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#### **Research Team:**

Anton Grushetsky Andrii Kruglashov Natalia Lygachova Volodymyr Paniotto Galyna Petrenko Roman Shutov

#### Design

Yana Dobrianska

In February 2018, KIIS conducted all-Ukrainian opinion poll, as requested by NGO "Detector Media". This research used opinion poll to learn views and opinions of adult Ukrainians (18+) regarding media usage, opposition to Russian propaganda and media literacy of population. The total number of interviews was 2043, with respondents from 110 Ukrainian communities. For Donetsk and Luhansk regions population size was calculated only for territories currently under control of Ukrainian authorities.

The research was conducted by KIIS, as requested by NGO "Detector Media", due to support of Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Danida) and US National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Opinion expressed in the report do not necessary represent those of the Danida and NED.

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### POLL METHODOLOGY

All-Ukrainian opinion poll was conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in February 2018, as requested by NGO "Detector Media", financed by Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and US National Endowment for Democracy.

The dynamics of changes in influence of Russian propaganda could be traced by comparing these data with previous opinion polls conducted at the request of "Detector Media". In particular, analytical report "Opposition to Russian informational aggression: joint efforts for protection of democracy" was presented in April 2015; opinion poll on the perception of Russian propagandist messages, credence to Russian and Ukrainian media, awareness about media owners was conducted in June 2015; research on the level of critical attitude of citizens towards media was completed in March 2016. In 2017 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, at the request of "Detector Media", conducted the research on "How Russian propaganda influences Ukrainian public opinion".

This research used opinion poll to learn views and opinions of adult Ukrainians (18+) regarding media usage, opposition to Russian propaganda and media literacy of population. The research consisted of several main stages: development of questionnaire and supplementary instruments; development of sample; interviewing of respondents; quality check; data processing and error check; preparation of final data set, tables of one-dimensional and two-dimensional distribution, and analytical report.

For this research KIIS developed stratified, 4-level sample, random at each level. The sample is representative for adult Ukrainian population that lives constantly in Ukraine, is not on military service, in prisons or health care centers (hospitals, hostels). The sample did not include territories which are temporarily out of control of Ukrainian authorities (Crimea, certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk regions).

At first, Ukrainian population was stratified by regions (24 regions and the city of Kyiv); then population of each region was additionally stratified as urban (cities, urban-type settlements) and rural (except Kyiv, where all population is urban). Thus, all Ukrainian population was divided into 49 strata. For each strata, in proportion to the size of adult population, KIIS defined the number of interview to be conducted and the number of communities to be involved in interviewing. For Donetsk and Luhansk regions KIIS calculated population size only for territories currently under control of Ukrainian authorities.

After stratification KIIS selected particular communities for interviewers' fieldwork. At the first stage, KIIS

selected communities within each strata. Urban communities were selected with probability, proportional to adult population size in the given community. For rural strata, KIIS initially selected districts (with probability proportional to adult population size in the given district), and then randomly selected rural communities within the selected district. At the second stage, KIIS selected electoral wards within the selected communities. At the third stage, KIIS selected initial addresses (street, house, if applicable – apartment) where the interviewers should start. At the fourth stage respondents were selected and questioned using modified route sampling.

The interviewing was conducted via personal interviews using Tablet PC in the respondents' private households.

Due to random sampling at each stage, women and elderly people were overrepresented in the final data set. Special statistical 'balances' were created to restore proper proportions.

Data below are presented for Ukraine in general and separately for four Ukrainian macro-regions: Western (Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi and Chernivtsi regions), Central (Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kyiv regions and the city of Kyiv), Southern (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Odesa regions), and Eastern (Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv regions).

The fieldwork lasted from Feb. 5 to Feb. 21, 2018. The total number of interviews was 2043, with respondents from 110 Ukrainian communities.

Statistical error for sample of 2043 respondents (with probability 0.95 and design effect 1.5) does not exceed:

- 3.3% for indexes close to 50%,
- 2.8% for indexes close to 25 or 75%,
- 2.0% for indexes close to 12 or 88%,
- 1.4% for indexes close to 5 or 95%,
- 0.7% for indexes close to 1 or 99%.

### MAIN RESULTS



### Level of usage and credence to information sources

- Absolute majority of Ukrainians (86%) receive information about Ukrainian and world events from Ukrainian TV channels. 27% of Ukrainians receive information from Ukrainian websites, 24% from social networks. For 18% the main source of information are personal social relations: relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, etc. No more than 8% of population use other informational sources. In particular, 5% of respondents admitted that they receive information about Ukrainian and world events from Russian TV channels.
- 57% of Ukrainian population receive information only from Ukrainian media (in the Eastern part of Ukraine there are 52% such respondents). Among the rest of the population, the majority also receive information from TV, but combine it with other sources; others receive information only from websites, social networks and personal acquaintances. Virtually all respondents who receive information from Russian media (5% nationwide, but 11% in the East of Ukraine), also receive information from Ukrainian media. Only 0.2% of Ukrainians (0.6% of Eastern Ukrainians) receive information solely from Russian media.
- At the same time, **57% trust information from Ukrainian TV channels about the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine** (46% in the Eastern macro-region vs. 54-61% in the other macro-regions), 14% trust such information from the websites, 13% information from social networks.
- On the average, an adult Ukrainian watches 3 Ukrainian TV channels but trusts only 1.5 channels regarding the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and "people's republics" in Donbas.
- For general audience, **top TV channels** are 1+1 (watched by 61% of Ukrainians), **Inter** (48%), **TV Ukraine** (44%), ICTV (39%), **STB** (36%), **New channel** (18%) and **112 channel** (15%). **In terms of credence to information no more than 35% trust any particular channel**. The same 7 channels are leading in terms of the number of trusting watchers: 1+1 (35%), Inter (22%), TV Ukraine (22%), ICTV (20%), New channel (6%) and 112 channel (8%).
- 1+1 is the leading channel in the Western and Central parts of Ukraine. In the South its rating is still high, but its competitors are closer. The positions of Inter and TV Ukraine are stronger in the Southern and Eastern parts of Ukraine. ICTV has roughly the same audience in all macroregions. STB is most watched in the South, somewhat less in the Western and Central macro-regions, least of all in the East of Ukraine. Some other channels also have visible regional particularities: e. g., ZIK, 24 channel and 5 channel are much more watched in the West, and NewsOne in the South and East. 112 channel and New channel are also somewhat more popular in the East.
- Only one fourth of Ukrainian TV watchers (27%) believe that Ukrainian channels truly provide objective information about the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and "people's republics". Significantly more people (43%) believe that the information provided by TV is not true (whereas 30% reserved their opinion). The proportion of those who believe in objectiveness of the information provided by Ukrainian TV channels becomes lower from the West to the East (31% to 20%).
- 42% of adult Ukrainians use at least one social network. **The most popular network is currently Facebook, used by 36% of Ukrainians**. No more than 11% of Ukrainians use other social networks.
- 29% of Ukrainians use only one of the "Western" social networks. Only 3% use solely Russian social networks; 8% have accounts in both "Western" and "Russian" social networks.

#### Information check

- 35% of respondents claim that, if they get an information from Ukrainian national, Russian, their local media, or media of "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics", they would check it with media of "the other" side. At the same time, slightly more than a half of the respondents (52%) would not check the information.
- At the same time, **if the information from different sources is contradictory, 58% prefer to believe Ukrainian nationwide media,** and only 1% would rather believe Russian media or media of "people's republics". At the same time, every third Ukrainian (38%) does not know which side he or she would rather believe in such situation. In the West 27% don't know which side to believe; in the Center 37%, South 47%, East 48% (although anyway Ukrainian media keep the lead in all macro-regions).

### Fullness of information on particular issues

- Most of Ukrainians admit that they receive insufficient information about state strategies and goals regarding Crimea (63% vs. 23% who said they have rather or fully enough information), regarding the territories controlled by "people's republics" (60% vs. 26%) and new Law on Reintegration of Donbas (68% vs. 13%).
- At the same time, as compared to previous KIIS poll (December 2016), the level of informational awareness has become somewhat higher (in December 2016 only 17% had enough information regarding Crimea, and 20% regarding Donbas).
- Subjectively, Eastern Ukrainians believe themselves more informed about state strategies and goals regarding both Crimea (34% believe themselves "sufficiently informed") and Donbas (40%), whereas in the other macro-regions the proportion of those who believe themselves sufficiently informed does not exceed 25%.
- Only 5% of the respondents claim to be familiar with at least some of the provisions of the Law on Reintegration of Donbas. At the same time, 50% heard something but do not know any details, and 41% didn't hear anything about the Law.

#### Interpretations of current events in the context of annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the east of Ukraine

- 52% of respondents believe that the war was initiated by Russia and separatists (at the same time, 15% blame Ukraine, and one third has no definite opinion which is a negative fact after 4 years of war), 43% of respondents believe that Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speaking people are persecuted in Crimea and "people's republics" (vs. 10% who believe that Russians and Russian-speaking people are persecuted in Ukraine).
- 30% believe that an attack on the freedom of speech is currently going on in Ukraine; 33% believe that in Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin media; 38% has no definite opinion about this issue.
- People mostly reject certain restrictive measures:
  - 44% do not support the ban of Russian TV channels (37% support it),
  - 46% do not support the ban of Russian social networks (30% support it),
  - 53% do not support the ban of certain Russian artists and movies (29% support it).
- Only in the Western macro-region we can see certain domination of the "pro-Ukrainian" interpretation of events and support of some decisions of the Ukrainian authorities. However, even here 28%

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of respondents either believe that the war was initiated by Ukraine or have no definite opinion about this issue. Just slightly more than a half of Western Ukrainians (52-56%) support the ban of Russian TV series / social networks / artists.

- In the Central macro-region 55% blame Russia / separatists for initiating the war (whereas 14% blame Ukraine, and 31% have no definite opinion about this issue). The ban of Russian TV channels is rather supported; however, the majority here stands against the ban of TV series / social networks / artists.
- In the South and East only one third of the respondents believe that that the war was initiated by Russia and separatists (17-18% blame Ukraine, the rest have no definite opinion). Also, the majority here is against the restrictive measures against Russian TV channels, TV series, social networks and artists.

# Opposition to kremlin propaganda and disinformation. Assessment of effectiveness of the state and NGOs

- Ukrainians mostly suppose that **opposition to Kremlin propaganda is the responsibility of governmental bodies**: 49% of respondents believe that this is solely governmental responsibility. 33% of respondents "split" the responsibility between governmental agencies and NGOs.
- Ukrainians have no definite opinion about the "success secret" of Russian propaganda. Mostly they suggest that Russian propaganda is effective due to serious financial investments into propaganda (38% of respondents), lack of critical thinking of ordinary audience (33%) and Russia's bribing foreign media and politicians (30%).
- Ukrainians **rather critically assess effectiveness** of both governmental bodies and NGOs in **opposing Kremlin propaganda**. The creation of Ukrainian content is assessed somewhat better: 24% believe that the state is doing enough in this direction (47% disagree), 19% believe the same about NGOs (44% disagree).
- 16% of respondents positively assess governmental activity in providing media literacy courses in educational institutions (46% disagree), 14% positively assess similar activities of NGOs (42% disagree). Regarding restoration of TV and radio broadcasting for Donbas 13% believe that government is doing enough (50% disagree), 10% believe the same about NGOs (42% disagree).
- Critical assessment of governmental and NGO's effectiveness prevails in all macro-regions, although the overall assessment in Southern and Eastern macro-regions is somewhat better.

#### Ukrainian language quotas on radio and TV

- One third of Ukrainians (33%) support quotas for Ukrainian language on radio and TV; 43% do not support it. Of those who support it only one third believe that the state and NGOs are doing enough in this direction.
- The support for quotas becomes much lower from the West to the East: in the Western macro-region 50% agree with this decision (24% disagree), in the Central macro-region the figures are 36% vs. 39%. In the South and East most of the people (resp., 57% and 67%) are against quotas, which are supported, resp., by 22% and 14% of regional respondents.

