular those regarding increase in tariffs, in order to get a loan and save the economy	11.5	17.2	9.7	8.5	10.0
Ukraine should not increase the dependence on the International Monetary Fund and other lenders	65.2	61.0	63.1	70.6	69.0
It's hard to say / Refusal	23.4	21.8	27.2	20.9	21.0

1.4 Index of pro-state vs. pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations

The obtained results can be used to form one general index of **pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian vs. pro-state** opinions of the Ukrainian population. Calculation methods were as follows: for every statement respondents either chose a certain interpretation or answered "it is hard to say". If respondents chose a pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation, they received 100 points for this answer. In case of a pro-state interpretation, they were given 0 points. If respondents were undecided, they received 50 points. Then the average score among all respondents' answers was calculated. In fact, the index varies from 0 (respondents support pro-state interpretations in case of all questions) to 100 (respondents support pro-opposition and pro-Russian interpretations in case of all questions).

The 15 questions under consideration can also be divided into two general groups: those concerning the conflict with Russia (in its various forms), and those that are more related to the economy, corruption, and domestic politics. The breakdown by groups is given below in Table 1.4.1. Therefore, below we presented the results of the:

- general index of pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian **vs.** pro-state orientations for all the issues under consideration;
- indices related to the conflict with Russia, the economy, corruption, and internal politics, which were calculated separately.

Table 1.4.1

Grouping statements

Conflict with Russia	
Peace in the Donbas is only possible in case of direct negotiations between Kyiv and the unrecognized republics	Direct negotiations with the separatists are a step towards peace under Russia's terms
Ukraine does not comply with the Minsk agreements, because it does not want to end the war in the Donbas	Russia does not comply with the Minsk agreements, because it uses the war in the Donbas to weaken Ukraine
Change of the Anti-Terrorist Operation into the United Forces Operation in the Donbas is a sign of Ukraine's preparation for an assault on "unrecognized republics"	Change of the Anti-Terrorist Operation into the United Forces Operation in the Donbas was caused by the need to restrain Russian aggression
Crimes committed by far-right organizations are covered by the President, the government, and intelligence agencies	Crimes under the guise of radical rhetoric are often committed by the Russian intelligence agencies
Ukraine made a mistake when it began legal proceedings against Russia for gas. As a result, the state will lose revenue from the transit of gas to Europe.	Ukraine was right to start legal proceedings against Gazprom. The fact that we won the case proved that Russia had offered unfavorable gas agreements
Arrest of Nadiya Savchenko and staging of the murder of Arkadiy Babchenko are an attempt of intelligence agencies to divert public attention from Petro Poroshenko's failures	Arrest of Nadiya Savchenko and staging of the murder of Arkadiy Babchenko are serious evidence of Russia's intentions to disrupt the situation in Ukraine


Tomos is President Poroshenko's pre-election game, which will provoke a new confrontation in the society	Promoting tomos of the autocephalous church is the right policy, which will make Ukraine more independent of Russia
Oleh Sentsov is a terrorist and a radical who was caught red-handed by the Russian intelligence agencies in the Crimea	Oleh Sentsov is a political prisoner whose case was falsified by the Russian intelligence agencies in the Crimea
US President Trump will "exchange" Ukraine for Putin's concessions in other important issues	US President Trump will not reduce the assistance to Ukraine in the war with Russia
Economy, corruption, domestic politics	
President of Ukraine is pursuing and suppressing independent media and political opponents who criticize him	In his actions, the President of Ukraine largely respects the principles of freedom of speech
President Petro Poroshenko will provoke a new war in the Donbas in order to call off presidential elections	Accusations that Poroshenko will call off the elections should be considered with caution, as they are made by political rivals
Ukrainian economy is on the brink of a deep crisis and a decline in living standards	Situation in the Ukrainian economy is complicated, but it is unlikely that there will be a new crisis
Corruption could have been overcome a long time ago, if the authorities had not been protecting corruptionists	Fight against corruption is a long and complicated process which requires years for Ukraine to go through. But the first steps which are very important have already been taken - all the necessary anti-corruption bodies have been created.
Ukraine should not increase the dependence on the International Monetary Fund and other lenders	Ukraine should comply with the requirements of the International Monetary Fund, in particular those regarding increase in tariffs, in order to get a loan and save the economy
Petro Poroshenko's initiative for Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO and the EU is nothing more than a pre-election trick	Petro Poroshenko's initiative for Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO and the EU is the right and long overdue decision

In general, the average **index is 49.8, which means that there is an almost uniform mixture of pro-state and pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations among the population** (chart 1.4.1). At the same time, 40.5% of the respondents received a score of 41-60, which corresponds to a partly pro-state, partly pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretation of events. Only 5% and 7% of respondents received extreme scores, which are indicative of a consistent pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian opinion (81-100) or a consistent pro-state opinion (0-20) respectively.

The picture becomes clearer, if we consider the conflict with Russia and other issues separately. **In the case of a conflict with Russia, the average index is 40.4, that is, there is a tendency, albeit a slight one, towards pro-state interpretations.** At the same time, 51% of respondents received a score which is rather indicative of supporting pro-state statements, whereas the score of 16% of the respondents was indicative of supporting pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian statements. **The picture is different in the issues of economy, corruption, and domestic politics - the average score is 63.4, that is, there is a tendency towards pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian statements.** At the same time, 52% of respondents have a rather pro-opposition score, and 14% have a pro-state / pro-governmental score.

Index of pro-state vs. pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations

(% / average score among all respondents)



There is a rather pronounced tendency towards the increase of pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian sentiments from the West to the East. On the whole, the index increases from 44.7 to 56.1; in case of the conflict with Russia, it increases from 34 to 48.1, and as for other issues, it increases from 60.5 to 67.7.

If we speak about the % of those who have pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian sentiments (a score of over 60), as for the general index, it is 14% in the West, 24% in the Center, and 38-40% in the South and in the East. As for the index of economy, corruption, and domestic politics, there is also an increase from 47-49% in the West and in the Center to 59-60% in the South and in the East, but in this case, there is a pronounced dissatisfaction in the first two regions.

