



ДЕТЕКТОР
ГРОМАДСЬКА ОРГАНІЗАЦІЯ




OPPOSITION TO RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA AND MEDIA LITERACY: RESULTS OF ALL-UKRAINIAN OPINION POLL

ANALYTICAL REPORT




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All-Ukrainian opinion poll was conducted by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in February 2018, as requested by NGO “Detector Media”, financed by Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and US National Endowment for Democracy.

The dynamics of changes in influence of Russian propaganda could be traced by comparing these data with previous opinion polls conducted at the request of “Detector Media”. In particular, analytical report¹ “Opposition to Russian informational aggression: joint efforts for protection of democracy” was presented in April 2015; opinion poll on the perception of Russian propagandist messages², credence to Russian and Ukrainian media³, awareness about media owners⁴ was conducted in June 2015; research on the level of critical attitude of citizens towards media⁵ was completed in March 2016. In 2017 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, at the request of “Detector Media”, conducted the research on “How Russian propaganda influences Ukrainian public opinion”⁶.

This research used opinion poll to learn views and opinions of adult Ukrainians (18+) regarding media usage, opposition to Russian propaganda and media literacy of population. The research consisted of several main stages: development of questionnaire and supplementary instruments; development of sample; interviewing of respondents; quality check; data processing and error check; preparation of final data set, tables of one-dimensional and two-dimensional distribution, and analytical report.

¹http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/go_telekrytyka/diyalnist/produkty/analitichniy_zvit_protidiya_rosiyskiy_informatsiyniy_agresii_spilni_zusillya_zadlya_zakhistu_demokratii/

²http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/mediaprosvita/research/rosiyskiy_poglyad_na_maydan_ta_viynu_na_donbasi_v_ukraini_ne_prizhivsvya_sotsopituvannya/

³http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/mediaprosvita/research/ukrainski_zmi_vtrachayut_doviru_ale_stavlennya_do_rosiyskikh_zmi_kritichno_pogirshilos_navit_na_skhodi_sotsopituvannya/

⁴http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/mediaprosvita/research/ukrainski_ne_znayut_khto_volodie_ukrainskimi_telekanalami_sotsopituvannya/

⁵http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/mediaprosvita/research/chi_kritichno_gromadyani_stavlyatsya_do_media_sotsdoslidzhennya/

⁶http://osvita.mediasapiens.ua/mediaprosvita/research/yak_rosiyska_propaganda_vplivae_na_suspilnu_dumku_v_ukraini_doslidzhennya/

For this research KIIS developed stratified, 4-level sample, random at each level. The sample is representative for adult Ukrainian population that lives constantly in Ukraine, is not on military service, in prisons or health care centers (hospitals, hostels). The sample did not include territories which are temporarily out of control of Ukrainian authorities (Crimea, certain areas in Donetsk and Luhansk regions).

At first, Ukrainian population was stratified by regions (24 regions and the city of Kyiv); then population of each region was additionally stratified as urban (cities, urban-type settlements) and rural (except Kyiv, where all population is urban). Thus, all Ukrainian population was divided into 49 strata. For each strata, in proportion to the size of adult population, KIIS defined the number of interview to be conducted and the number of communities to be involved in interviewing. For Donetsk and Luhansk regions KIIS calculated population size only for territories currently under control of Ukrainian authorities.

After stratification KIIS selected particular communities for interviewers' fieldwork. At the first stage, KIIS selected communities within each strata. Urban communities were selected with probability, proportional to adult population size in the given community. For rural strata, KIIS initially selected districts (with probability proportional to adult population size in the given district), and then randomly selected rural communities within the selected district. At the second stage, KIIS selected electoral wards within the selected communities. At the third stage, KIIS selected initial addresses (street, house, if applicable – apartment) where the interviewers should start. At the fourth stage respondents were selected and questioned using modified route sampling.

The interviewing was conducted via personal interviews using Tablet PC in the respondents' private households.

Due to random sampling at each stage, women and elderly people were overrepresented in the final data set. Special statistical 'balances' were created to restore proper proportions.

Data below are presented for Ukraine in general and separately for four Ukrainian macro-regions: *Western* (Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Zakarpattia, Khmelnytskyi and Chernivtsi regions), *Central* (Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Sumy, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Kyiv regions and the city of Kyiv), *Southern* (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Odesa regions), and *Eastern* (Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv regions).