### Self-assessment of ability to recognize fakes

• Slightly more than a half of Ukrainians (53%) believe themselves capable to distinguish good-quality information from disinformation and fakes at least in most cases (including 20% who believe they can do it always). One third of respondents (31%) admit themselves usually or utterly unable to discern whether the information is trustworthy. The number of respondents who believe themselves generally capable to discern rotten information is about the same in all regions.

- These respondents are more certain about their ability to identify fakes:
- Respondents from middle-size towns and big cities (60-68% believe that they mostly can identify fakes vs. 43-49% of rural respondents);
- Men (61% vs. 47% women);
- Younger persons (the figures are gradually lowing from 60% for re spondents below 30 to 33% for persons 70+);
- Better educated Ukrainians (66% for respondents with higher edu cation vs. no more than 50% for persons with lower level of education);
- Specialists, students, businessmewn (66-73% vs. no more than 55% for other occupations; least of all retired persons – 41%);
- Wealthier Ukrainians (66-73% for those who have high or average income vs. 46% low-income persons and 38% very low-income persons).
- Among the criteria of identification of non-fakes people mostly refer to their trust to the media which provided this information (for 33% of Ukrainians this is one of the main criteria) and visible authorship (30%).

### Enhancement of media literacy

- Most of Ukrainians (61%) believe that the state and NGOs should foster the enhancement of media literacy. Teaching media literacy is important for 61-66% in the Western, Central and Southern macro-regions vs. 43% in the Eastern macro-region.
- In virtually all social-demographical categories of the population, the majority believes that teaching media literacy is important.
- At the same time, the respondents have no definite opinion about the primary target group of such teaching. Most of those who admit that teaching media literacy is important give priority to teenagers (48%); 29% of respondents consider media literacy important for adults.
- 22% of Ukrainians would personally agree to receive training in media literacy. The most interested are Westerners 31% vs. no more than 20% in other regions. Of those who are interested people mostly prefer online courses (56%).
- There is a correlation between readiness to receive training and positive self-assessment of one's ability to recognize fakes: an interest to trainings was expressed by 31% of those who believe themselves always capable to identify fakes, 26% of those who believe themselves capable to identify fakes in most of the cases, and 16-17% of those who believe themselves capable to identify fakes at least sometimes.
- These respondents are more interested in getting such trainings:
  - Respondents from middle-size towns and big cities (26% vs. 18% of rural respondents and those from small towns);
  - Younger persons (40% for respondents below 30, 21-24% for respondents between 30-49, no more than 16% for persons 50+);
  - Better educated Ukrainians (34% for respondents with higher edu cation vs. no more than 19% for persons with lower level of eduction);
  - Students, specialists, businessmen (35-48%);
  - Wealthier Ukrainians (46% of those who have high or average incom evs. 32% low-income persons and 10-17% very low-income persons).



## STRUCTURE AND CREDENCE TO INFORMATION SOURCES

### 1.1

#### General structure of information sources for Ukrainian population

Absolute majority of Ukrainians (86%) receive information about the events in Ukraine and the world from Ukrainian TV channels (Table 1.1.1). About a quarter of Ukrainians receive information from Ukrainian websites (27%); same about social networks (24%). Totally 42% of Ukrainians receive information from the Internet (national and local Ukrainian Internet-media, Russian Internet-media, social networks). For 18% of Ukrainians the main source of information is the circle of personal acquaintances: relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, etc. No more than 8% of respondents use other sources.

Regarding state strategies and purposes for Donbas and Crimea, the respondents refer to particular sources less often. Even less often they trust certain sources regarding the armed stand-off in Donbas. However, Ukrainian TV channels keep the lead anyway, with 74% of respondents receiving information about state strategies and purposes from this source, and 57% trusting this source. For Ukrainian websites

the corresponding figures are, respectively, 16% and 14%, for social networks – 12% and 13%. Generally 25% of Ukrainians receive information about state strategies and purposes from the Internet, and 24% trust information about the conflict in Donbas from this source.

5% of respondents admitted receiving information about the events in Ukraine and the world from Russian TV channels. On the one hand, this is much less than Ukrainian sources; however, in the absolute figures there are about 1.4 million of Ukrainian citizens. In addition, some respondents could possibly hide their receiving information from Russian TV channels, so that the given figures rather indicate conservative lower margin. One should also note that 67% of those who receive information from Russian TV channels inhabit Southern and Eastern Ukraine.

The main technical way of access to Russian TV channels is satellite (69% of users). 13% watch Internet TV, 12% use analog antenna, 8% have access via cable TV.

Table 1.1.1

?

From which sources you receive information about Ukrainian and world events most often? From which sources
you receive information
about state strategies and
purposes regarding
Crimea and Donbas?

Which of the listed sources of information about the armed stand-off in Donbas you trust?


(% of all respondents, n=2043)

	% of respond	lents receiving inforn	nation about
% in the column*	% of respondents receiving infor- mation about	State strategies and purposes regarding Crimea and Donbas	Trust information about the con- flict in Donbas
Ukrainian TV (national channels)	85.7	73.9	57.2
Ukrainian Internet media	27.1	16.3	14.1
Social networks	23.5	12.0	12.5
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances	17.9	9.5	8.7
Ukrainian newspapers (national editions)	8.1	2.9	3.3
Local TV	6.4	1.6	2.0
Local printed media	4.8	1.0	1.4
Russian TV	4.7	2.0	1.6
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	4.2	2.5	2.4
Local Internet media	2.5	1.1	0.6
Local radio	2.0	0.4	0.7
Russian websites	0.5	0.4	
Media of "people's republics" in Donbas (including websites)	0.1	0.1	0.1
Russian printed media	0.1	0.0	0.0
Official information from Ukrainian Ministry of Defense / media of this Ministry			0.3
Acquaintances who are or were in the zone of conflict, Crimea or territory controlled by "people's republics"			4.9
Other sources	0.7	0.6	0.3
I don't trust any sources			15.8
Hard to say / No answer	2.2	13.0	9.2

<sup>\*</sup> The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

There are different ways to categorize information sources, but for the purposes of this study it is expedient to use these categories: Ukrainian media (national and local), Russian media (including media of "people's republics"), social media and personal acquaintances. The results of the poll show that 95% of Ukrainians receive information from Ukrainian media, whereas 5% receive information from Russian media (Diagram 1.1.1).

57% of Ukrainians receive information solely from Ukrainian media (i.e. they referred to at least one Ukrainian media and did not mention Russian media, social networks, personal relatives, friends, acquaintances, etc.) (in the East of Ukraine this group amounts to 52%). Almost all of those who receive information from Russian media also get information from Ukrainian media. Only 0.2% of Ukrainians receive information solely from Russian media (in the East of Ukraine this group amounts to 0.6%).



**Tables 1.1.2-4** below present data for different regions. The basic structure of information sources is the same in all macro-regions: both Western and Eastern Ukrainians mostly receive information from Ukrainian TV channels (83-88% in different macro-regions). Internet resources are less popular: generally, Ukrainian central/local websites, Russian websites, and social networks are used as a source of information by 49% of respondents in the Western macro-region, 39% in the Central macro-region, 41% in the Southern macro-region and 38% in the Eastern macro-region. It is remarkable that Russian TV was mentioned by 1% of respondents in the West vs. 3% in the Center, 8% in the South, and 10% in the East.

#### Table 1.1.2 From which sources you receive information about Ukrainian and world events most often? (% of all respondents) % of respondents of macro-region... % in the column\* West Center South East (n=572 (n=710)(n=491)(n=270)Ukrainian TV (national 87.8 85.2 85.3 83.3 channels) Ukrainian Internet media 34.4 21.8 27.8 24.6 Social networks 24.9 24.8 19.8 24.2 Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances 19.0 19.5 13.4 21.1 Ukrainian newspapers 10.2 9.7 5.9 4.0 (national editions) Local TV 11.1 2.8 5.4 8.1 Local printed media 8.1 3.8 4.1 2.1 Russian TV 1.3 3.3 7.5 9.8 Ukrainian radio 5.2 5.6 2.1 2.8 (national stations) Local Internet media 2.7 4.2 2.2 1.0 Local radio 2.9 2.0 0.3 3.5 Russian websites 0.0 0.1 1.8 0.4 Media of "people's republics" in 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 Donbas (including websites) Russian printed media 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 Other sources 0.0 1.4 0.4 0.9 Hard to say / No answer 1.3 2.3 1.9 4.0

\* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

In terms of the narrower topic of state strategy and goals for Donbas and Crimea 75-77% of Western, Central and Southern Ukrainians mention Ukrainian channels **(Table 1.1.3)**. In the East there are 60% of such respondents, whereas 5% mention Russian channels. At the same time, every fifth Eastern respondent could not answer this question (21%).

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Table 1.1.3 From which sources you receive information about state strategies and purposes regarding Crimea and Donbas? (% of all respondents) % of respondents of macro-region... % in the column\* West Center South East (n=572)(n=270)(n=710)(n=491)Ukrainian TV (national 77.1 74.8 60.1 76.2 channels) Ukrainian Internet media 22.6 16.0 14.7 12.1 Social networks 11.2 11.5 12.2 14.2 Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances 5.4 7.5 12.7 16.9 Ukrainian newspapers 1.7 2.6 5.1 2.1 (national editions) Local TV 1.7 0.3 2.4 3.5 2.2 0.5 0.0 Local printed media 1.0 Russian TV 0.3 1.5 3.0 4.7 Ukrainian radio 3.6 3.0 0.6 2.1 (national stations) Local Internet media 0.7 0.7 2.0 1.1 Local radio 0.6 0.0 0.4 1.1 Russian websites 0.4 0.3 0.2 8.0 Media of "people's republics" in 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 Donbas (including websites) Russian printed media 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other sources 0.2 1.3 0.0 8.0 Hard to say / No answer 9.1 14.0 11.6 20.7

The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

As to the credence to information sources regarding the conflict in Donbas, 46% of Eastern Ukrainians trust information from Ukrainian TV channels (3% trust information from Russian TV channels). In other macro-regions 54-61% trust information from Ukrainian TV channels (**Table 1.1.4**).

#### Table 1.1.4

2

### Which of the listed sources of information about the armed stand-off in Donbas you trust?

(% of all respondents)

	% of respondents of macro-region							
% in the column*	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)				
Ukrainian TV (national channels)	61.1	60.3	54.4	46.0				
Ukrainian Internet media	22.3	10.7	12.6	8.9				
Social networks	13.4	13.8	11.1	9.9				
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances	7.1	7.3	11.1	11.2				
Ukrainian newspapers (national editions)	3.8	4.0	2.7	1.7				
Local TV	3.0	0.5	2.1	4.0				
Local printed media	2.7	0.7	0.9	1.2				
Russian TV	0.7	1.4	2.4	2.6				
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	3.2	3.4	0.7	1.4				
Local Internet media	0.8	0.1	1.3	0.4				
Local radio	1.2	0.4	0.2	1.3				
Media of "people's republics" in Donbas (including websites)	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0				
Russian printed media	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4				
Official information from Ukrainian Ministry of Defense / media of this Ministry	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.0				
Acquaintances who are or were in the zone of conflict, Crimea or territory controlled by "people's republics"	4.7	3.5	6.7	5.5				
Other sources	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.8				
I don't trust any sources	13.6	12.9	21.1	17.7				
Hard to say / No answer	3.9	11.9	6.6	18.2				

<sup>\*</sup> The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

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Table 1.1.5 From which sources you receive information about state strategies and purposes regarding Crimea and Donbas? (% of respondents who live in the corresponding type of community) Urban-type settlements / Small towns Middle-size Village (n=693) **Big cities** % in the column\* towns (n=910) (n=130) (n=310) Ukrainian TV (national 80.3 70.9 72.1 70.2 channels) Ukrainian Internet media 12.5 16.1 10.8 20.0 Social networks 7.1 12.0 19.3 14.6 Relatives, friends, neighbors, 7.1 12.9 10.9 9.9 colleagues, acquaintances Ukrainian newspapers 3.0 1.9 1.6 3.4 (national editions) Ukrainian radio (national stations) 3.4 2.4 2.0 1.8 Russian TV 2.2 2.7 0.5 1.8 Local TV 2.1 0.5 2.8 1.1 Local Internet media 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1 Local printed media 1.4 0.8 1.9 0.6 Local radio 0.2 0.3 8.0 0.6 Russian websites 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.7 Media of "people's republics" in Donbas (including websites) 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 Russian printed media 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other sources 0.0 0.0 2.6 1.0 Hard to say / No answer 14.3 10.8 14.0 12.4 The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

**Table 1.1.5** shows sources of information about state strategy and goals for Donbas and Crimea used by inhabitants of different types of communities.