As for the Russia's index in the West, the proportion of residents with pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian sentiments is 9%. In the Center, this figure reaches 15%, in the South it is up to 20%, and in the East it reaches 28%. **In the West, 68% also share pro-state interpretations of events related to the conflict with Russia, whereas in the Center, 54% share such events, and in the South and East, this figure is 36-38%.**

Table 1.4.2

Index of pro-state vs. pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations

(% / average score among all respondents)

% / average score in the column	West	Center	South	East
In general				
<i>Average score</i>	<i>44.7</i>	<i>48.1</i>	<i>54.2</i>	<i>56.1</i>
Pro-state	8.6	7.8	6.7	3.8
Rather pro-state	31.9	28.1	18.8	17.5
Partly pro-state, partly pro-opposition / pro-Russian	45.5	40.3	36.2	38.8
Rather pro-opposition / pro-Russian	12.0	17.8	32.2	32.5
Pro-opposition / pro-Russian	2.0	6.0	6.1	7.4
Conflict with Russia				
<i>Average score</i>	<i>34.0</i>	<i>39.2</i>	<i>44.9</i>	<i>48.1</i>
Pro-state	22.6	18.8	10.5	5.5
Rather pro-state	45.0	35.1	27.9	30.3
Partly pro-state, partly pro-opposition / pro-Russian	23.2	30.9	41.9	36.5
Rather pro-opposition / pro-Russian	7.0	10.6	17.6	23.3
Pro-opposition / pro-Russian	2.1	4.6	2.0	4.4
Economy, corruption, domestic politics				
<i>Average score</i>	<i>60.5</i>	<i>61.2</i>	<i>67.6</i>	<i>67.7</i>
Pro-state / pro-governmental	3.6	4.7	4.7	2.8
Rather pro-state / pro-governmental	11.3	11.2	7.4	8.5
Partly pro-state / pro-governmental, partly pro-opposition	37.9	35.4	28.2	29.8
Rather pro-opposition	27.2	26.6	21.9	23.6
Pro-opposition	20.0	22.0	37.8	35.2

1.5 TV channels which promote assertions accepted by respondents

Only 50% of respondents can name a television channel that, in their opinion, promotes interpretations shared by the respondent (chart 1.5.1). On the contrary, even less people (32%) can say which channel promotes opposing interpretations.

Speaking of favorite channels, "1+1" (20%), Inter (16%), and "Ukraine" (16%) were mentioned most often. ICTV (11%), 112 (10%), STB (8%) were mentioned somewhat less often. The others were mentioned even less often, for example, 5% mentioned NewsOne.

Chart 1.5.1

Which TV channels, in your opinion, most often promote statements you share? / Which TV channels, in your opinion, most often promote statements you do not share? (Not more than five answers.)




Table 1.5.1 shows regional differences with regard to the issue under consideration.

Table 1.5.1

Which TV channels, in your opinion, most often promote statements you share? / Which TV channels, in your opinion, most often promote statements you do not share? (Not more than five answers.)

(% among *all* respondents)

100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than 5 answers	West		Center		South		East	
	Share	Do not share	Share	Do not share	Share	Do not share	Share	Do not share
1+1	25.7	5.7	24.2	5.5	14.2	5.6	7.3	8.9
Inter	10.0	20.5	16.5	9.4	16.7	6.6	22.4	5.9
Ukraine	10.1	10.4	16.6	10.5	16.7	6.7	22.0	10.6
ICTV	11.3	4.2	15.9	3.9	8.7	3.3	2.5	5.7
112	8.9	1.4	13.7	4.8	6.4	3.5	11.6	4.9

STB	6.5	3.3	11.7	4.1	6.2	2.5	7.1.	7.4
ZIK	9.3	0.9	4.3	2.1	1.7	1.8	5.1	1.1
NewsOne	2.3	1.5	5.5	5.0	4.0	1.5	8.3	3.8
Channel 24	7.1	0.7	3.6	2.0	0.8	0.8	1.3	3.1
UA: Pershyi	4.3	0.9	1.7	1.7	1.2	2.6	2.3	4.7
Novyi Kanal	0.9	1.9	3.8	2.9	0.9	0.7	4.2	0.4
Pryamyi channel	1.1	0.7	3.0	3.7	0.7	0.7	1.4	2.0
Russian channels	0.1	5.0	0.8	4.1	1.2	1.6	3.9	1.0
Hromadske	1.6	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.7	0.3	0.0	1.5
Espresso.TV	0.7	0.3	0.6	1.7	0.5	0.8	1.3	3.1
Regional channels	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0
ATR	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0
Other	1.5	0.4	0.7	0.6	2.0	1.1	0.3	2.6
I do not watch TV	19.0	22.0	19.6	20.6	20.5	21.0	25.6	29.4
It's hard to say / Refusal	26.8	42.8	28.4	47.6	38.1	53.7	18.9	33.9

1.6 TV channels and Interpretation of topical social and political events

The relationship between TV channels and interpretations of different topical events was studied in several ways.

First, all the respondents were asked a direct question about TV channels which, in their opinion, promote certain statements / interpretations (regardless of whether they watch these TV channels or not). The results are shown below in Table 1.6.1. As we can see, **taking into account all statements, not more than a third of respondents relate them to a particular TV channel. This is indicative of a low level of crystallization of the image of certain TV channels at the level of the entire society.**

On the whole, only in the case of "1+1" there is a rather noticeable tendency that this channel is more often associated with the promotion of **pro-Ukrainian** interpretations of topical events.

Table 1.6.1

Which TV channels, in your opinion, most often promote these statements?

(% among all the respondents)

<p>% in a line</p> <p>Respondents could choose not more than three answers for every statement</p>	UA: Pershyi	Inter	1+1	ICTV	STB	112	News One	Ukraine	ZIK	Channel 24	Pryamyi	Novyi Kanal	ATR	Hromadske	Russian channels	Do not watch TV	It's hard to say / Refusal
Oleh Sentsov case																	
Oleh Sentsov is a terrorist and a radical who was caught red-handed by the Russian intelligence agencies in the Crimea	1.0	3.7	3.5	2.2	1.5	1.7	1.4	2.2	0.5	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.1	12.1	22.3	54.0
Oleh Sentsov is a political prisoner whose case was falsified by the Russian intelligence agencies in the Crimea	3.4	9.8	19.4	10.5	5.3	4.4	2.0	5.9	2.3	1.7	1.6	0.7	0.2	0.7	0.4	21.6	43.8
Minsk agreements performance by Ukraine / Russia																	
Ukraine does not comply with the Minsk agreements, because it does not want to end the war in the Donbas	0.9	6.5	4.3	3.0	1.3	3.0	3.7	3.3	1.0	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.1	9.1	23.1	49.8
Russia does not comply with the Minsk agreements, because it uses the war in the Donbas to weaken Ukraine	2.8	9.0	16.9	8.7	5.3	4.0	1.8	5.1	2.2	2.2	2.0	0.8	0.1	0.6	0.6	22.3	42.7
Gazprom trial																	
Ukraine made a mistake when it began legal proceedings against Russia for gas. As a result, the state will lose revenue from the transit of gas to Europe	1.7	8.4	5.6	3.3	1.8	4.1	2.9	4.0	1.0	1.1	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.3	4.3	21.8	52.7
Ukraine was right to start legal proceedings against Gazprom. The fact that we won the case proved that Russia had offered unfavorable gas agreements	2.9	7.2	15.6	7.7	4.7	4.0	1.4	4.1	1.7	2.2	2.4	0.7	0.1	0.7	0.1	21.1	47.0
Change of the ATO into the United Forces Operation																	