The fieldwork lasted from Feb. 5 to Feb. 21, 2018. The total number of interviews was 2043, with respondents from 110 Ukrainian communities.

Statistical error for sample of 2043 respondents (with probability 0.95 and design effect 1.5) does not exceed:

- 3.3% for indexes close to 50%,
- 2.8% for indexes close to 25 or 75%,
- 2.0% for indexes close to 12 or 88%,
- 1.4% for indexes close to 5 or 95%,
- 0.7% for indexes close to 1 or 99%.

MAIN RESULTS



LEVEL OF USAGE AND CREDENCE TO INFORMATION SOURCES

- **Absolute majority** of Ukrainians (**86%**) receive information about Ukrainian and world events from **Ukrainian TV channels**. **27% of Ukrainians receive information from Ukrainian websites**, **24% from social networks**. For 18% the main source of information are personal social relations: relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, etc. No more than 8% of population use other informational sources. In particular, 5% of respondents admitted that they receive information about Ukrainian and world events from Russian TV channels.
- **57% of Ukrainian population receive information only from Ukrainian media** (in the Eastern part of Ukraine there are 52% such respondents). Among the rest of the population, the majority also receive information from TV, but combine it with other sources; others receive information only from websites, social networks and personal acquaintances. Virtually all respondents who receive information from Russian media (5% nationwide, but 11% in the East of Ukraine), also receive information from Ukrainian media. Only 0.2% of Ukrainians (0.6% of Eastern Ukrainians) receive information solely from Russian media.
- At the same time, **57% trust information from Ukrainian TV channels about the armed conflict in the East of Ukraine** (46% in the Eastern macro-region vs. 54-61% in the other macro-regions), 14% trust such information from the websites, 13% – information from social networks.
- On the average, **an adult Ukrainian watches 3 Ukrainian TV channels** but trusts only 1.5 channels regarding the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and “people’s republics” in Donbas.
- For general audience, **top TV channels** are **1+1** (watched by 61% of Ukrainians), **Inter** (48%), **TV Ukraine** (44%), **ICTV** (39%), **STB** (36%), **New channel** (18%) and **112 channel** (15%). **In terms of credence to information no more than 35% trust any particular channel**. The same 7 channels are leading in terms of the number of trusting watchers: 1+1 (35%), Inter (22%), TV Ukraine (22%), ICTV (20%), New channel (6%) and 112 channel (8%).
- 1+1 is the leading channel in the Western and Central parts of Ukraine. In the South its rating is still high, but its competitors are closer. The positions of Inter

and TV Ukraine are stronger in the Southern and Eastern parts of Ukraine. ICTV has roughly the same audience in all macro-regions. STB is most watched in the South, somewhat less in the Western and Central macro-regions, least of all in the East of Ukraine. Some other channels also have visible regional particularities: e.g., ZIK, 24 channel and 5 channel are much more watched in the West, and NewsOne in the South and East. 112 channel and New channel are also somewhat more popular in the East.

- **Only one fourth of Ukrainian TV watchers (27%) believe that Ukrainian channels truly provide objective information** about the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and “people’s republics”. Significantly more people (43%) believe that the information provided by TV is not true (whereas 30% reserved their opinion). The proportion of those who believe in objectiveness of the information provided by Ukrainian TV channels becomes lower from the West to the East (31% to 20%).
- 42% of adult Ukrainians use at least one social network. **The most popular network is currently Facebook, used by 36% of Ukrainians.** No more than 11% of Ukrainians use other social networks.
- 29% of Ukrainians use only one of the “Western” social networks. Only 3% use solely Russian social networks; 8% have accounts in both “Western” and “Russian” social networks.

INFORMATION CHECK

- 35% of respondents claim that, if they get an information from Ukrainian national, Russian, their local media, or media of “Donetsk/Luhansk people’s republics”, they would check it with media of “the other” side. At the same time, **slightly more than a half of the respondents (52%) would not check the information.**
- At the same time, **if the information from different sources is contradictory, 58% prefer to believe Ukrainian nationwide media**, and only 1% would rather believe Russian media or media of “people’s republics”. At the same time, every third Ukrainian (38%) does not know which side he or she would rather believe in such situation. In the West 27% don’t know which side to believe; in the Center – 37%, South – 47%, East – 48% (although anyway Ukrainian media keep the lead in all macro-regions).