#### Table 1.1.6 Which of the listed sources of information about the armed stand-off in Donbas you trust? (% of respondents depending on whether they visited the EU for the last 2 years) Visited EU Did not visit EU % in the column\* (n=166) (n=1871)**Ukrainian TV (national channels)** 48.7 58.0 Ukrainian Internet media 35.0 12.1 Social networks 22.1 11.5 Relatives, friends, 10.2 8.6 neighbors, colleagues Acquaintances who are or were in the zone of conflict, Crimea or territory controlled by "people's republics" 6.6 4.7 2.8 Ukrainian radio (national stations) 2.4 Local TV 2.0 2.6 Ukrainian newspapers (national editions) 2.0 3.4 Local Internet media 1.6 0.6 Local printed media 1.2 1.4 Russian TV 1.1 1.7 Local radio 0.6 0.7 Official information from Ukrainian Ministry of Defense 0.4 0.3 / media of this Ministry Russian printed media 0.0 0.1 Media of "people's republics" in 0.0 0.1 Donbas (including websites) Other sources 0.4 0.3 I don't trust any sources 11.4 16.2 Hard to say / No answer 5.5 9.6

\* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

**Table 1.1.6** shows credence to the sources of information depending on experience of visiting the EU for the last 2 years. Those who visited EU somewhat less rely on TV and somewhat more on Internet resources. However, one should also take into account that Ukrainians who visited the EU are generally younger, better educated and wealthier.

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
1.2

### Information check with alternative sources. Credence in case of contradictory information

35% of respondents claim that at least sometimes they check an information with "another" source (**Diagram 1.2.1**). However, given the structure of information sources (see above, 1.1), it seems that a good part of the respondents overestimate their verification skills.

At the same time, the respondents were asked about hypothetical situations of receiving contradictory information from different sources (Ukrainian central and local media, Russian media, media of "people's republics"). The question was, which source of information they would probably treat as more trustworthy. In case of contradictory information from different sources 58% would rather trust Ukrainian national media, and only 1% would rather trust Russian media or media of "people's republics". At the same time, every third Ukrainian (38%) doesn't know which media to trust in such situation.

Those who always check information, who sometimes check and who never check information – all these groups prefer Ukrainian national media as the most trustworthy source.



In case of contradictory information, credence to **Ukrainian national media becomes lower from the West to the East.** In the West 69% would rather believe Ukrainian media vs. 62% in the Central macro-region, 49% in the Southern macro-region, and 43% in the Eastern macro-region. (At the same time, the proportion of those who check information at least sometimes is about the same in all macro-regions: 31-36%) **(Table 1.2.1)**. Although less credence to Ukrainian national media correlates with more credence to Russian media or media of "people's republics" (from 0.5% in the Western macro-region to 5% in the Eastern macro-region), it also correlates with more people who don't know which side to believe: 27% in the Western macro-region, 37% in the Central macro-region, 47% in the Southern macro-region, 48% in the Eastern macro-region.

#### Table 1.2.1

?

If you get an information from Ukrainian national, Russian, your local media, or media of "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics", would you check this information with the other side's media?

If an information you get from Ukrainian national, Russian, your local media, or media of "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics" is contradictory, or at least significantly differs, which kind of media you usually trust most?

#### (% of all respondents)

	% of respondents of macro-region								
100% in the column	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)					
Information check with alternative sources									
Yes	21.4	16.3	15.0	18.6					
Sometimes	14.8	19.6	16.2	15.5					
No	50.1	50.9	56.2	50.7					
Hard to say / No answer	13.7	13.2	12.7	15.2					
Which kind of media	is preferable ir	n case of contra	adictory inform	ation					
Ukrainian national media	68.8	62.3	48.6	42.9					
Local media	4.3	0.2	2.9	4.6					
Russian media	0.5	0.4	1.3	3.4					
Media of "people's republics"	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.3					
Hard to say / No answer	26.5	37.1	47.0	47.8					

**Table 1.2.2** contains data for separate social and demographical population groups. These groups more often claim to check information at least sometimes:

- inhabitants of middle-size towns and big cities (39-46% vs. 27-31% among inhabitants of villages and small towns / urban-type settlements);
- men (42% vs. 29% women);
- younger and middle-aged persons (36-41% for the group 18-59 years old vs. 21-27% for 60+ group);

Table 1.2.2

If you get an information from Ukrainian national, Russian, your local media, or media of "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics", would you check this information with the other side's media?


If an information you get from Ukrainian national, Russian, your local media, or media of "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics" is contradictory, or at least significantly differs, which kind of media you usually trust most?

(% among respondents of the corresponding strata)

Information ch		on che	ck		Which source is rather credible						
100% in the row	Yes	Sometimes	No	Hard to say / No answer		Ukrainian media	Local media	Russian media	Media of people's republics"	Hard to say / No answer	Potential of the strata*
		Co	ommuni	ty type	and	dsize					
- village (n=693)	12.4	18.1	52.6	17.0		59.4	1.9	0.6	0.3	37.8	33.8
- urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000) (n=310)	10.2	16.9	63.5	9.4		49.5	4.2	1.2	0.0	45.1	15.3
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	22.0	23.7	41.4	12.9		65.5	3.7	2.0	0.0	28.8	6.4
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	23.6	15.0	49.0	12.3		59.0	2.3	1.2	0.3	37.2	44.5
			Ger	der stra	ata						
- men (n=802)	21.7	20.0	46.1	12.2		57.3	2.2	1.3	0.4	38.8	45.1
- women (n=1241)	14.3	14.3	56.8	14.5		58.7	2.9	0.8	0.1	37.5	54.9
			Age-sp	ecific	stra	ıta					
- 18-29 years (n=280)	19.5	17.9	48.7	13.9		61.3	1.2	0.3	0.3	36.9	21.1
- 30-39 years (n=396)	21.4	17.6	48.6	12.4		52.5	2.1	0.5	0.0	44.8	18.5
- 40-49 years (n=308)	21.2	19.9	45.1	13.8		58.4	1.8	1.5	0.6	37.7	16.6
- 50-59 years (n=400)	16.5	19.6	54.1	9.8		55.7	4.8	2.3	0.4	36.8	17.7
- 60-69 years (n=353)	16.8	9.9	57.7	15.6		61.1	3.4	0.2	0.0	35.2	12.4
- 70+ years (n=306)	7.9	13.6	61.9	16.6		60.5	2.4	1.5	0.0	35.7	13.8
			Educa	tional s	tra	ta					
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	6.2	8.5	68.4	16.9		63.7	0.8	0.0	0.0	35.4	8.6
- complete secondary (n=593)	13.2	15.9	57.5	13.5		60.9	2.8	1.9	0.0	34.3	28.1
- vocational (n=673)	15.2	19.4	52.2	13.2		54.6	2.0	1.3	0.5	41.6	32.1
- higher (n=615)	27.3	17.6	42.2	12.8		57.5	3.4	0.3	0.2	38.7	31.2
			Lingual	-ethnic	str	ata					
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	18.8	19.0	50.9	11.3		66.6	2.3	0.6	0.0	30.5	57.3
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	15.7	13.8	55.2	15.2		51.4	2.2	1.1	0.7	44.7	34.3
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	18.5	12.4	48.2	20.9		23.7	6.2	4.8	0.0	65.3	3.4

- people with higher education (45% vs. 35% for persons with vocational education, 29% with complete secondary education and 15% with incomplete secondary education);
- specialists and businessmen / self-employed (51% vs. no more than one third for persons with other occupation);
- high-income persons (61% vs. 43% of middle-income persons and 29% of low and very low-income persons).

At the same time, respondents from all social and demographical groups, in case of contradictory information, would rather believe Ukrainian media. The most important correlation it with lingual-ethnic categories. Among Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians 67% would rather trust Ukrainian media; among Russian-speaking Ukrainians – only 51%; among Russian-speaking Russians – 24% (at the same time, the proportion of those who don't know which source to trust increases from 31% to 65%). However, one should also take into account that this lingual-ethnic structure is closely related to regional distribution: 87% of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians inhabit Central and Western Ukraine, whereas three fourths of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians inhabit Southern and Eastern Ukraine.



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1.3


#### Receiving and credence to information from Ukrainian TV channels

On an average, **an adult Ukrainian watches 3 Ukrainian TV channels**, but trust only 1.5 channels regarding events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and "people's republics".

Top channels for general audience nationwide are 1+1 (watched by 61% of Ukrainians), Inter (watched by 48% of Ukrainians), TV Ukraine (44%), ICTV (39%), STB (36%). In terms of credence to information no more than 35% trust any particular channel. The same five channels are leading as the most trustworthy sources of information: 1+1 (trusted by 35% of respondents), Inter (trusted by 22%), Україна (22%), ICTV (20%). That is, about a half of watchers of any particular channel trust its information about the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and "people's republics".

?

Diagram 1.3.1



There are significant differences in channel preferences between Ukrainian macro-regions. 1+1 is leading in Western in Central macro-regions; in the South its rating is still high, but its competitors are closer **(Table 1.3.1).** Inter and TV Ukraine have stronger positions in the Southern and Eastern macro-regions. ICTV has roughly the same level of popularity in all regions. STB is most watched in the Sough, somewhat less in the Western and Central macro-regions, least of all in the East. Some other channels also have visible regional peculiarities: e.g., ZIK, 24 channel and 5 channel are much more watched in the West, whereas NewsOne – in the South and East.

Table 1.3.1

?

Which Ukrainian TV channels you watch most often? / Which of those Ukrainian channels you trust most regarding the information on events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics"?


(% of all respondents)

	West (n=572)		Center (n=710)		South (n=491)		East (n=270)	
% in the column*	Watch	Trust	Watch	Trust	Watch	Trust	Watch	Trust
1+1	68.6	39.9	63.0	39.4	63.4	33.9	35.0	18.2
Inter	42.4	16.2	43.2	21.3	54.5	27.9	59.3	26.8
TV Ukraine	34.7	12.9	42.4	24.2	51.1	25.5	51.7	26.2
ICTV	43.5	22.4	36.4	19.0	37.4	19.1	40.8	18.3
STB	35.5	10.0	36.2	17.6	43.7	18.8	23.9	7.7
New channel	14.8	2.4	17.3	9.2	17.9	4.0	26.6	10.4
112 Ukraine	16.2	8.0	14.0	7.7	11.4	5.4	22.3	11.6
NewsOne	2.1	0.5	6.3	3.6	10.6	6.3	15.4	9.8
5 channel	13.9	6.1	6.0	2.3	2.2	1.0	3.4	2.0
ZIK	10.6	7.9	3.2	1.9	2.7	1.9	3.1	1.0
24 channel	10.9	6.4	1.6	0.6	3.6	0.9	1.2	0.6
UA:Pershyj	3.8	1.8	5.0	3.5	2.9	0.6	2.1	0.4
Pryamyj channel	1.2	0.5	2.9	1.0	2.4	1.6	3.3	1.7
Espreso TV	2.7	1.2	2.7	1.4	1.0	0.7	0.0	0.0
Hromadske TV	2.5	1.6	1.0	0.4	2.2	0.9	0.6	0.0
ATR	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Do not watch Ukrainian TV	6.4	0.0	8.7	0.0	8.4	0.0	7.9	0.0
Hard to say / No answer	1.6	17.5	3.6	22.8	1.5	25.0	5.0	31.4

<sup>\*</sup> The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

Only one fourth of Ukrainian TV watchers (27%) believe that Ukrainian channels truly provide objective information about the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and "people's republics". Significantly more people (43%) believe that the information provided by TV is not true (whereas 30% reserved their opinion).