<p>% in a line</p> <p>Respondents could choose not more than three answers for every statement</p>	UA: Pershyi	Inter	1+1	ICTV	STB	112	News One	Ukraine	ZIK	Channel 24	Pryamyi	Novyi Kanal	ATR	Hromadske	Russian channels	Do not watch TV	It's hard to say / Refusal
Change of the Anti-Terrorist Operation into the United Forces Operation in the Donbas is a sign of Ukraine's preparation for an assault on "unrecognized republics"	0.8	4.1	5.0	2.8	1.0	2.8	1.9	1.7	0.8	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.5	4.2	23.4	57.5
Change of the Anti-Terrorist Operation into the United Forces Operation in the Donbas was caused by the need to restrain Russian aggression	2.1	6.6	9.9	6.1	3.0	3.3	1.6	3.3	1.3	1.1	2.1	0.7	0.1	0.4	0.2	22.3	53.1
Promotion of the exacerbation of the situation in the Donbas by the President																	
President Petro Poroshenko will provoke a new war in the Donbas in order to call off presidential elections	0.7	6.0	4.4	2.8	1.1	4.0	3.6	2.8	1.7	0.9	0.6	0.4	0.1	0.4	5.0	22.2	55.4
Accusations that Poroshenko will call off the elections should be considered with caution, as they are made by political rivals	1.9	5.1	8.0	4.2	2.8	3.4	1.6	3.7	1.1	1.2	1.7	0.8	0.2	0.9	0.6	21.5	55.8
Donald Trump's assistance to Ukraine																	
US President Trump will "exchange" Ukraine for Putin's concessions in other important issues	1.0	5.0	3.9	2.2	1.0	3.3	2.1	2.3	0.9	1.1	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.4	3.2	22.0	59.9
US President Trump will not reduce the assistance to Ukraine in the war with Russia	1.8	4.4	9.5	4.1	2.2	3.9	1.4	3.9	1.1	1.2	1.9	0.9	0.2	0.2	0.4	21.6	55.5
Tomos																	
Tomos of the autocephalous church is President Poroshenko's pre-election game, which will provoke a new confrontation in the society	1.4	8.6	5.6	3.5	1.4	4.0	3.4	4.0	1.4	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.6	2.3	22.7	54.7
Promoting tomos of the autocephalous church is the right policy, which will make Ukraine more independent of Russia	2.2	5.8	12.7	5.8	3.4	3.0	0.9	3.6	1.6	1.4	2.2	1.0	0.4	0.4	0.1	22.9	51.4
Crimes committed by far-right organizations																	

<p>% in a line</p> <p>Respondents could choose not more than three answers for every statement</p>	UA: Pershyi	Inter	1+1	ICTV	STB	112	News One	Ukraine	ZIK	Channel 24	Pryamyi	Novyi Kanal	ATR	Hromadske	Russian channels	Do not watch TV	It's hard to say / Refusal
Crimes committed by far-right organizations are covered by the President, the government, and intelligence agencies	1.3	5.7	4.1	2.6	1.8	2.5	3.4	2.5	1.5	1.0	0.3	0.6	0.1	0.3	3.7	23.2	55.1
Crimes under the guise of radical rhetoric are often committed by the Russian intelligence agencies	2.2	5.1	11.6	6.2	4.2	3.2	1.4	3.5	1.1	1.8	1.4	0.8	0.2	0.8	0.4	22.8	51.0
President's initiative to join the EU / NATO																	
Petro Poroshenko's initiative for Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO and the EU is the right and long overdue decision	4.0	10.1	18.6	8.7	5.2	3.6	1.5	5.3	1.4	1.4	2.2	0.9	0.2	0.2	0.0	20.4	45.2
Petro Poroshenko's initiative for Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO and the EU is nothing more than a pre-election trick	1.1	7.5	4.1	2.5	1.6	4.3	3.8	3.7	1.7	1.5	0.7	0.5	0.0	1.0	2.8	21.6	54.7
Arrest of Nadiya Savchenko and staging of the murder of Arkadiy Babchenko																	
Arrest of Nadiya Savchenko and staging of the murder of Arkadiy Babchenko are an attempt of intelligence agencies to divert public attention from Petro Poroshenko's failures	1.7	6.8	4.9	3.2	1.7	4.2	3.9	2.9	1.3	1.1	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.3	2.7	22.0	55.6
Arrest of Nadiya Savchenko and staging of the murder of Arkadiy Babchenko are serious evidence of Russia's intentions to disrupt the situation in Ukraine	1.7	5.2	8.9	5.6	3.1	2.7	1.9	2.8	0.9	1.5	1.8	0.9	0.0	0.7	0.7	22.6	54.5
Negotiations between Ukraine and the "DNR" / "LNR"																	
Peace in the Donbas is only possible in case of direct negotiations between Kyiv and the unrecognized republics	1.7	10.9	8.6	5.3	2.7	4.7	4.6	5.7	1.8	1.0	0.6	0.7	0.0	0.2	3.6	22.4	45.6
Direct negotiations with the separatists are a step towards peace under Russia's terms	1.4	6.6	6.2	3.6	1.8	2.5	2.6	3.2	1.0	1.9	1.6	0.8	0.1	0.7	2.7	23.4	51.0

% in a line Respondents could choose not more than three answers for every statement	UA: Pershyi	Inter	1+1	ICTV	STB	112	News One	Ukraine	ZIK	Channel 24	Pryamyi	Novyi Kanal	ATR	Hromadske	Russian channels	Do not watch TV	It's hard to say / Refusal
President's position on the freedom of speech																	
President of Ukraine is pursuing and suppressing independent media and political opponents who criticize him	1.2	9.4	6.4	3.4	1.8	5.3	4.3	3.7	2.6	1.6	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.6	3.2	21.7	49.6
In his actions, the President of Ukraine largely respects the principles of freedom of speech	3.2	6.4	9.0	4.8	3.5	3.0	1.6	4.6	1.4	1.8	2.5	1.0	0.1	0.5	0.1	22.0	51.3
Economic situation																	
Ukrainian economy is on the brink of a deep crisis and a decline in living standards	3.2	15.0	12.7	7.3	3.4	7.9	5.7	6.8	3.4	2.2	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.4	3.2	20.9	39.9
Situation in the Ukrainian economy is complicated, but it is unlikely that there will be a new crisis	2.6	6.4	9.6	6.0	3.4	2.9	1.8	4.5	1.3	2.0	1.5	0.9	0.1	0.5	0.1	21.0	52.5
Fighting corruption																	
Fight against corruption is a long and complicated process which requires years for Ukraine to go through.	3.8	10.9	17.3	9.3	5.2	4.4	2.3	5.4	0.9	1.5	1.9	0.6	0.1	0.5	0.1	21.3	43.2
Corruption could have been overcome a long time ago, if the authorities had not been protecting corruptionists	2.0	10.7	8.1	6.5	2.8	6.5	5.2	5.8	3.9	3.0	1.2	0.9	0.1	1.3	0.4	21.5	44.7
Cooperation with the IMF																	
Ukraine should comply with the IMF requirements, in particular those regarding increase in tariffs, in order to get a loan and save the economy	3.5	11.2	14.8	6.5	4.1	4.3	2.0	5.4	1.0	0.8	1.4	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.2	20.9	46.7
Ukraine should not increase the dependence on the International Monetary Fund and other lenders	0.9	7.4	6.7	4.2	2.6	5.4	4.2	4.8	2.8	2.2	0.9	0.8	0.1	1.1	0.3	21.5	51.2

At the same time, other results of the poll indicate that **there is a dependence between the fact that respondents rather share pro-state VS pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations and the TV channels which, in their opinion, promote statements shared by respondents**. Since there are some differences in meaning between the indices related to the conflict with Russia and those related to other issues, we should take a look at the differences in these two cases separately.