FULLNESS OF INFORMATION ON PARTICULAR ISSUES

- **Most of Ukrainians** admit that they **receive insufficient information** about state strategies and goals regarding Crimea (63% vs. 23% who said they have rather or fully enough information), regarding the territories controlled by “people’s republics” (60% vs. 26%) and new Law on Reintegration of Donbas (68% vs. 13%).

- At the same time, as compared to previous KIIS poll (December 2016), the level of informational awareness has become somewhat higher (in December 2016 only 17% had enough information regarding Crimea, and 20% regarding Donbas).
- Subjectively, Eastern Ukrainians believe themselves more informed about state strategies and goals regarding both Crimea (34% believe themselves “sufficiently informed”) and Donbas (40%), whereas in the other macro-regions the proportion of those who believe themselves sufficiently informed does not exceed 25%.
- **Only 5% of the respondents claim to be familiar with at least some of the provisions of the Law on Reintegration of Donbas.** At the same time, 50% heard something but do not know any details, and 41% didn’t hear anything about the Law.

INTERPRETATIONS OF CURRENT EVENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA AND THE CONFLICT IN THE EAST OF UKRAINE

- **52% of respondents believe that the war was initiated by Russia and separatists** (at the same time, 15% blame Ukraine, and one third has no definite opinion – which is a negative fact after 4 years of war), **43% of respondents believe that Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speaking people are persecuted in Crimea and “people’s republics”** (vs. 10% who believe that Russians and Russian-speaking people are persecuted in Ukraine).
- 30% believe that an attack on the freedom of speech is currently going on in Ukraine; 33% believe that in Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin media; 38% has no definite opinion about this issue.
- People mostly reject certain restrictive measures:
 - **44% do not support the ban of Russian TV channels** (37% support it),
 - **46% do not support the ban of Russian social networks** (30% support it),
 - **53% do not support the ban of certain Russian artists and movies** (29% support it).
- **Only in the Western macro-region we can see certain domination of the “pro-Ukrainian” interpretation of events and support of some decisions of the Ukrainian authorities.** However, even here 28% of respondents either believe that the war was initiated by Ukraine or have no definite opinion about this issue. Just slightly more than a half of Western Ukrainians (52-56%) support the ban of Russian TV series / social networks / artists.
- In the Central macro-region 55% blame Russia / separatists for initiating the war (whereas 14% blame Ukraine, and 31% have no definite opinion about this issue). The ban of Russian TV channels is rather supported; however, the majority here stands against the ban of TV series / social networks / artists.
- In the South and East only one third of the respondents believe that the war was initiated by Russia and separatists (17-18% blame Ukraine, the rest have no

definite opinion). Also, the majority here is against the restrictive measures against Russian TV channels, TV series, social networks and artists.

OPPOSITION TO KREMLIN PROPAGANDA AND DISINFORMATION. ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STATE AND NGOs

- Ukrainians mostly suppose that **opposition to Kremlin propaganda is the responsibility of governmental bodies**: 49% of respondents believe that this is solely governmental responsibility. 33% of respondents “split” the responsibility between governmental agencies and NGOs.
- Ukrainians have no definite opinion about the “**success secret**” of **Russian propaganda**. Mostly they suggest that Russian propaganda is effective due to **serious financial investments** into propaganda (38% of respondents), **lack of critical thinking** of ordinary audience (33%) and **Russia’s bribing foreign media and politicians** (30%).
- Ukrainians **rather critically assess effectiveness** of both governmental bodies and NGOs in **opposing Kremlin propaganda**. The creation of Ukrainian content is assessed somewhat better: 24% believe that the state is doing enough in this direction (47% disagree), 19% believe the same about NGOs (44% disagree).
- 16% of respondents positively assess governmental activity in providing media literacy courses in educational institutions (46% disagree), 14% positively assess similar activities of NGOs (42% disagree). Regarding restoration of TV and radio broadcasting for Donbas 13% believe that government is doing enough (50% disagree), 10% believe the same about NGOs (42% disagree).
- Critical assessment of governmental and NGO’s effectiveness prevails in all macro-regions, although the overall assessment in Southern and Eastern macro-regions is somewhat better.

UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE QUOTAS ON RADIO AND TV

- **One third of Ukrainians (33%) support quotas** for Ukrainian language on radio and TV; 43% do not support it. Of those who support it only one third believe that the state and NGOs are doing enough in this direction.
- The support for quotas becomes much lower from the West to the East: in the Western macro-region 50% agree with this decision (24% disagree), in the Central macro-region the figures are 36% vs. 39%. In the South and East most of the people (resp., 57% and 67%) are against quotas, which are supported, resp., by 22% and 14% of regional respondents.

SELF-ASSESSMENT OF ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE FAKES

- **Slightly more than a half of Ukrainians (53%)** believe themselves capable to **distinguish good-quality information** from disinformation and fakes at least in most cases (including 20% who believe they can do it always). One third of respondents (31%) admit themselves usually or utterly unable to discern whether the information is trustworthy. The number of respondents who believe themselves generally capable to discern rotten information is about the same in all regions.
- These respondents are more certain about their ability to identify fakes:
 - Respondents from middle-size towns and big cities (60-68% believe that they mostly can identify fakes vs. 43-49% of rural respondents);
 - Men (61% vs. 47% women);
 - Younger persons (the figures are gradually lowering from 60% for respondents below 30 to 33% for persons 70+);
 - Better educated Ukrainians (66% for respondents with higher education vs. no more than 50% for persons with lower level of education);
 - Specialists, students, businessmen (66-73% vs. no more than 55% for other occupations; least of all retired persons – 41%);
 - Wealthier Ukrainians (66-73% for those who have high or average income vs. 46% low-income persons and 38% very low-income persons).
- Among the criteria of identification of non-fakes people mostly refer to their trust to the media which provided this information (for 33% of Ukrainians this is one of the main criteria) and visible authorship (30%).

ENHANCEMENT OF MEDIA LITERACY

- **Most of Ukrainians (61%) believe that the state and NGOs should foster the enhancement of media literacy.** Teaching media literacy is important for 61-66% in the Western, Central and Southern macro-regions vs. 43% in the Eastern macro-region.
- In virtually all social-demographical categories of the population, the majority believes that teaching media literacy is important.
- At the same time, the respondents have no definite opinion about the primary target group of such teaching. Most of those who admit that teaching media literacy is important give priority to teenagers (48%); 29% of respondents consider media literacy important for adults.
- **22% of Ukrainians would personally agree to receive training in media literacy.** The most interested are Westerners – 31% vs. no more than 20% in other regions. Of those who are interested people mostly prefer online courses (56%).
- There is a correlation between readiness to receive training and positive self-assessment of one's ability to recognize fakes: an interest to trainings was expressed by 31% of those who believe themselves always capable to identify

fakes, 26% of those who believe themselves capable to identify fakes in most of the cases, and 16-17% of those who believe themselves capable to identify fakes at least sometimes.

- These respondents are more interested in getting such trainings:
 - Respondents from middle-size towns and big cities (26% vs. 18% of rural respondents and those from small towns);
 - Younger persons (40% for respondents below 30, 21-24% for respondents between 30-49, no more than 16% for persons 50+);
 - Better educated Ukrainians (34% for respondents with higher education vs. no more than 19% for persons with lower level of education);
 - Students, specialists, businessmen (35-48%);
 - Wealthier Ukrainians (46% of those who have high or average income vs. 32% low-income persons and 10-17% very low-income persons).

CHAPTER I. STRUCTURE AND CREDENCE TO INFORMATION SOURCES



1.1 General structure of information sources for Ukrainian population

Absolute majority of Ukrainians (**86%**) receive information about the events in Ukraine and the world from **Ukrainian TV channels** (Table 1.1.1). About a quarter of Ukrainians receive information from Ukrainian websites (27%); same about social networks (24%). Totally **42% of Ukrainians receive information from the Internet** (national and local Ukrainian Internet-media, Russian Internet-media, social networks). For 18% of Ukrainians the main source of information is the circle of personal acquaintances: relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, etc. No more than 8% of respondents use other sources.

Regarding state strategies and purposes for Donbas and Crimea, the respondents refer to particular sources less often. Even less often they trust certain sources regarding the armed stand-off in Donbas. However, **Ukrainian TV channels** keep the lead anyway, with **74% of respondents receiving information about state strategies and purposes from this source, and 57% trusting this source**. For Ukrainian websites the corresponding figures are, respectively, 16% and 14%, for social networks – 12% and 13%. Generally 25% of Ukrainians receive information about state strategies and purposes from the Internet, and 24% trust information about the conflict in Donbas from this source.