The proportion of those who believe in objectiveness of the information provided by Ukrainian TV channels becomes lower from the West to the East (31% to 20%).



**Table 1.3.2** provides information on whether the information provided by TV channels is true to facts for those who watch the corresponding channel and those who generally believe its information. Skeptical attitude is visible virtually everywhere. The only exception is 5 channel and those who trust its information: within the group of its watchers 60% believe that its information is true to facts, whereas with all other channels this belief is shared by no more than one third of their audience.


Table 1.3.2


?

Do you believe that the presented information about the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and "people's republics" is true to facts?

(% of respondents, who watch / trust information of the corresponding TV channel\*)

100% in the row	Yes	No	Hard to say / No answer	
	Total audience			
- 1+1 (n=1267)	29.6	41.4	29.0	
- Inter (n=1037)	23.5	47.1	29.5	
- TV Ukraine (n=949)	23.9	47.2	28.9	
- ICTV (n=801)	24.3	47.6	28.1	
- STB (n=763)	23.5	47.6	28.9	
- New channel (n=343)	24.9	46.6	28.5	
- 112 Ukraine (n=308)	30.0	45.5	24.5	
- NewsOne (n=161)	27.8	35.5	36.7	
- 5 channel (n=137)	41.0	35.3	23.8	
- ZIK (n=108)	32.8	36.8	30.4	
	bout the events in l ne, Russia and "ped		ns	
- 1+1 (n=719)	37.9	35.0	27.1	
- Inter (n=480)	33.3	39.5	27.2	
- TV Ukraine (n=465)	29.9	43.5	26.6	
- ICTV (n=393)	32.4	43.8	23.8	
- STB (n=305)	32.5	43.2	24.2	
N 1 1/ 447)	05.0	40.0	24.8	
- New channel (n=117)	35.2	10.0		
- New channel (n=117) - 112 Ukraine (n=165)	42.1	33.5	24.4	
,				
- 112 Ukraine (n=165)	42.1	33.5	24.4	





Two thirds of Ukrainians watch TV serials, 53% of them mostly watch TV serials on Ukrainian TV (Diagram 1.3.3). 10% watch Western TV serials via Internet. 4% watch Russian TV serials via Internet, 3% via Russian TV (totally 7% somehow watch Russian TV serials).


In all regions most of the people watch TV serials, mostly on Ukrainian TV (Table 1.3.4).

### 1.4

#### Social networks usage

 $2\ of\ 5$  adult Ukrainians (42%) use at least 1 social network (**Diagram 1.4.1**). Facebook is currently the most popular social network in Ukraine, used by 36% of Ukrainians. Other social networks are used by no more than 11% of Ukrainians.

29% of Ukrainians use only one of the «Western» social networks. No more than 3% of Ukrainians use only Russian social networks, 8% have accounts in both Western and Russian social networks.



Facebook is the most popular social network in all regions (Table 1.4.2).

Which social networks you use to get information about the events in Ukraine and the world?  (% of all respondents)									
% in the column*	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	of macro-region South (n=491)	East (n=270)					
Facebook	36.8	38.8	30.2	34.3					
VKontakte	7.8	11.6	14.0	12.2					
Instagram	9.3	11.5	6.5	11.0					
Odnoklassniki	4.7	4.7	13.7	6.8					
Twitter	3.3	7.8	4.0	5.7					
LinkedIn	0.9	0.2	0.3	0.4					
Other	1.1	0.6	1.1	1.3					
Do not use social networks	51.0	50.5	54.9	55.2					
Hard to say / No answer	6.8	4.9	6.3	2.2					






FULLNESS OF INFORMATION AND INTERPRETATION OF CURRENT EVENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT IN THE EAST OF UKRAINE AND ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA

2.1

Fullness of information on particular issues

**Most of Ukrainians** admit **having not enough information** about the governmental strategies and goals regarding Crimea (63% vs. 23% of those who believe having rather or fully enough information), regarding the "people's republics" in Donbas (60% vs. 26%) and regarding the new Law on Reintegration of Donbas (68% vs. 13%) **(Diagram 2.1.2)**. As compared with KIIS survey in December 2016, the level of informational awareness is now somewhat higher (in 2016 17% believed having enough information about Crimea, 20% about Donbas).




Western Ukrainians believe themselves the most informed about strategies and goals regarding both Crimea and Donbas (34% have «enough information» regarding Crimea and 40% – regarding Donbas, vs. no more than one fourth in other macro-regions) (Table 2.1.).

able 2.1.1				
Do you ha	ve sufficient	information	about?	
	%	of respondents	of macro-regio	n
100% in the column	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)
State s	trategies and g	oals regarding	Crimea	
Enough	19.6	20.0	25.1	34.2
Not enough	66.2	63.5	67.9	44.7
Hard to say / No answer	14.2	16.5	7.0	21.1
State strategies an	d goals regardi	ng "people's re	publics" in Do	nbas
Enough	18.8	23.8	27.8	39.9
Not enough	65.8	58.8	65.3	41.8
Hard to say / No answer	15.3	17.4	7.0	18.3
Newly ac	lopted Law on F	Reintegration o	f Donbas	
Hard to say / No answer	10.4	10.4	16.9	18.4
Hard to say / No answer	66.8	71.1	70.3	58.0
Hard to say / No answer	22.8	18.5	12.8	23.6


### 2.2

### Knowledge about the Law on Reintegration of Donbas

Only 5% of respondents claim to be familiar with at least some of the provisions of the Law on Reintegration of Donbas (**Diagram 2.2.1**). 50% did hear something but do not know any details. 41% of respondents replied that this is the first time they hear about it.



**Diagram 2.2.2** shows familiarity with the Law depending on sources of received information about state strategies and goals regarding Crimea and Donbas. best informed, in comparison, are those who get information from Ukrainian websites.



### 2.3 Interpretations of current events in the context of annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the East of Ukraine

Ukrainians have quite contradictory interpretations of the current events. On the one hand, **52% believe that the current war was initiated by Russia and separatists** (at the same time, 15% blame Ukraine, and one third has no definite opinion, which is disturbing after 4 years of war); **43% believe that Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speaking persons are persecuted in Crimea and the "people's republics"** (vs. 10%, who believe that Russians and Russian-speaking persons are persecuted in Ukraine) (**Diagram 2.3.1**).

On the other hand, people rather reject particular restrictive measures:

- 44% do not support the ban of Russian TV channels (supported by 37%),
- 46% do not support the ban of Russian social networks (supported by 30%),
- 53% do not support the ban of certain artists and Russian movies (supported by 29%).

Ukrainians also have split opinions regarding freedom of speech in their country: 30% believe there is an attack on the freedom of speech, 33% claim that in Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media; 38% has no definite opinion about this issue. Among those who believe that only the government should oppose disinformation, 31% believe there is an attack on the freedom of speech in Ukraine, and 32% claim that in Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media. However, among those who say that opposition to disinformation is either shared responsibility of the government and NGOs or sole responsibility of NGOs, 45-48% claim that in Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, and only 19-23% believe there is an attack on the freedom of speech.

Among the Ukrainian macro-regions (see Table 2.3.1) more or less "pro-Ukrainian" interpretation of events and some support of the governmental decisions are visible only in the West. At the same

time, even to the question, who initiated the war, 28% of Western Ukrainians either blame Ukraine or have no definite opinion. Just slightly more than a half of Western Ukrainians (52-56%) support ban of Russian TV serials / social networks / Russian artists.

In the Central macro-region only 55% blame Russia / separatists for initiating the war (although 14% blame Ukraine, and 31% have no definite opinion). The inhabitants of this macro-region mostly support ban of Russian TV channels, but are mostly against the ban of Russian TV serials, artists and social networks.

In the Southern and Eastern macro-regions only one third of the respondents believe that the war was initiated by Russia and separatists (17-18% blame Ukraine, the rest have no definite opinion). Also, the majority here stands against any restrictive measures against Russian TV channels, serials, artists and social networks.



Table 2.3.1

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Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option "Hard to say / No answer".

	% of respondents of macro-region						
100% in the column	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)			
	Who initiate	d the war					
The war was initiated by Ukrainian government and oligarchs	12.7	13.7	18.2	17.0			
The war was initiated by separatists and Russia	71.6	55.4	37.3	29.0			
Hard to say / No answer	15.7	30.8	44.5	54.0			
F	reedom of spe	ech in Ukraine					
In Ukraine there is an attack on the freedom of speech	27.4	23.1	33.8	43.3			
In Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, whereas the state's and society's reaction is too weak	47.0	30.5	29.5	15.9			
Hard to say / No answer	25.6	46.5	36.7	40.8			
Ban	of Russian artis	sts and TV seri	als				
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	52.3	24.9	20.5	9.8			
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	29.5	54.5	66.6	71.7			
Hard to say / No answer	18.2	20.6	12.9	18.5			
Ва	an of Russian s	ocial networks					
The ban of Russian social networks is a necessary step for the protection of state	53.0	27.0	19.1	13.2			
The ban of Russian social networks is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	28.5	44.0	60.2	58.8			
Hard to say / No answer	18.5	29.0	20.7	28.0			
Persecutions of Uk	rainian-speaki	ng or Russian-	speaking peop	le			
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in Crimea and on territories controlled by "Donetsk/ Luhansk people's republics"	72.1	40.4	26.4	24.1			
Ethnical Russians, Russian- speaking citizens and dissidents are persecuted in Ukraine	2.7	9.6	11.4	20.6			
Hard to say / No answer	25.1	49.9	62.2	55.3			

**Tables 2.3.2, 2.3.3 i 2.3.4** show interpretations of the same events for different social-demographical categories of population.