If we talk about a conflict with Russia, people who are more likely to share pro-state interpretations (have a score of 0–40) **are mostly those who watch: "1+1"** (31 % vs. 7 % among those who rather share pro-opposition interpretations), **ICTV** (16 % vs. 5.5 %), **STB** (12 % vs. 4 %). At the same time, **as for people who are more likely to share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations** (have a score of 61–100), these are mostly those who watch: **"Inter"** (21% vs. 15% of those who rather share pro-state interpretations), **112** (16% vs. 10%), **NewsOne** (12% vs. 2.5%), **Russian channels** (5% vs. 0.2%).

As for the issues of economy, corruption, and domestic politics, the tendency is that those who share **pro-Ukrainian** interpretations are more likely to watch 1+1 (35 % vs. 14 %), ICTV (21 % vs. 9 %), STB (14 % vs. 7 %). As well as among those who are more likely to watch Ukraine (23% vs. 14%). Among those who are more likely to share **pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian** interpretations, there are slightly more people who watch NewsOne (7 % vs. 2 %).

Table 1.6.2

Which TV channels, in your opinion, most often promote statements you share?

(% of respondents depending on the index value)

100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than five options	general index			Index related to the conflict with Russia			Index related to the economy, corruption, and domestic politics		
	Pro-state	Average score	Pro-opposition	Pro-state	Average score	Pro-opposition	Pro-state	Average score	Pro-opposition
1+1	34.4	16.3	7.7	30.6	9.6	6.8	34.7	22.1	14.4
ICTV	19.2	7.6	6.5	15.9	6.3	5.5	20.6	9.9	9.2
Inter	17.3	11.6	19.5	14.9	14.0	21.1	18.3	13.4	16.2
Ukraine	19.8	13.1	14.2	17.0	12.4	17.8	23.2	15.2	13.8
STB	12.7	7.4	4.5	11.8	4.9	4.3	14.1	8.5	6.7
112	11.8	6.7	14.0	10.2	7.7	15.9	10.5	8.5	11.4
Channel 24	5.3	3.4	1.6	5.4	0.9	2.8	4.5	2.8	3.8
ZIK	5.1	5.0	5.3	6.0	3.2	6.1	4.3	3.6	6.3
UA: Pershyi	4.5	1.6	0.8	3.2	1.9	0.6	3.8	2.8	1.7
Pryamyi channel	3.5	0.8	1.0	2.7	0.5	1.0	4.9	1.6	0.9
Novyi Kanal	3.3	2.1	1.5	2.6	2.0	2.2	3.9	2.4	1.8

100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than five options	general index			Index related to the conflict with Russia			Index related to the economy, corruption, and domestic politics		
	Pro-state	Average score	Pro-opposition	Pro-state	Average score	Pro-opposition	Pro-state	Average score	Pro-opposition
NewsOne	2.1	3.3	9.8	2.5	4.5	11.7	2.2	2.6	6.6
Hromadske	1.9	0.6	0.1	1.5	0.4	0.2	2.4	1.0	0.4
Espresso.TV	1.1	0.8	0.0	1.0	0.5	0.0	1.0	1.2	0.2
ATR	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.2	0.1
Russian channels	0.3	0.1	3.7	0.2	0.6	5.0	0.6	0.0	2.0
Regional channels	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.4
Other	1.8	0.4	1.6	1.3	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.5
I do not watch TV	16.5	24.4	19.5	18.0	25.4	17.9	16.5	21.8	20.7
It's hard to say / Refusal	19.3	33.5	34.4	22.8	38.9	29.8	15.4	32.7	30.5

Another approach to the analysis of the relationship between watching television and interpretations is to calculate the average values of the index among those who believe that a particular channel promotes interpretations shared by a respondent.

As for the index related to the conflict with Russia, those respondents who talked about Russian TV channels (average index of 65.9) and NewsOne (53.7) have the highest scores (which correspond to the highest adherence to pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations). Those who talked about Hromadske TV (24.5) and Pryamyi (24.9) had the lowest scores. As for other channels, the average value varies within the range of 28.1-40.9, that is within the "rather pro-state interpretation."

As for the index related to other issues, the situation is quite similar.

Table 1.6.3

Average index of pro-state vs. pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations among respondents depending on which TV channels, in their opinion, promote statements shared by the respondents

Average value in the column	General index	Index related to the conflict with Russia	Index related to the economy, corruption, and domestic politics
Channel which promotes statements shared by the respondents			
Russian channels	72.1	65.9	81.2
NewsOne	62.6	53.7	75.9
ZIK	51.9	39.9	70.0
112	50.8	40.8	65.9

Inter	50.2	40.9	64.0
Ukraine	47.1	39.0	59.1
Novyi Kanal	44.8	36.4	57.3
Channel 24	42.7	29.9	61.6
STB	42.1	32.5	56.2
ICTV	40.4	29.8	56.0
1+1	39.3	29.2	54.3
UA: Pershyi	39.0	28.1	55.6
Pryamyyi channel	34.9	24.9	49.8
Hromadske	32.9	24.5	45.4

1.7 Politicians and popular persons who promote assertions accepted by respondents

Only 49% of respondents can name at least one politician or popular person who promotes interpretations of events a respondent agrees with (chart 1.7.1). At the same time, as for the general population, the maximum figure does not exceed 11%. On the whole, judging by this figure, Yulia Tymoshenko (11%), Anatoliy Hrytsenko (11%), Oleh Lyashko (9%), Svyatoslav Vakarchuk (8%), Vadym Rabinovych (7%), Petro Poroshenko 6%), Yuriy Boyko (5%), Andriy Sadovyi (5%), Volodymyr Hroysman (5%), and Yevhen Murayev (4.5%) are the top activists at the level of Ukraine.

Table 1.7.1

Which politicians and bloggers, in your opinion, most often promote statements you share? / Which politicians, popular bloggers and persons, in your opinion, most often promote statements you do not share? (Not more than seven answers.)

(% among *all* the respondents)

100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than five options	Ukraine in general		West		Center		South		East	
	Share	Do not share	Share	Do not share	Share	Do not share	Share	Do not share	Share	Do not share
Yulia Tymoshenko	10.7	8.3	11.0	7.4	11.9	7.2	10.6	8.5	7.0	12.7
Anatoliy Hrytsenko	10.6	2.2	15.1	1.5	10.3	2.7	7.4	2.7	7.9	1.6
Oleh Lyashko	8.8	9.1	9.1	9.7	7.1	10.1	9.3	6.8	11.7	9.3
Svyatoslav Vakarchuk	8.1	1.1	17.3	0.4	5.3	2.2	5.0	0.4	2.7	1.0
Vadym Rabinovych	6.6	7.0	1.7	10.2	5.1	7.7	12.6	4.4	9.1	3.8
Petro Poroshenko	5.9	16.1	4.7	7.4	7.9	15.7	5.1	24.1	4.3	19.6
Yuriy Boyko	5.2	4.4	1.9	4.4	3.5	5.1	8.4	4.9	10.2	1.9
Andriy Sadovyi	4.9	1.4	10.5	0.9	3.8	1.2	2.6	0.8	1.0	3.9
Volodymyr Hroysman	4.6	7.5	3.6	8.2	6.0	7.2	5.5	9.2	1.4	3.6
Yevhen Murayev	4.5	2.8	1.3	2.5	4.4	4.4	7.4	1.9	6.1	1.2
Oleh Tyahnybok	3.4	6.6	7.0	3.9	2.5	5.2	1.6	8.4	1.7	12.1
Mustafa Nayem	3.0	1.2	3.5	0.0	3.4	1.3	2.8	1.9	1.3	2.1
Oleksandr Shevchenko	3.0	0.3	7.2	0.3	2.3	0.3	1.0	0.2	0.0	0.6
Dmytro Dobrodomov	2.6	0.7	5.3	1.0	1.7	0.8	2.1	0.7	0.2	0.0
Serhiy Taruta	2.6	0.8	0.8	1.1	3.0	0.7	3.2	1.2	3.8	0.0
Oleksandr Vilkul	2.3	3.5	0.6	5.8	1.4	2.7	6.4	3.0	0.2	2.0
Viktor Medvedchuk	2.0	7.0	0.4	12.3	2.2	7.3	1.9	3.7	4.6	1.5
Anatoliy Shariy	1.7	1.7	0.1	0.6	3.1	3.5	1.5	0.5	1.4	1.2
Arseniy Yatsenyuk	1.6	13.4	2.1	9.6	1.1	11.7	2.2	17.3	0.9	18.0
Inna Bohoslovska	1.5	2.9	1.0	5.2	1.7	2.4	1.8	1.4	1.2	2.4

100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than five options	Ukraine in general		West		Center		South		East	
	Share	Do not share	Share	Do not share	Share	Do not share	Share	Do not share	Share	Do not share
Serhiy Kaplin	1.3	0.6	0.1	0.8	1.5	0.9	2.6	0.1	0.8	0.0
Serhiy Leshchenko	1.2	0.6	2.0	0.4	1.1	0.9	1.0	0.7	0.3	0.0
Vyacheslav Pikhovshek	1.2	1.8	0.0	3.5	1.7	2.2	1.8	0.4	1.1	0.0
Andriy Parubiy	1.2	8.7	1.8	3.5	1.1	8.3	1.1	14.5	0.2	9.3
Mykhaylo Dobkin	1.1	6.5	0.0	9.6	0.8	7.5	1.9	3.6	3.2	2.9
Arsen Avakov	1.1	9.1	0.3	9.4	1.6	6.1	1.0	10.4	1.8	14.0
Oleksandr Turchynov	1.1	4.8	1.1	1.7	1.5	5.3	1.2	6.8	0.0	5.8
Vadym Novynskyi	1.1	3.2	0.1	3.7	0.8	3.6	1.8	2.5	2.4	2.5
Henadiy Kernes	1.0	4.6	0.0	8.1	1.0	5.0	0.0	2.0	5.1	1.0
Yuriy Lutsenko	1.0	5.5	0.3	2.8	1.7	4.6	1.3	9.9	0.0	4.7
Mykola Azarov	0.9	5.4	0.0	8.0	1.2	6.3	0.2	3.5	3.0	1.5
Olena Lukash	0.4	2.0	0.0	4.1	0.6	2.0	0.9	0.4	0.0	0.6
Oleksiy Honcharenko	0.4	1.9	0.0	0.1	1.0	2.4	0.0	3.9	0.0	0.2
Andriy Portnov	0.3	1.9	0.6	2.8	0.4	1.4	0.0	1.9	0.0	1.4
Oleksandr Klimenko	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0
Russian politicians	0.0	2.1	0.0	2.8	0.0	2.5	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.7
Other	1.4	0.5	1.7	0.6	1.4	0.8	1.2	0.1	1.0	0.3
None of them	21.6	11.6	19.3	11.5	18.0	10.8	27.0	14.0	25.9	9.1
It's hard to say / Refusal	29.6	39.9	26.8	40.2	35.4	41.6	25.6	37.9	27.2	38.7

1.8 Politicians and popular persons, interpretation of topical social and political events

The connection between certain interpretations and trust to individual politicians / popular persons was studied similarly to the TV channels. If we talk about the index related to the conflict with Russia, among those who are more likely to share pro-state interpretations, there are more people who believe that the statements shared by the respondent themselves are promoted by such politicians and popular persons as Anatoliy Hrytsenko (16% vs. 6% among those who are more likely to be pro-opposition / pro-Russian orientated), Petro Poroshenko (10% vs. 1%), Svyatoslav Vakarchuk (11.5% vs. 4%), Andriy Sadovyi (8% vs. 2%), Oleh Tyahnybok (5% vs. 1%). On the contrary, among those who are more likely to share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations, there are slightly more people who mentioned Yuriy Boyko (15% vs. 2%), Vadym Rabinovych (17% vs. 3%), Yevhen Murayev (13% vs. 2%), Oleksandr Vilkul (6.5% vs. 1%), Anatoliy Shariy (5.9% vs. 0.2%) and Mykhailo Dobkin (5% vs. 0.2%).

As for the index with regard to other issues (economy, corruption, domestic politics), those who share pro-state interpretations were more likely to mention Anatoliy Hrytsenko (15% vs. 9.5%), Petro Poroshenko (26% vs. 1%), Svyatoslav Vakarchuk (13% vs. 7%), Volodymyr Hroisman (14% vs. 2%), Mustafa Nayem (8% vs. 2%), and Arsen Avakov (5% vs. 0.5%).

Among those who are more likely to share pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations, there are slightly more people who mentioned Vadym Rabinovych (9.5% vs. 3%).

Table 1.8.1

Which politicians and bloggers, in your opinion, most often promote statements you share?

(% of the respondents depending on the index value)