	_	_	_	_	_	_	_
Table 2.3.2							?
Please select in each pair one set opinion about the events or state any of the two answers in each p	acts ar	nd dec	isions.	You ma	y sele	ct eith	er
(% among respondent	s of th	e corre	espond	ing strat	a)		
Who initiated the War  Who initiated the War  War  Persecutions of Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking people							
100% in the row	Ukraine / oligarchs	Russia / separatists	Hard to say / No answer	Ukrainian- speaking	Russian- speaking	Hard to say / No answer	Potential of the strata*
Commu	nity type	and siz	e	-			
- village (n=693)	14.4	55.0	30.6	47.4	6.8	45.8	33.8
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310)	16.6	37.7	45.7	31.5	6.7	61.8	15.3
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	22.1	48.8	29.1	32.9	17.5	49.6	6.4
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	13.9	54.7	31.4	45.8	11.7	42.5	44.5
G	ender st	rata					
- men (n=802)	16.6	53.5	29.8	44.8	9.9	45.3	45.1
- women (n=1241)	13.6	50.4	35.9	42.1	9.4	48.5	54.9
	specific						
- 18-29 years (n=280)	13.0	55.9	31.1	46.3	9.1	44.6	21.1
- 30-39 years (n=396)	15.4	51.8	32.8	43.2	10.1	46.7	18.5
- 40-49 years (n=308)	17.6	54.0	28.4	48.0	8.4	43.6	16.6
- 50-59 years (n=400)	15.6	49.4	34.9	42.5	11.5	46.0	17.7
- 60-69 years (n=353)	14.2	49.5	36.3	38.1	9.1	52.8	12.4
- 70+ years (n=306)	14.4 cational	48.0	37.6	39.0	9.5	51.4	13.8
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	7.1	50.4	42.5	34.8	7.0	58.2	8.6
- complete secondary (n=593)	17.2	51.1	31.7	41.1	10.9	48.1	28.1
- vocational (n=673)	14.7	49.8	35.5	42.9	10.3	46.8	32.1
- higher (n=615)	15.5	54.8	29.6	48.0	8.6	43.4	31.2
	al-ethni		20.0	10.0	0.0	10.1	0112
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	12.0	61.7	26.3	55.2	5.6	39.2	57.3
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	17.0	40.7	42.3	28.7	13.7	57.7	34.3
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	27.9	22.2	50.0	13.8	28.7	57.5	3.4
Prima	ary occu	pation					
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	14.0	54.1	32.0	46.0	10.0	44.1	19.1
- office employee (n=205)	16.2	47.0	36.8	38.5	8.3	53.2	10.6
- specialist (n=218)	13.7	60.5	25.8	53.0	7.2	39.8	12.1
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	26.9	47.7	25.4	51.2	13.1	35.7	5.4
- housekeeper (n=203)	15.3	53.4	31.3	47.2	4.9	47.9	10.3
- retired (n=731)	14.7	49.1	36.2	39.1	10.7	50.1	31.0
- student (n=49)	10.3	52.1	37.6	35.1	11.1	53.8	4.3
- unemployed (n=126)	16.4	55.5	28.2	42.1	17.3	40.6	7.2
Househo							
- very low (n=273)	14.7	46.4	39.0	35.0	15.5	49.5	12.4
- low (n=1022)	13.9	52.1	34.0	40.3	10.1	49.6	49.3
- average (n=637)	17.0	52.1	30.8	48.8	7.5	43.7	34.1
- high (n=74)	12.6	60.3	27.1	58.9	8.6	32.4	4.2

<sup>\*</sup> Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.

<sup>\*\* &</sup>quot;Very low" households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" - those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.

- \* Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.
- \*\* "Very low" households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" - households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.

Table 2.3.3 Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option "Hard to say / No answer". (% among respondents of the corresponding strata) Freedom of Ban of **Russian TV** speech in Ukraine Hard to say / No answer Kremlir ð say answei 100% in the row **Potential** Support 2 Do not Attack Dro-Community type and size - village (n=693) 27.4 33.1 39.4 37.6 37.3 25.0 33.8 - Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310) 20.8 45.5 279 517 20.5 33.7 15.3 - middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130) 21.7 41.3 37.0 25.0 59.5 15.6 6.4 40.5 - big city (>100.000) (n=910) 30.9 35.4 33.7 43.5 16.0 44.5 Gender strata - men (n=802) 30.3 34.8 34.9 40.5 40.6 18.9 45.1 - women (n=1241) 28.9 31.1 39.9 33.4 46.3 20.3 54.9 Age-specific strata - 18-29 years (n=280) 24.4 36.0 39.6 39.9 40.7 19.4 21.1 16.0 48.7 - 30-39 years (n=396) 27.9 38.3 33.8 35.3 18.5 - 40-49 years (n=308) 32.3 34.0 33.8 39.3 47.1 13.6 16.6 - 50-59 years (n=400) 37.9 26.1 36.0 36.1 45.8 18.0 17.7 25.8 - 60-69 years (n=353) 28.7 28.9 42.4 32.9 41.3 12.4 - 70+ years (n=306) 26.4 31.2 42.4 34.0 37.0 29.0 13.8 **Educational strata** 33.4 - incomplete secondary and lower (n=161) 24.7 30.6 447 31.1 35.5 8.6 - complete secondary (n=593) 27.5 34.0 38.5 35.2 45.2 19.6 28.1 33.0 - vocational (n=673) 28.3 38.8 47.3 19.7 32.1 32.9 - higher (n=615) 29.3 36.8 33.8 43.0 41.0 16.0 31.2 Lingual-ethnic strata 35.0 - Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187) 26.4 36.6 37.0 44.9 20.1 57.3 - Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676) 31.3 30.1 38.6 28.3 52.5 19.2 34.3 - Russian-speaking Russians (n=75) 51.0 12.1 36.9 10.8 73.3 15.8 3.4 **Primary occupation** 32.0 32.4 43.7 18.6 - worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350) 35.7 37.7 19.1 - office employee (n=205) 34.6 28.8 36.6 34.7 48.6 16.8 10.6 - specialist (n=218) 29.0 35.1 35.9 49.0 40.1 10.9 12.1 - self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95) 29.5 36.5 34.0 41.0 50.6 8.4 5.4 28.4 33.1 38.5 32.9 46.2 20.9 - housekeeper (n=203) 10.3 - retired (n=731) 28.2 30.5 41.2 33.3 40.2 26.5 31.0 - student (n=49) 20.8 40.2 39.0 40.9 36.2 22.8 4.3 7.2 - unemployed (n=126) 27.8 44.5 35.5 10.6 27.7 54.0 Household income level\*\* - very low (n=273) 32.7 27.6 39.6 38.8 41.2 20.0 12.4 - low (n=1022) 29.8 29.0 41.2 31.8 45.5 22.7 49.3 - average (n=637) 29.2 37.4 33.4 40.6 43.3 16.1 34.1 - high (n=74) 23.7 55.1 21.2 56.5 35.3 8.2 4.2

Table 2.3.4								?	
Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option "Hard to say / No answer".									
(% among respondents of the corresponding strata)									
	Ban of TV serials / Ban of Russian social networks								
100% in the row	Support	Do not support	Hard to say / No answer		Support	Do not support	Hard to say / No answer	Potential of the strata*	
Commu	nity type	and siz	е						
- village (n=693)	30.9	47.6	21.5		31.6	38.4	30.0	33.8	
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310)	20.9	60.5	18.6		20.5	52.1	27.3	15.3	
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	17.9	62.0	20.1		24.6	52.1	23.3	6.4	
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	32.4	53.3	14.3		33.3	48.4	18.3	44.5	
	ender sti		40.4		00.4	45.0	00.7	45.4	
- men (n=802)	31.3	50.2 55.4	18.4		32.1	45.2	22.7	45.1	
- women (n=1241)	27.5 specific		17.2		28.6	46.4	25.0	54.9	
- 18-29 years (n=280)	32.1	52.6	15.4		28.8	53.8	17.5	21.1	
- 30-39 years (n=396)	30.6	55.1	14.3		33.5	51.7	14.8	18.5	
- 40-49 years (n=308)	31.1	54.6	14.3		33.2	52.7	14.1	16.6	
- 50-59 years (n=400)	28.1	54.5	17.4		30.1	44.2	25.7	17.7	
- 60-69 years (n=353)	28.0	50.5	21.5		29.5	36.1	34.4	12.4	
- 70+ years (n=306)	23.2	49.5	27.3		25.2	28.4	46.5	13.8	
Educ	cational	strata							
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	25.2	46.7	28.1		20.2	27.5	52.3	8.6	
- complete secondary (n=593)	26.9	54.0	19.1		27.8	46.4	25.9	28.1	
- vocational (n=673)	26.6	56.0	17.4		27.5	48.8	23.6	32.1	
- higher (n=615)	35.1	50.9	13.9		38.0	47.3	14.7	31.2	
	al-ethni		18.9		40.0	35.4	04.0	F7.0	
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187) - Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	38.2 19.3	43.0 64.2	16.5		40.3 17.5	60.0	24.2	57.3 34.3	
- Russian-speaking Oktainians (n=676) - Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	6.7	79.5	13.8		10.0	65.7	24.3	3.4	
	ary occu		13.0		10.0	05.7	24.0	5.4	
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	31.6	48.9	19.5		30.3	47.1	22.6	19.1	
- office employee (n=205)	30.2	55.6	14.2		31.4	55.2	13.4	10.6	
- specialist (n=218)	39.2	47.7	13.0		44.8	44.2	11.0	12.1	
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	35.8	54.3	10.0		40.7	52.8	6.5	5.4	
- housekeeper (n=203)	28.3	54.5	17.1		26.1	54.1	19.8	10.3	
- retired (n=731)	25.5	51.5	23.1		26.9	33.1	40.0	31.0	
- student (n=49)	19.6	63.9	16.5		16.7	69.3	14.0	4.3	
- unemployed (n=126)	30.5	61.5	8.0		30.8	49.2	19.9	7.2	
Househo									
- very low (n=273)	29.0	53.5	17.5		28.5	35.9	35.6	12.4	
- low (n=1022)	26.5	53.5	20.0		26.8	45.2	28.0	49.3	
- average (n=637)	32.6	53.4	14.0		33.5	51.3	15.2	34.1	
- high (n=74)	38.3	46.1	15.6		50.6	40.1	9.3	4.2	

<sup>\*</sup> Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.

<sup>\*\* &</sup>quot;Very low" households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.

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Table 2.3.5

Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option "Hard to say / No answer".

(% of the respondents depending on their assessment of governmental effectiveness in different ways of opposing Russian propaganda)

		,						,	
	Broadcasting for Creation of Ukrainian conten			of ntent		nceme lia litera			
100% in the column	Enough (n=272)	Not enough (n=1029)	Hand to say (n=710)	Enough (n=481)	Not enough (n=977)	Hand to say (n=552)	Enough (n=311)	Not enough (n=947)	Hand to say (n=756)
	Who	initiate	d the w	ar		,			
The war was initiated by Ukrainian government and oligarchs	16.9	15.2	13.0	17.5	15.0	11.6	18.9	14.5	13.1
The war was initiated by separatists and Russia	52.2	58.3	44.0	51.6	57.1	44.9	53.2	55.8	47.1
Hard to say / No answer	30.9	26.5	43.0	30.9	28.0	43.5	27.9	29.6	39.8
	Freedon	of spee	ech in U	kraine					
In Ukraine there is an attack on the freedom of speech	29.1	30.0	29.1	32.3	28.9	28.2	30.4	29.9	28.5
In Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, whereas the state's and society's reaction is too weak	34.1	42.3	20.0	32.9	41.4	19.2	34.4	40.9	22.8
Hard to say / No answer	36.8	27.7	50.9	34.8	29.7	52.6	35.2	29.2	48.7
	Ban of F	Russian	TV cha	nnels					
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	36.0	46.1	24.7	38.9	45.4	21.3	39.7	42.2	29.7
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	46.0	38.7	48.8	45.6	38.6	49.2	45.5	42.3	43.8
Hard to say / No answer	18.0	15.1	26.5	15.4	15.9	29.6	14.9	15.6	26.5
Bai	n of Rus	sian ar	tists an	d serial	s				
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	28.8	36.5	20.2	29.5	36.1	18.7	31.2	33.5	24.0
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	57.9	48.8	56.7	57.2	49.2	54.8	54.2	52.1	53.0
Hard to say / No answer	13.3	14.7	23.1	13.3	14.7	26.5	14.6	14.4	23.0
Ва	an of Ru	ıssian s	ocial n	etworks					
The ban of Russian social networks is a necessary step for the protection of state	29.2	38.2	20.5	32.6	36.5	19.0	34.0	34.8	23.6
The ban of Russian social networks is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	49.8	42.4	48.6	49.0	42.3	48.3	49.4	46.0	43.7
Hard to say / No answer	21.0	19.4	30.9	18.4	21.2	32.7	16.6	19.2	32.7
Prosecution of	Ukrain	ian-spe	aking o	r Russ	ian-spe	eaking			
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in Crimea and on territories controlled by "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics"	43.3	53.4	30.5	46.8	51.5	28.4	41.7	52.3	33.8
Ethnical Russians, Russianspeaking citizens and dissidents are persecuted in Ukraine	10.6	9.3	9.0	12.0	8.6	8.7	13.0	9.4	7.6
Hard to say / No answer	46.1	37.3	60.5	41.2	40.0	63.0	45.3	38.3	58.6

**Table 2.3.5** shows interpretations of the mentioned events by respondents depending on their attitude to governmental activity of opposing Russian propaganda (more details see in Chapter III). Those who consider governmental efforts insufficient are more inclined to support restrictive measures against Russian TV channels / serials / artists / social networks. Chapter III will show that respondents from Western and Central macro-regions are rather more dissatisfied with the governmental efforts, so that the results partially reflect regional specifics.