100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than 7 answers	General index			Index related to the conflict with Russia			Index related to the economy, corruption, and domestic politics		
	Pro-state	Average score	Pro-opposition	Pro-state	Average score	Pro-opposition	Pro-state	Average score	Pro-opposition
Anatoliy Hrytsenko	16.4	9.3	5.4	15.6	4.8	6.1	15.2	10.3	9.5
Petro Poroshenko	15.5	1.8	0.3	10.0	2.0	0.7	26.0	5.3	0.9
Svyatoslav Vakarchuk	13.0	6.4	4.9	11.5	4.9	4.0	13.3	8.4	6.6
Yulia Tymoshenko	12.6	10.5	8.7	12.4	9.3	8.3	11.6	9.6	11.2
Oleh Lyashko	10.1	9.1	6.7	9.7	8.0	7.6	8.1	9.8	8.3
Volodymyr Hroisman	9.2	3.0	1.5	6.6	2.6	2.4	13.7	4.9	2.0
Andriy Sadovyi	8.7	3.8	2.1	7.7	2.1	2.0	6.9	5.1	4.3
Mustafa Nayem	5.7	2.1	1.1	5.2	0.3	1.4	8.2	2.2	2.1
Oleh Tyahnybok	5.7	3.1	1.2	5.4	1.6	0.7	4.4	3.2	3.3
Oleksandr Shevchenko	4.5	2.2	2.2	3.8	1.8	3.0	4.9	2.8	2.6
Dmytro Dobrodomov	4.2	1.9	1.7	4.0	1.4	0.7	3.5	2.5	2.4
Serhiy Taruta	3.4	0.8	4.3	2.3	2.0	4.7	2.4	1.9	3.0
Arseniy Yatsenyuk	2.8	0.7	1.6	2.0	1.4	0.9	4.6	0.8	1.3
Yuriy Boyko	2.7	3.2	11.1	2.1	5.0	15.1	3.2	2.8	7.2
Yuriy Lutsenko	2.7	0.1	0.3	1.7	0.1	0.5	4.6	0.5	0.3
Andriy Parubiy	2.5	0.4	0.7	1.8	0.3	0.8	3.8	1.0	0.6
Oleksandr Turchynov	2.5	0.3	0.6	1.5	0.8	0.5	2.8	1.1	0.7
Serhiy Leshchenko	2.1	0.8	0.9	1.7	1.2	0.0	1.4	1.5	1.0
Arsen Avakov	2.1	1.0	0.3	1.2	1.3	0.4	5.0	0.5	0.5
Vadym Rabinovych	1.9	5.3	14.1	2.7	7.5	17.0	3.4	3.4	9.5
Yevhen Murayev	1.8	2.8	10.6	2.2	4.1	12.8	2.6	2.0	6.7
Viktor Medvedchuk	1.6	0.8	4.2	1.5	1.1	5.2	1.9	0.9	2.7
Vyacheslav Pikhovshek	1.3	0.3	2.5	0.8	0.7	3.4	2.5	0.2	1.5

100% in the column Respondents could choose not more than 7 answers	General index			Index related to the conflict with Russia			Index related to the economy, corruption, and domestic politics		
	Pro-state	Average score	Pro-opposition	Pro-state	Average score	Pro-opposition	Pro-state	Average score	Pro-opposition
Serhiy Kaplin	1.3	0.5	2.6	0.9	1.6	2.2	1.5	0.6	1.8
Inna Bohoslovska	1.2	1.0	2.4	1.3	1.5	1.9	1.4	0.7	1.9
Oleksiy Honcharenko	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.0	2.0	0.2	0.0
Vadym Novynskyi	0.8	0.7	2.1	0.5	1.3	2.6	1.1	0.7	1.4
Oleksandr Vilkul	0.7	1.5	5.4	1.0	2.1	6.5	0.6	1.0	3.6
Andriy Portnov	0.5	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2
Mykola Azarov	0.4	0.5	2.0	0.2	0.6	3.5	0.8	0.5	1.1
Olena Lukash	0.2	0.1	1.1	0.1	0.6	1.3	0.6	0.0	0.7
Henadiy Kernes	0.2	0.7	2.5	0.4	1.1	2.8	0.7	0.2	1.6
Anatoliy Shariy	0.2	1.2	4.1	0.2	1.9	5.9	0.5	0.6	2.7
Mykhaylo Dobkin	0.2	0.2	3.8	0.2	0.9	4.7	0.0	0.2	2.0
Oleksandr Klimenko	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Russian politicians	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
None	18.2	24.1	21.9	19.8	24.2	21.6	15.3	24.5	21.5
It's hard to say / Refusal	21.8	36.9	27.9	25.8	38.2	24.0	21.1	34.6	28.5

Data on the average indices among those who believe that particular politicians / popular persons promote positions shared by respondents are provided below. As for the index related to the conflict with Russia, those who mentioned Mykola Azarov (68), Mykhaylo Dobkin (66.6), Anatoliy Shariy (66), Oleksandr Vilkul (58), Henadiy Kernes (57.7), Yuriy Boyko (57.2), Yevhen Murayev (56.1), and Vadym Rabinovych (55.6) have the highest average scores. At the same time, those who mentioned Petro Poroshenko (20.9), Mustafa Nayem (25.7), Oleksandr Turchynov (26.6), Oleh Tyahnybok (26.9), Serhiy Leshchenko (27.1), and Andriy Parubiy (27.1) have the lowest average scores.

As for the index related to other issues, the situation is quite similar.

Table 1.8.2

Average index of pro-state vs. pro-opposition and / or pro-Russian interpretations among respondents depending on which politicians / popular persons, in their opinion, promote statements shared by the respondents

Average value in the column	General index	Index related to the conflict with Russia	Index related to the economy, corruption, and domestic politics
Politician / popular person who promotes statements shared by respondents			
Mykhaylo Dobkin	74.2	66.6	85.7

Average value in the column	General index	Index related to the conflict with Russia	Index related to the economy, corruption, and domestic politics
Mykola Azarov	71.5	68.0	76.7
Anatoliy Shariy	71.4	66.0	79.4
Henadiy Kernes	66.7	57.7	79.8
Oleksandr Vilkul	66.3	58.0	79.0
Yevhen Murayev	65.2	56.1	78.6
Yuriy Boyko	64.2	57.2	74.7
Vadym Rabinovych	63.9	55.6	76.3
Viktor Medvedchuk	60.7	52.8	72.3
Vadym Novynskyi	59.4	52.0	70.1
Vyacheslav Pikhovshek	59.0	51.3	71.1
Serhiy Kaplin	57.7	46.0	74.7
Inna Bohoslovska	56.3	45.6	72.0
Serhiy Taruta	51.2	41.1	66.1
Oleh Lyashko	48.4	38.4	63.2
Yulia Tymoshenko	47.3	36.5	63.3
Oleksandr Shevchenko	43.1	33.2	57.7
Dmytro Dobrodomov	42.0	28.6	61.8
Anatoliy Hrytsenko	41.6	30.4	58.0
Svyatoslav Vakarchuk	41.4	30.3	57.5
Andriy Sadovyi	40.3	28.4	57.9
Serhiy Leshchenko	39.4	27.1	57.6
Arseniy Yatsenyuk	39.4	29.3	54.3
Oleh Tyahnybok	39.3	26.9	58.2
Oleksandr Turchynov	36.0	26.6	50.1
Andriy Parubiy	35.7	27.1	48.5
Mustafa Nayem	35.0	25.7	48.7
Volodymyr Hroysman	34.4	28.7	42.9
Petro Poroshenko	25.6	20.9	32.7

SECTION II. GENERAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SENTIMENTS



2.1 The biggest threats to the independence of Ukraine

The overwhelming **majority of Ukrainians see more threats to Ukraine's independence in internal reasons rather than in external ones: 57 % of the respondents consider corrupt government officials to be the biggest threat** (chart 2.1.1). Almost half as many respondents (32%) mentioned the hybrid war on the part of Russia. Populism among politicians (24%), the influence of oligarchs (23%), the absence of new people (22.5%), and emigration (19%) should also be listed as the top threats.

Chart 2.1.1

What, in your opinion, is currently the biggest threat to the independence of Ukraine and its development? (Not more than five answers.)

(% among *all* respondents)



At the same time, internal causes are predominant among residents of all regions of Ukraine (Table 2.1.1). In particular, in all regions, not less than 53% mentioned corruption, whereas Russia's actions were mentioned by not more than one third of the respondents (24-36.5% in the West and in the Center, 25-27% in the South and in the East).

Table 2.1.1

What, in your opinion, is currently the biggest threat to the independence of Ukraine and its development? (Not more than five answers.)

(% among *all* respondents)

% in a line Respondents could choose not more than five answers		West	Center	South	East
1	Corruption in the government, due to which the latter is not capable of making effective reforms	52.6	57.8	58.5	59.6
2	Hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine, including because of the activation of the pro-Russian forces	33.7	36.5	25.3	27.2
3	Populism among Ukrainian politicians	24.8	22.3	26.9	19.9
4	Dependence of the political and economic system on oligarchs	17.1	21.7	27.7	26.3
5	Absence of new, non-corrupt politicians, whom citizens would trust	14.4	22.3	34.1	17.5
6	Outflow of able-bodied citizens from Ukraine	20.1	19.5	23.1	6.7
7	The inability of the authorities to effectively communicate their actions	13.5	13.6	16.0	12.0
8	Loss of interest to Ukraine in the world	8.5	12.6	10.8	11.8
9	Reluctance of the West to break ties with Russia	8.1	12.3	11.8	9.1
10	Predominance of pro-Russian politicians in the opposition	10.4	11.9	9.0	8.1
11	Unwillingness of Ukrainians to negotiate with each other	6.0	9.0	16.0	7.1.
12	Activation of far-right and nationalist forces	6.4	9.1	9.4	14.4
13	Media coverage of events in Ukraine mainly in a negative light, which undermines citizens' confidence in their own state.	3.8	8.7	7.9	20.8
14	Failure of the media to accept criticism of the authorities and opposition speeches	3.1	3.8	6.4	10.0
15	Apolitical youth	4.9	4.2	5.1	2.0
---	Other	0.3	0.2	1.2	1.4
---	Hard to say / Refusal to answer	13.9	9.9	14.1	9.2

2.2 Scope of responsibilities of the Ukrainian authorities

First of all, the overwhelming majority of citizens (63.5-74%) are quite right to qualify foreign policy and security as the scope of the President's responsibility (table 1.2.1). At the same time, secondly, a quarter to a half of citizens consider the President to be responsible for the areas where his constitutional powers are more limited. In particular, 47% consider the President to be responsible for corruption, which is the key issue for Ukraine. Every third respondent (31%) also considers the head of the state to be responsible for the economic reforms. Thirdly, except for the President, people most often hold the government/prime minister responsible. They were particularly often held responsible for economic reforms (52%), increase in tariffs (56%, with 24.5% holding the President responsible), and decentralization (37%, with 27% of those who mentioned the President). In general, the majority of respondents held the President / government / prime minister responsible for virtually all areas, except for security (where 45% mentioned law enforcement agencies). Fourthly, it is symptomatic for Ukraine that not more than 8% said that the parliament is responsible for a certain area.

Table 2.2.1

Who, in your opinion, is primarily responsible for...

(% among *all* respondents)

100% in the column	Foreign policy	The war in the Donbas	Reforming the Armed Forces of Ukraine	Reforming law enforcement system	Economic reforms	Fighting corruption	Increase in the utility rates	Decentralization	Safety of citizens
President	71.8	73.6	63.5	38.5	30.7	46.8	24.5	27.0	28.8
Government	10.8	8.8	17.8	20.0	34.7	21.5	37.0	25.7	11.4
Prime minister	1.6	1.6	2.8	5.0	17.3	6.0	19.4	11.2	2.5
Parliament	3.6	2.6	3.9	5.0	7.8	6.3	7.8	6.7	2.5
Parliamentary coalition	0.5	1.1	0.6	1.0	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.6	0.6
Parliamentary opposition	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.6
Law enforcement agencies	0.3	0.6	2.0	22.0	0.3	7.9	0.3	0.4	45.0
Local authorities	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.5	3.2	8.0	1.4
Certain deputies	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4
Local communities	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.3	2.4	0.7
Civil society	0.6	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.3	1.1	0.3	0.3	0.6
Other	0.8	1.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	1.3	0.7	0.2	0.2
It's hard to say / Refusal	8.9	8.8	8.5	6.6	5.6	6.6	5.0	16.1	5.2

2.3 Bringing peace in the Donbas

If we speak separately about the war in the Donbas, **most Ukrainians** (almost a half, **46%**) believe that peace **depends personally on Petro Poroshenko** (chart 2.3.1). A smaller number of people (**43 %**) mentioned **Vladimir Putin**. Another 30% were talking about Ukrainian authorities in general, and 16.5% mentioned Russian authorities in general.

At the same time, all the options can be classified as "Ukraine in general" (Ukrainian authorities, Petro Poroshenko, the army, unity within the population, etc.), "Russia in general" (Russian authorities, Vladimir Putin, "DNR" / "LNR" authorities), and "the West in general". According to the obtained results, a total of 74% of Ukrainians at least partly believe that peace depends on Ukraine, 59% believe it depends on Russia, and 8% think it depends on the West.

Chart 2.3.1

Who does peace in the Donbas primarily depend on? (Not more than three answers.)

(% among *all* respondents)



In all the regions, the overwhelming majority holds Ukraine responsible (Table 2.3.1). At the same time, even in the West and in the Center, approximately the same number of people hold Petro Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin responsible, while Ukrainian authorities are mentioned even more often than the Russian authorities.

Table 2.3.1

Who does peace in the Donbas primarily depend on? (Not more than three answers.)

(% among *all* respondents)

% in a line Respondents could choose not more than three answers		Event	Center	South	East
	Ukraine in general	66.7	80.1	74.9	70.5
	Russia in general	55.6	63.3	59.7	51.3
	The West in general	3.1	7.4	8.9	15.0
1	On Petro Poroshenko personally	40.0	51.6	44.9	45.7
2	On Putin personally	43.7	48.4	36.4	40.2
3	On the Ukrainian authorities	34.9	27.3	34.2	22.1
4	On the Russian authorities	16.5	16.1	20.7	9.5
5	On the authorities of the so-called DNR and LNR	6.9	11.3	16.1	4.5
6	On overcoming corruption and satisfying politicians' interests in the war	8.3	13.6	11.7	3.1
7	On the West	3.1	7.4	8.9	15.0
8	On the unity and solidarity of all Ukrainians	4.4	6.6	4.7	4.1
9	On the combat capability of the Ukrainian Army	4.3	6.6	2.4	4.0
10	On the Ukrainian civil society	3.3	3.8	3.4	6.2
11	On volunteers	0.3	0.8	0.9	1.8
---	Other	0.9	0.3	0.6	2.7
---	Hard to say / Refusal to answer	12.9	5.2	12.5	12.1

Only 13% of Ukrainians believe that Russia is interested in bringing peace in the Donbas. 56% disagree with this, and another 30% still have not decided.

At the same time, only 14% of Ukrainians believe that the Ukrainian authorities should make concessions to Vladimir Putin in order to restore peace (53-56% do not agree with this). Only 14-18% of Ukrainian citizens agree that territories and part of independence must be sacrificed to bring peace (56% do not think like this). Another 26.5-33% hesitated to answer.