**Table 2.3.6** provides data depending on the respondents' attitude to quotas for Ukrainian language on radio and TV, and their assessment of governmental effectiveness in this respect (more details see in Chapter III). Those who are generally against quotas stand much stronger against application of any restrictive measures to Russian media content; also, within this group of respondents, only 39% believe that the war was initiated by Russia / separatists. On the other hand, those who support quotas, and negatively assess governmental effectiveness in this respect, are more inclined to support restrictive measures. However, one should also take into account that attitude to quotas closely correlates with regional structure; this correlation significantly impacts the results below.

Table 2.3.6 ? Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option "Hard to say / No answer". (% of the respondents depending on their assessment of governmental effectiveness in implementing quotas for Ukrainian language on radio and TV) **Broadcasting for** Donbas enond say 100% in the column Against Who initiated the war The war was initiated by Ukrainian government and oligarchs 21.6 11.0 11.0 11.6 The war was initiated by separatists and Russia 38.9 71.9 72.7 54.8 Hard to say / No answer 39.5 17.0 16.2 33.6 Freedom of speech in Ukraine 22.1 In Ukraine there is an attack on the freedom of speech 35.5 21.7 29.2 The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state 25.4 47.7 50.7 29.8 Hard to say / No answer 39.1 30.6 20.1 48.1 Ban of Russian TV channels The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state 18.9 68.5 44.0 61.4 The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights 66.3 23.8 23.2 29.4 8.3 26.6 Hard to say / No answer 14.8 14.8 Ban of Russian artists and serials The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a necessary step for the 15.1 49.9 57.5 37.3 protection of state The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a mistake and only 73.4 33.7 35.1 35.6 restricts citizens' rights 11.4 16.4 7.4 27.2 Hard to say / No answer Ban of Russian social networks The ban of Russian social networks is a necessary step for the protection of state 14.2 51.5 61.7 36.9 The ban of Russian social networks is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights 66.9 27.7 24.4 28.9 13.9 18.9 Hard to say / No answer 20.8 34.1 Prosecution of Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in Crimea and on 48.4 27.6 70.8 67.6 territories controlled by "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics" 17.2 4.3 2.8 6.5 Ethnical Russians, Russian-speaking citizens and dissidents are persecuted in Ukraine Hard to say / No answer 55.2 24.9 29.6 45.1

**Table 2.3.7** presents respondents' interpretations depending on their self-assessment of ability to recognize rotten information (more details see in Chapter III). Those who believe themselves more capable to detect fakes are somewhat more inclined to held that the war was initiated by Russia / separatists, and that an attack on the freedom of speech is currently

going on in Ukraine. This very group is also somewhat more inclined to support restrictive measures against Russian TV channels / serials / artists / social networks. However, one should take into account (see Chapter III) that this group mostly consists of younger, better educated and wealthier Ukrainians who live in middle-size towns and big cities.

Table 2.3.7

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
Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option "Hard to say / No answer".

(% among respondents depending on their self-assessment of ability to detect fakes)

100% in the column	Can detect fakes mostly or always (n=1053)	Cannot detect fakes mostly or always (n=640)
Who initiated the war		
The war was initiated by Ukrainian government and oligarchs	15.4	16.1
The war was initiated by separatists and Russia	57.3	46.4
Hard to say / No answer	27.3	37.5
Freedom of speech in Ukraine		
In Ukraine there is an attack on the freedom of speech	33.6	25.9
In Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, whereas the state's and society's reaction is too weak	36.1	34.3
Hard to say / No answer	30.3	39.8
Ban of Russian TV channels		
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	41.8	32.8
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	44.5	42.5
Hard to say / No answer	13.8	24.7
Ban of Russian artists and serials		
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	33.5	25.5
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	53.4	55.0
Hard to say / No answer	13.1	19.5
Ban of Russian social networks		
The ban of Russian social networks is a necessary step for the protection of state	34.7	25.1
The ban of Russian social networks is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	49.3	43.3
Hard to say / No answer	16.0	31.7
Prosecution of Ukrainian-speaking or Russian	-speaking	
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in Crimea and on territories controlled by "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics"	47.9	41.4
Ethnical Russians, Russian-speaking citizens and dissidents are persecuted in Ukraine	10.8	9.9
Hard to say / No answer	41.3	48.7

**Table 2.3.8** presents respondents' interpretations depending on their usage of social networks, particularly "Western" and "Russian" ones. The results show that using "Russian" social networks (both solely

and combined with "Western" networks) correlates with more dissatisfaction regarding restrictive measures against Russian TV channels / serials / artists / social networks.



**Table 2.3.9** presents respondents' interpretations depending on whom they held responsible for opposing Russian propaganda

Table 2.3.9

?

Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option "Hard to say / No answer".

(% of the respondents depending on whom they held responsible for opposing Russian propaganda)

100% in the column	State (n=1011)	NGOs (n=40)	Both state and NGOs (n=681)						
Who initiated the war									
The war was initiated by Ukrainian government and oligarchs	12.3	19.7	15.7						
The war was initiated by separatists and Russia	58.7	55.0	56.5						
Hard to say / No answer	29.0	25.3	27.8						
Freedom of speech in U	Jkraine								
In Ukraine there is an attack on the freedom of speech	31.3	19.1	22.9						
In Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, whereas the state's and society's reaction is too weak	31.5	47.8	44.9						
Hard to say / No answer	37.2	33.1	32.2						
Ban of Russian TV cha	nnels								
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	40.6	12.9	44.4						
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	39.9	83.6	38.6						
Hard to say / No answer	19.5	3.6	17.0						
Ban of Russian artists an	d serials								
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	33.2	8.4	35.0						
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	48.6	81.1	50.0						
Hard to say / No answer	18.1	10.5	15.0						
Ban of Russian social ne	etworks								
The ban of Russian social networks is a necessary step for the protection of state	33.7	10.7	37.1						
The ban of Russian social networks is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	43.5	73.0	40.9						
Hard to say / No answer	22.8	16.3	22.1						
Prosecution of Ukrainian-speaking o	or Russian-s	peaking							
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in Crimea and on territories controlled by "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics"	48.1	24.6	51.9						
Ethnical Russians, Russian-speaking citizens and dissidents are persecuted in Ukraine	7.6	42.1	6.4						
Hard to say / No answer	44.3	33.3	41.7						





# OPPOSITION TO RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA AND MEDIA LITERACY

3.1

Who is responsible for opposing Kremlin propaganda and disinformation. "Success secrets" of Russian propaganda

49% of Ukrainians believe that opposition to Kremlin propaganda is the responsibility of Ukrainian state organs **(Diagram 3.1).** 33% suggest to "split" the responsibility between state organs and NGOs.





Ukrainians have no unanimous opinion regarding the secret of influence of Kremlin propaganda. Most often they suggest that its effectiveness is due to serious resource investments into propaganda (38% of respondents), lack of critical thinking of commonplace people (33%), Russia's bribing foreign media and politicians (30%) (Diagram 3.1.2).

Opinions about the secret of influence of Kremlin propaganda have some regional distinctions. Western Ukrainians mostly talk about Russia's investing money into propaganda and bribing foreign media and politicians; respectively, the problem of critical thinking recedes to the third place (see **Table 3.1.1**). Ukrainians in the Central macro-region give equal weight to money investments and lack of critical thinking. Southern Ukrainians consider lack of critical thinking as the main problem. Eastern Ukrainians are different in that here 54% of respondents gave no answer to this question, vs. no more than 19% of such respondents in the other macro-regions.

## Table 3.1.1 In your opinion, what is the secret of influence of Kremlin

propaganda on many people in the whole world?

(% of all respondents)

	% of respondents of macro-region					
% in the column*	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)		
Russia invests a lot of money in propaganda	56.4	37.6	28.1	19.7		
Many people has no critical thinking regarding what they see/read in media	32.3	34.4	42.2	15.6		
Russia invests a lot of money in order to corrupt foreign media and politicians	48.9	26.9	24.4	9.1		
Russian propaganda is very convincing	17.4	22.9	22.0	18.8		
Russian propaganda is very aggressive	11.7	21.0	16.2	7.9		
The leaders of other countries cannot oppose propaganda	10.0	12.7	15.6	5.2		
Other	0.5	1.1	1.4	0.0		
Hard to say / No answer	14.8	16.7	18.6	53.7		

<sup>\*</sup> The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

Those who have experience of visiting the EU for the last 2 years pay more attention to Russia's investing money into propaganda and bribing foreign media and politicians (**Table 3.1.2**).

#### Table 3.1.2

?

### In your opinion, what is the secret of influence of Kremlin propaganda on many people in the whole world?

(% of respondents depending on their experience of visiting the EU for the last 2 years)

	Visited the EU (n=166)	Did not visit the EU (n=1871)
Russian propaganda is very aggressive	17.1	15.4
Russian propaganda is very convincing	15.0	21.3
Russia invests a lot of money in propaganda	55.1	36.4
Russia invests a lot of money in order to corrupt foreign media and politicians	53.6	27.6
Many people has no critical thinking regarding what they see/read in media	38.0	32.9
The leaders of other countries cannot oppose propaganda	9.1	12.0
Other	0.0	1.0
Hard to say / No answer	10.9	22.4

<sup>\*</sup> The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.


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### Effectiveness assessment of opposing propaganda by the government and NGOs. Ukrainian language quotas on radio and TV

Ukrainians **rather critically assess effectiveness** of both state and NGOs in **opposing Kremlin propaganda**. They assess somewhat better the creation of Ukrainian content: 24% believe that the state is doing enough in this direction (47% disagree), 19% positively assess corresponding activities of NGOs (44% disagree) **(Diagram 3.2.1)**.

16% of respondents positively assess governmental activity in implementing media literacy in educational institutions (46% disagree), 14% positively assess the activity of NGOs (42% disagree). 13% believe that the state is doing enough regarding restoration of broadcasting for Donbas (50% disagree), 10% believe the same about NGOs (42% disagree).



Ukrainians from all regions critically assess the efficiency in question, although those from South and East are of somewhat better opinion regarding the efforts of both state and NGOs (Table 3.2.1).

Table 3.2.1 ?

### How do you assess the effectiveness of the state / NGOs in opposing Kremlin propaganda?

(% of all respondents)

	We (n=5	est 572)	Cer (n=7		South (n=491)		Ea (n=2	st 270)
100% in the column	State	NGOs	State	NGOs	State	NGOs	State	NGOs
	Restorati	on of bro	adcasting	for Donk	as			
Enough	7.9	7.7	12.6	8.3	16.8	11.7	20.6	17.2
Not enough	63.9	52.7	49.6	47.2	46.3	43.4	28.9	26.1
Hard to say / No answer	28.2	39.6	37.9	44.5	36.9	44.9	50.5	56.6
Creation of Uk	rainian c	ontent, i	ncluding	for movi	es and T	/ serials		
Enough	18.6	17.8	22.6	13.9	29.9	23.5	29.0	23.5
Not enough	58.3	49.2	49.9	49.9	44.0	41.4	23.2	21.9
Hard to say / No answer	23.1	33.1	27.5	36.1	26.2	35.1	47.7	54.6
Implement	ation of r	nedia lite	racy in e	ducation	al institu	tions		
Enough	13.2	14.4	13.8	11.1	19.5	15.8	19.4	18.7
Not enough	55.4	47.7	50.1	46.7	41.0	37.7	26.8	23.2
Hard to say / No answer	31.4	37.9	36.2	42.2	39.6	46.4	53.8	58.1

**Table 3.2.2** presents assessment of state effectiveness among the respondents who are potentially most interested in opposing propaganda. As well as Ukrainians in general, these respondents assess relatively better state activities in creating content.

Table 3.2.2

?

### How do you assess state effectiveness in opposing Kremlin propaganda?

(% of the respondents who support trainings in media literacy / believe themselves capable to identify rotten information at least in most cases)

Support trainings in media literacy (n=1231)		Believe themselves capable to identify fakes at least in most cases (n=1053)
Restoration	of broadcasting for Donbas	
Enough	12.5	15.3
Not enough	58.3	53.9
Hard to say / No answer	29.2	30.8
Creation of Ukrainian cont	tent, including for movies ar	nd TV serials
Enough	25.6	26.8
Not enough	55.1	50.7
Hard to say / No answer	19.3	22.5
Implementation of med	lia literacy in educational ins	stitutions
Enough	15.5	18.6
Not enough	54.9	49.9
Hard to say / No answer	29.6	31.5

**Table 3.2.3** presents assessment of effectiveness of NGOs depending on the respondents' interest to media literacy and their self-assessment in terms of ability to identify fakes.

**Table 3.2.4** presents assessment of NGOs for different age categories.

Table 3.2.3

?

#### How do you assess the effectiveness of NGOs in opposing Kremlin propaganda?

(% of the respondents who consider media literacy trainings expedient / believe themselves capable to identify rotten information at least in most cases / personally interested in receiving training in media literacy)

	in teachir	aching media						sted in ing)
100% in the column	Yes (n=1231)	No (n=362)	Can identify fakes at least in most cases (n=1053)	Cannot identify fakes in most cases (n=640)	Yes (n=402)	No (n=1304)		
	Restoration	of broadcast	ing for Donb	as				
Enough	9.4	15.5	11.7	8.1	13.1	9.2		
Not enough	52.3	41.6	49.2	48.5	50.6	43.4		
Hard to say / No answer	38.3	43.0	39.0	43.4	36.3	47.4		
Creation of Uk	rainian cont	ent, includi	ng for movie	s and TV se	rials			
Enough	19.6	21.1	20.6	17.0	20.7	18.0		
Not enough	51.5	42.0	48.6	47.1	52.1	41.2		
Hard to say / No answer	28.9	36.9	30.8	35.9	27.2	40.8		
Implementa	ation of med	ia literacy i	n education	al institution	ıs			
Enough	14.8	16.5	17.6	10.1	17.3	13.8		
Not enough	49.4	40.5	44.2	48.1	50.6	37.1		
Hard to say / No answer	35.9	43.0	38.2	41.8	32.1	49.1		

Table 3.2.4


?

### How do you assess the effectiveness of NGOs in opposing Kremlin propaganda?


(% of the respondents of the given age))

100% in the column	18-29 years (n=280	30-39 years (n=396	40-49 years (n=308)	50-59 years (n=400)	60-69 years (n=353)	70+ years (n=306)	
Restoration of broadcasting for Donbas							
Enough	11.5	8.8	10.0	8.1	11.3	11.9	
Not enough	45.6	46.6	51.7	48.2	45.3	29.3	
Hard to say / No answer	42.9	44.7	38.4	43.7	43.4	58.7	
Creation of	Ukrainian c	ontent, incl	uding for mo	vies and T\	/ serials		
Enough	18.4	20.0	20.6	16.2	18.3	18.2	
Not enough	46.1	45.2	47.9	47.1	43.6	30.3	
Hard to say / No answer	35.6	34.8	31.5	36.7	38.1	51.5	
Impleme	entation of n	nedia literac	y in educati	onal institut	ions		
Enough	16.9	14.5	15.9	10.6	15.0	11.2	
Not enough	44.3	45.0	46.3	44.6	40.4	24.8	
Hard to say / No answer	38.8	40.4	37.9	44.8	44.6	64.0	

**Implementation of quotas** for Ukrainian language on radio and TV **is supported by 33%** of Ukrainians; 43% do not support it **(Diagram 3.2.2).** At the same time, among those who consider this step expedient, only one third believe that the state and NGOs are doing enough in this direction.



The support for quotas becomes significantly lower from the West to the East: if in the Western macro-region 50% greet this initiative (24% disagree), in the Central macro-region this step is supported by only 36% (39% disagree) (**Diagram 3.2.3**). In the Southern and Eastern macro-regions most of the respondents (respectively, 57% i 67%) are against quotas (whereas 22% i 14%, respectively, support them).



 $\textbf{Table 3.2.5} \ \text{shows attitude to the quotas for different social-demographical strata}.$ 

Table 3.2.5				?					
Do you consider expedient introduction of quotas for Ukrainian language on radio and TV?									
(% among respondents of the corresponding strata)									
(70 among respondents o	T tile come	sponding s	ii aiaj						
100% in the row	Yes	No	Hard to say / No answer	Potential of the strata*					
Community	type and si	ze							
- village (n=693)	40.0	33.4	26.6	33.8					
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)	22.1	49.5	28.4	15.3					
(n=310)	31.4	45.5	23.1	6.4					
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130) - big city (>100.000) (n=910)	31.9	45.5	20.3	44.5					
	er strata	47.0	20.3	44.5					
- men (n=802)	33.6	42.7	23.7	45.1					
- women (n=1241)	32.7	43.3	24.0	54.9					
Age-spe	cific strata								
- 18-29 years (n=280)	36.8	39.2	24.0	21.1					
- 30-39 years (n=396)	33.3	48.4	18.2	18.5					
- 40-49 years (n=308)	30.7	49.3	20.0	16.6					
- 50-59 years (n=400)	32.1	44.0	23.9	17.7					
- 60-69 years (n=353)	30.6	40.8	28.7	12.4					
- 70+ years (n=306)	33.5	34.8	31.7	13.8					
Hard to say / No answer	18.5	29.0	20.7	28.0					
	onal strata								
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	30.1	34.3	35.6	8.6					
- complete secondary (n=593)	33.7	44.5	21.8	28.1					
- vocational (n=673)	28.7	45.7	25.6	32.1					
- higher (n=615)	37.8	41.4	20.8	31.2					
	thnic strata		00.0	E7 0					
<ul><li>Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)</li><li>Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)</li></ul>	41.7	31.7	26.6	57.3					
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	22.6 16.9	57.2	20.2	34.3 3.4					
, ,	occupation	65.0	18.1	3.4					
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	25.5	46.9	27.6	19.1					
- office employee (n=205)	25.6	50.6	23.8	10.6					
- specialist (n=218)	41.8	41.1	17.1	12.1					
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	39.9	49.0	11.1	5.4					
- housekeeper (n=203)	37.2	38.8	24.0	10.3					
- retired (n=731)	32.5	39.5	28.1	31.0					
- student (n=49)	34.2	36.5	29.3	4.3					
- unemployed (n=126)	42.1	43.7	14.2	7.2					
Household i	ncome leve	el**							
- very low (n=273)	31.1	44.1	24.8	12.4					
- low (n=1022)	28.4	44.4	27.3	49.3					
- average (n=637)	39.6	41.4	19.0	34.1					
- high (n=74)	41.4	43.6	15.0	4.2					

<sup>\*</sup> Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.

<sup>\*\* &</sup>quot;Very low" households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.

**Table 3.2.6** shows assessment of the governmental measures depending


on the respondents' attitude to the quotas.

Table 3.2.6 How do you assess state effectiveness in opposing Kremlin propaganda? (% of the respondents depending on their attitude to the quotas for Ukrainian language) Hard to say (n=465 Yes (n=678) No (n=874) 100% in the column Restoration of broadcasting for Donbas Enough 12.4 15.6 10.8 Not enough 43.9 60.8 44.9 Hard to say / No answer 26.8 39.4 45.4 Creation of Ukrainian content, including for movies and TV serials Enough 23.3 26.8 20.8 40.2 Not enough 59.8 41.5 39.0 Hard to say / No answer 16.9 31.7 Implementation of media literacy in educational institutions Enough 14.4 18.5 12.8 Not enough 52.9 44.0 41.5 Hard to say / No answer 32.7 37.5 45.7


#### Self-assessment of ability to recognize fakes

Slightly more than a half of Ukrainians (53%) believe that they are capable to distinguish good-quality information from disinformation and fakes at least in most cases (Diagram 3.3.1). On the other hand, one third of Ukrainians (31%) believe themselves incapable to apply this distinction or capable to apply it only in some cases.

Among the criteria of identification of (non-)fakes Ukrainians mostly refer to their credence to the media that disseminates this or that information (for 33% of Ukrainians this is one of the key criteria) and indication of authorship (30%).



In all regions roughly the same proportion of respondents claim that they are capable to discern rotten information at least in most cases (**Diagram 3.3.2**).



Those categories of the respondents are more confident about their ability to recognize fakes **(Table 3.3.1):** 

- Respondents from middle-size towns and big cities (60-68% believe that they mostly can identify fakes vs. 43-49% of rural respondents);
- Men (61% vs. 47% women);
- Younger persons (the figures are gradually lowing from 60% for respondents below 30 to 33% for persons 70+);
- Better educated Ukrainians (66% for respondents with higher education vs. no more than 50% for persons with lower level of education);

- Specialists, students, businessmen (66-73% vs. no more than 55% for other occupations; least of all retired persons 41%);
- Wealthier Ukrainians (66-73% for those who have high or average income vs. 46% low-income persons and 38% very low-income persons).


Additionally one should remark that 71% of those who visited the EU for the last 2 years believe in their ability to recognize fakes at least in most cases, vs. 51% of those who did not visit the EU. However, one should also take into account that those who visited the EU are mostly Western Ukrainians, younger, better educated and wealthier persons.