Chart 2.3.2

Bringing peace in the Donbas

(% among *all* the respondents)

■ Yes ■ No ■ Hard to say / Refusal to answer



Although it was predictable that confidence in the fact that Russia seeks peace and that it would be better, if the Ukrainian authorities made concessions increases from the West to the East (from 7% to 21% and from 11% to 19% respectively) (Table 2.3.2), in the South and in the East, almost half of respondents have no definite answers to both questions. At the same time, perhaps, to a large extent, those are people who are really ready to make concessions in order to restore peace, but, given the current discourse in the country, they did not want to voice their true opinion during the poll, but chose to avoid a straight answer.

At the same time, it is unexpected that the number of those who are willing to sacrifice territories / independence to bring peace decreases from 23% to 10% from the West to the East.

Table 2.3.2

Bringing peace in the Donbas

(% among *all* the respondents)

100% in the column	Event	Center	South	East
Is Russia, in your opinion, interested in bringing peace in the Donbas?				
Yes	7.0	15.1	12.6	21.0
No	72.8	61.7	41.1	39.2
It's hard to say / Refusal	20.2	23.2	46.3	39.8
Should the Ukrainian authorities make concessions to Vladimir Putin in order to restore peace?				
Yes	11.0	14.5	13.3	18.9
No	69.0	54.1	44.5	35.7
It's hard to say / Refusal	19.9	31.4	42.3	45.3

Are you ready to make sacrifices and to give up territories or parts of Ukraine's independence in order to restore peace?


Yes	23.4	19.6	12.4	10.0
No	58.1	53.9	58.8	51.7
It's hard to say / Refusal	18.5	26.5	28.8	38.4

In general, in terms of information on the situation in the Donbas, the largest number of Ukrainians primarily trust volunteers (27%), representatives of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (23%), and residents of the front-line territories (19%) (chart 2.3.3).

Chart 2.3.3

Whom do you consider to be an authoritative source of information about the situation in the Donbas? (Give not more than five sources.)

(% among *all* the respondents)



2.4 Tomos


As at September 2018, only 28.5% of Ukrainians said they knew what tomos was (chart 2.4.1). Among those who know this, most people (42%) learned it from the media.

In the West of Ukraine, 43% know what tomos is, whereas in the Center this figure is 30%, and in the South and East, it is only 16-18%.

Chart 2.4.1


Do you know what tomos is? And if you know what it is, when did you find out about this?

(% among *all* the respondents)



Where did you learn the meaning of this concept?

(% among those who know what tomos is)



2.5 The use of social networks

Almost one in five Ukrainians (18%) now use at least one Russian social network (chart 2.5.1). At the same time, when asked about a network they use most often, 7% of all respondents mentioned one of the Russian networks.

People in the West use Russian social networks the least often (13%). At the same time, in other regions this figure is 18-23% of the population.


Chart 2.5.1

% of those who use Russian social networks

(% among *all* the respondents)

Which social network do you use most often at the moment?

(% among *all* the respondents)




2.6 The return of Viktor Medvedchuk to Ukrainian public affairs

About half of respondents (52%) could not answer the question of who promotes the return of Viktor Medvedchuk to public affairs most actively (chart 2.6.1). The biggest number of people believe that it is "the Kremlin" (21%), Ukrainian oligarchs (15%), and Viktor Yanukovich's "family" (12%). Fewer people mentioned Petro Poroshenko (5.5%) and Yulia Tymoshenko (3%).

Chart 2.6.1

Who, in your opinion, promotes the return of Viktor Medvedchuk, Andriy Portnov, and other representatives of the Kuchma-Yanukovich regimes to Ukrainian politics and the Ukrainian information space most actively?

(% among *all* the respondents)



Viktor Medvedchuk is primarily perceived as a man whose daughter's godfather is Vladimir Putin – this is the opinion of 35% of Ukrainians (Table 2.6.1). There are 39.5-41% of such people in the West and in the Center, whereas in the South and East, this figure is 23-27.5%.

Another 13% perceive Viktor Medvedchuk as a representative of the Minsk Tripartite Contact Group (TCG), and 10% perceive him as the former head of the Leonid Kuchma presidential administration (in the case of these characteristics, regional differences are more even).

At the same time, it should be noted that perception of Viktor Medvedchuk as the one who effectively manages to get captives out of prisons increases from 1% to 9% from the West to the East.

Table 2.6.1

Which characteristic of Viktor Medvedchuk best corresponds to your vision of him?

(% among *all* the respondents)

% in a line Respondents could choose not more than two answers		Ukraine in general	West	Center	South	East
1	He is a man whose daughter's godfather is Vladimir Putin	34.8	41.3	39.5	27.5	22.7

2	He is a representative of the Minsk Tripartite Contact Group	12.8	10.5	14.8	13.6	10.6
3	He is a former head of the Kuchma presidential administration	10.3	11.7	7.8	8.4	17.3
4	He is the one who effectively helps get captive Ukrainians out of prisons	4.6	1.3	4.4	6.2	8.7
5	He advocates peace at all costs, even at the expense of sacrificing Ukraine's interests	3.7	4.5	3.7	1.6	6.5
6	He wants to achieve peace, it's a pity that no one listens to him	2.5	0.9	2.6	3.0	4.9
7	He is the one who introduced censorship in the Ukrainian media in 2002-2004 through the so-called temnyks <i>[rules that set guidelines on what can be covered and how it should be covered in the media]</i>	2.4	5.0	1.9	0.6	1.8
---	Other	1.4	0.6	1.2	2.5	1.2
---	It's hard to say / Refusal	45.1	42.5	42.3	54.5	39.6

Viktor Medvedchuk is perceived more positively by the respondents who "like" the NewsOne channel (and to a lesser extent this concerns the "112" channel). First of all, 49% of the respondents who think that none of these channels promotes their opinion were unable to answer the question about Viktor Medvedchuk. As for those who watch NewsOne / "112", only a quarter could not answer this question. Secondly, there are more people who perceive Viktor Medvedchuk in a more neutral and positive way among those who watch NewsOne / "112".

Table 2.6.2

Which characteristic of Viktor Medvedchuk best corresponds to your vision of him?

(% among the respondents, depending on whether they believe that NewsOne and "112" promote interpretations shared by a respondent)

% in a line Respondents could choose not more than two answers		None of these TV channels	Only NewsOne	Only "112"	Both
1	He is a man whose daughter's godfather is Vladimir Putin	33.1	25.7	51.0	50.5
2	He is a representative of the Minsk Tripartite Contact Group	10.8	37.4	23.3	28.4
3	He is a former head of the Kuchma presidential administration	9.8	11.8	13.0	14.8
4	He advocates peace at all costs, even at the expense of sacrificing Ukraine's interests	3.4	11.8	5.6	2.1
5	He is the one who effectively helps get captive Ukrainians out of prisons	3.1	15.8	10.6	28.3

6	He is the one who introduced censorship in the Ukrainian media in 2002-2004 through the so-called temnyks <i>[rules that set guidelines on what can be covered and how it should be covered in the media]</i>	2.2	3.4	2.9	7.1.
7	He wants to achieve peace, it's a pity that no one listens to him	2.0	15.6	2.5	11.1
---	Other	1.3	0.0	2.6	0.0
---	It's hard to say / Refusal	49.0	26.2	17.9	8.6