Table 3.3.1				_	_	?			
Do you believe that you yours quality information from dis			_	_					
(% among respondents of the	ne corre	spond	ing stra	ata)					
	Ability to discern fakes								
100% in the row	Yes	Usually yes	Usually no	No	Hard to say / No answer	Potential of the strata*			
Community type and size									
- village (n=693)	13.3	29.5	16.6	23.1	17.6	33.8			
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310)	20.3	29.0	11.8	18.3	20.6	15.3			
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	25.9	41.7	11.0	13.4	8.0	6.4			
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	24.5	35.8	9.1	16.5	14.1	44.5			
Gender s	trata								
- men (n=802)	24.7	35.7	11.7	14.9	12.9	45.1			
- women (n=1241)	16.4	30.7	12.5	22.0	18.4	54.9			
Age-specifi									
- 18-29 years (n=280)	22.5	37.8	10.6	15.9	13.1	21.1			
- 30-39 years (n=396)	19.4	35.4	15.3	16.9	13.1	18.5			
- 40-49 years (n=308)	24.3	37.8	9.2	15.2	13.5	16.6			
- 50-59 years (n=400)	20.7	33.2	12.5	16.1	17.5	17.7			
- 60-69 years (n=353)	19.2	28.3	13.1	21.9	17.5	12.4			
- 70+ years (n=306)  Educationa	12.8	20.4	12.7	30.9	23.3	13.8			
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	7.9	22.7	16.8	31.4	21.2	8.6			
- complete secondary (n=593)	17.3	31.1	13.8	20.2	17.5	28.1			
- vocational (n=673)	17.3	33.2	11.8	21.4	16.4	32.1			
- higher (n=615)	29.2	37.2	9.8	11.3	12.6	31.2			
Linqual-ethr		37.2	9.0	11.0	12.0	31.2			
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	19.1	33.8	13.2	18.8	15.1	57.3			
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	20.2	34.0	11.0	19.3	15.5	34.3			
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	28.3	18.9	8.0	16.7	28.2	3.4			
Primary occ									
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	18.9	34.9	11.8	19.8	14.6	19.1			
- office employee (n=205)	17.7	36.7	10.3	17.8	17.5	10.6			
- specialist (n=218)	25.6	46.6	5.7	8.9	13.2	12.1			
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	36.3	36.2	10.8	7.5	9.2	5.4			
- housekeeper (n=203)	20.5	31.3	10.5	27.8	9.9	10.3			
- retired (n=731)	16.1	25.1	13.0	25.3	20.5	31.0			
- student (n=49)	26.6	39.7	11.2	7.1	15.4	4.3			
- unemployed (n=126)	20.1	34.7	21.0	12.2	11.9	7.2			
Household inc	ome leve	l**							
- very low (n=273)	14.4	23.3	18.7	27.3	16.4	12.4			
- low (n=1022)	14.6	31.6	12.6	21.7	19.4	49.3			
- average (n=637)	27.9	38.5	9.9	12.9	10.8	34.1			
- high (n=74)	37.6	35.9	7.7	10.0	8.8	4.2			
Visiting the EU for		_							
- так (n=166)	29.7	41.0	9.2	12.5	7.6	8.7			
- ні (n=1871)	19.1	32.2	12.5	19.5	16.7	90.9			

<sup>\*</sup> Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.

<sup>\*\* &</sup>quot;Very low" households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" – households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" – those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.

Whether or not Ukrainians have accounts in social networks - in both groups two thirds claim that at least in most cases they can discern disinformation (Diagram 3.3.3).



#### Attitude to enhancement of media literacy and readiness to take part in training programs

Most of Ukrainians (61%) believe that the state and NGOs should exert efforts for enhancement of media literacy (Diagram 3.4.1). At the same time, they have no definite opinion about the preferable target audience. Those who believe that such trainings make sense more often refer to teenagers (48%) than adults (29%).



?

In your opinion, should the state and NGOs exert efforts for enhancement of media literacy, ability to critically process information, distinguish good-quality from bad-quality information and information from disinformation?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)

In your opinion, who should be the primary target audience of media literacy trainings?

(% of the respondents who believe that teaching media literacy is expedient, n=1231)




Table 3.4.1

?

In your opinion, should the state and NGOs exert efforts for enhancement of media literacy, ability to critically process information, distinguish good-quality from bad-quality information and information from disinformation?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)

In your opinion, who should be the primary target audience of media literacy trainings?

(% of the respondents who believe that teaching media literacy is expedient, n=1231)

	% of respondents of macro-region						
100% in the column	West (n=572/383)			East (n=270/114)			
Teaching media literacy is expedient							
Yes	65.8	61.4	63.4	43.1			
No	17.5	14.6	17.7	28.9			
Hard to say / No answer	16.7	24.0	18.9	27.9			
Primary target audience							
Adults	31.0	30.9	23.7	30.7			
Teenagers	44.4	44.0	53.0	57.2			
Children	20.8	17.8	17.4	6.2			
Hard to say / No answer	3.7	7.3	5.9	5.9			

\*\* "Very low" households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all. Table 3.3.2

In your opinion, should the state and NGOs exert efforts for enhancement of media literacy, ability to critically process information, distinguish good-quality from badquality information and information from disinformation?

(% among respondents of the corresponding strata)

100% in the row	Yes	No	Hard to say / No answer	Potential of the strata*		
Community type and size						
- village (n=693)	60.4	14.9	24.8	33.8		
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310)	61.8	15.9	22.3	15.3		
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	60.3	24.0	15.7	6.4		
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	60.7	20.3	19.0	44.5		
Gender strata						
- men (n=802)	63.0	18.5	18.5	45.1		
- women (n=1241)	58.8	17.7	23.5	54.9		
Age-specific	strata					
- 18-29 years (n=280)	64.0	15.3	20.6	21.1		
- 30-39 years (n=396)	62.9	19.3	17.8	18.5		
- 40-49 years (n=308)	67.5	14.5	18.1	16.6		
- 50-59 years (n=400)	57.6	20.8	21.7	17.7		
- 60-69 years (n=353)	61.1	15.0	23.9	12.4		
- 70+ years (n=306)	48.3	24.1	27.6	13.8		
Hard to say / No answer	18.5	29.0	20.7	28.0		
Educational	strata					
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	41.5	27.8	30.8	8.6		
- complete secondary (n=593)	57.5	19.0	23.5	28.1		
- vocational (n=673)	62.6	15.6	21.8	32.1		
- higher (n=615)	66.9	17.0	16.1	31.2		
Lingual-ethnic	strata					
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	64.8	15.1	20.1	57.3		
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	55.5	22.2	22.3	34.3		
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	50.0	21.1	28.8	3.4		
Primary occu	pation					
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	59.7	21.6	18.6	19.1		
- office employee (n=205)	57.9	17.3	24.8	10.6		
- specialist (n=218)	72.4	12.5	15.1	12.1		
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	74.1	14.7	11.2	5.4		
- housekeeper (n=203)	60.8	19.3	19.9	10.3		
- retired (n=731)	55.0	19.9	25.1	31.0		
- student (n=49)	63.0	16.2	20.8	4.3		
- unemployed (n=126)	64.9	15.8	19.3	7.2		
Household income level**						
- very low (n=273)	54.4	25.8	19.8	12.4		
- low (n=1022)	56.4	19.4	24.1	49.3		
- average (n=637)	68.1	13.7	18.2	34.1		
- high (n=74)	70.9	19.4	9.8	4.2		

In all social-demographical categories of Ukrainian population there is a majority that stands for teaching media literacy (**Table 3.3.2**).

Preferences for primary target audience of such teaching do not depend on the respondents' age: in all age-specific strata 28-30% prefer adult audience, 47-52% – teenagers, 15-21% – children.

 $\begin{tabular}{ll} \textbf{Table 3.4.1} provides information about the most popular TV channels among those who does and does not consider teaching media literacy expedient. \\ \end{tabular}$ 

Table 3.4.1

?


Which Ukrainian TV channels you watch most often? /
Which of these channels you trust most regarding the events
in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine,
Russia and "people's republics"?

(% of the respondents depending on their attitude to teaching media literacy)


	% watch		% trust		
100% in the column	Teaching needed (n=1231)	Teaching not needed (n=362)	Teaching needed (n=1231)	Teaching not needed (n=362)	
1+1	62.8	55.6	35.4	37.6	
Inter	44.3	49.6	17.7	26.2	
TV Ukraine	41.7	44.4	18.2	28.3	
ICTV	39.1	41.2	17.9	26.5	
STB	34.8	35.2	11.7	19.3	
New channel	18.5	19.2	5.8	8.0	
112 Ukraine	14.3	19.4	8.0	6.8	
NewsOne	6.9	6.5	4.0	3.3	
5 channel	7.7	7.2	4.0	2.0	
ZIK	6.5	2.8	4.5	1.5	
24 channel	4.9	6.0	2.7	1.4	
UA:Pershyj	4.0	3.1	2.0	1.0	
Pryamyj channel	2.8	1.8	1.1	1.1	
Espreso TV	2.6	1.3	1.5	0.1	
Hromadske TV	2.1	1.2	1.0	0.5	
ATR	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	

 $<sup>^{\</sup>star}$  The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents  $\,$  could select several answers.

At the same time, despite rather widespread understanding that media literacy is important, and despite rather critical self-assessment, only 22% of Ukrainians would personally agree to receive such training **(Diagram 3.4.1).** Most of those who agree (56%) would prefer online courses.




Western Ukrainians are most interested in trainings for enhancement of your media literacy: 31% would take part in such courses vs. no more than 20% in other regions (**Diagram 3.4.2**).



At the same time, those who better assess their own abilities to identify fakes, are more interested in trainings: 31% of those who believe themselves capable to identify fakes always, 26% of those who believe themselves capable to identify fakes in most cases, and 16-17% of those who believe themselves incapable to identify fakes in most cases (**Diagram 3.4.3**).

It is also remarkable that among those who see the "success secret" of Russian propaganda in the lack of critical thinking only 22% would agree to take part in the courses for enhancement of media literacy.



These respondents are more interested in getting such trainings:

- Respondents from middle-size towns and big cities (26% vs. 18% of rural respondents and those from small towns);
- Younger persons (40% for respondents below 30, 21-24% for respondents between 30-49, no more than 16% for persons 50+);
- Better educated Ukrainians (34% for respondents with higher education vs. no more than 19% for persons with lower level of education);
- Students, specialists, businessmen (35-48%);
- Wealthier Ukrainians (46% of those who have high or average income vs. 32% low-income persons and 10-17% very low-income persons).

It is remarkable that among those who visited the EU for the last 2 years 38% would take part in such trainings vs. 20% of those who did not visit the EU. However, one should also take into account that Ukrainians who visited the EU are generally younger, better educated and wealthier, so that it is difficult to say which feature mostly influences people's readiness to take part in the trainings.

\*\* "Very low" households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.

	_	_	_	_
Table 3.4.2				?
Would you yourself agree to receive tr	aining ir	cludina	online for	the
enhancement of your	0,	0	0111110, 101	
(% among respondents of the	corresp	onding s	trata)	
Hard to				Potential
100% in the row	Yes	No	say / No answer	of the strata*
Community type	and size			
- village (n=693)	17.6	68.2	14.2	33.8
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310)	18.2	65.0	16.8	15.3
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	26.3	55.3	18.4	6.4
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	26.4	55.5	18.1	44.5
Gender str	ata			
- men (n=802)	23.2	60.7	16.2	45.1
- women (n=1241)	21.4	61.7	17.0	54.9
Age-specific	strata			
- 18-29 years (n=280)	39.6	43.5	16.8	21.1
- 30-39 years (n=396)	23.7	58.2	18.1	18.5
- 40-49 years (n=308)	20.7	57.5	21.8	16.6
- 50-59 years (n=400)	15.7	68.4	15.9	17.7
- 60-69 years (n=353)	12.3	73.1	14.6	12.4
- 70+ years (n=306)	12.4	77.0	10.7	13.8
Educational	strata			
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	15.1	75.9	8.9	8.6
- complete secondary (n=593)	14.7	72.7	12.6	28.1
- vocational (n=673)	18.9	60.0	21.1	32.1
- higher (n=615)	34.4	48.1	17.5	31.2
Lingual-ethnic	strata			
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	25.0	58.6	16.3	57.3
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	20.0	62.9	17.0	34.3
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	13.7	67.2	19.1	3.4
Primary occu	pation			
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	17.6	66.3	16.1	19.1
- office employee (n=205)	20.5	55.3	24.1	10.6
- specialist (n=218)	34.6	45.1	20.3	12.1
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	36.7	51.3	12.0	5.4
- housekeeper (n=203)	28.7	51.3	20.0	10.3
- retired (n=731)	12.0	75.3	12.7	31.0
- student (n=49)	48.2	33.9	17.9	4.3
- unemployed (n=126)	22.9	62.8	14.3	7.2
Household incor	ne level*			
- very low (n=273)	10.1	75.2	14.6	12.4
- low (n=1022)	16.7	69.7	13.6	49.3
- average (n=637)	31.8	46.5	21.7	34.1
- high (n=74)	45.9	38.7	15.4	4.2
Visiting the EU for th	e last 2 y	ears		
- yes (n=166)	38.4	43.5	18.1	8.7
- no (n=1871)	20.6	63.0	16.4	90.9