5% of respondents admitted receiving information about the events in Ukraine and the world from Russian TV channels. On the one hand, this is much less than Ukrainian sources; however, in the absolute figures there are about 1.4 million of Ukrainian citizens. In addition, some respondents could possibly hide their receiving information from Russian TV channels, so that the given figures rather indicate conservative lower margin. One should also note that 67% of those who receive information from Russian TV channels inhabit Southern and Eastern Ukraine.

The main technical way of access to Russian TV channels is satellite (69% of users). 13% watch Internet TV, 12% use analog antenna, 8% have access via cable TV.

Table 1.1.1

From which sources you receive information about Ukrainian and world events most often? / From which sources you receive information about state strategies and purposes regarding Crimea and Donbas? / Which of the listed sources of information about the armed stand-off in Donbas you trust?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)

% in the column*	% of respondents receiving information about...		
	Ukrainian and world events	State strategies and purposes regarding Crimea and Donbas	Trust information about the conflict in Donbas
Ukrainian TV (national channels)	85.7	73.9	57.2
Ukrainian Internet media	27.1	16.3	14.1
Social networks	23.5	12.0	12.5
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances	17.9	9.5	8.7
Ukrainian newspapers (national editions)	8.1	2.9	3.3
Local TV	6.4	1.6	2.0
Local printed media	4.8	1.0	1.4
Russian TV	4.7	2.0	1.6
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	4.2	2.5	2.4
Local Internet media	2.5	1.1	0.6
Local radio	2.0	0.4	0.7
Russian websites	0.5	0.4	---
Media of "people's republics" in Donbas (including websites)	0.1	0.1	0.1
Russian printed media	0.1	0.0	0.0
Official information from Ukrainian Ministry of Defense / media of this Ministry	---	---	0.3
Acquaintances who are or were in the zone of conflict, Crimea or territory controlled by "people's republics"	---	---	4.9
Other sources	0.7	0.6	0.3
I don't trust any sources	---	---	15.8
Hard to say / No answer	2.2	13.0	9.2

* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.


There are different ways to categorize information sources, but for the purposes of this study it is expedient to use these categories: Ukrainian media (national and local), Russian media (including media of “people’s republics”), social media and personal acquaintances. The results of the poll show that **95% of Ukrainians receive information from Ukrainian media**, whereas 5% receive information from Russian media (Diagram 1.1.1).

57% of Ukrainians receive information solely from Ukrainian media (i.e. they referred to at least one Ukrainian media and did not mention Russian media, social networks, personal relatives, friends, acquaintances, etc.) (in the East of Ukraine this group amounts to 52%). Almost all of those who receive information from Russian media also get information from Ukrainian media. Only 0.2% of Ukrainians receive information solely from Russian media (in the East of Ukraine this group amounts to 0.6%).

Diagram 1.1.1

Categories of information sources: % of Ukrainians who receive information from...

(% of all respondents, n=2043)



Tables 1.1.2-4 below present data for different regions. The basic structure of information sources is the same in all macro-regions: both Western and Eastern Ukrainians mostly receive information from Ukrainian TV channels (83-88% in different macro-regions). Internet resources are less popular: generally, Ukrainian central/local websites, Russian websites, and social networks are used as a source of information by 49% of respondents in the Western macro-region, 39% in the Central macro-region, 41% in the Southern macro-region and 38% in the Eastern macro-region. It is remarkable that Russian TV was mentioned by 1% of respondents in the West vs. 3% in the Center, 8% in the South, and 10% in the East.

Table 1.1.2

From which sources you receive information about Ukrainian and world events most often?

(% of all respondents)

% in the column*	% of respondents of macro-region...			
	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)
Ukrainian TV (national channels)	87.8	85.2	85.3	83.3
Ukrainian Internet media	34.4	21.8	27.8	24.6
Social networks	24.9	24.8	19.8	24.2
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances	13.4	19.0	19.5	21.1
Ukrainian newspapers (national editions)	10.2	9.7	5.9	4.0
Local TV	11.1	2.8	5.4	8.1
Local printed media	8.1	3.8	4.1	2.1
Russian TV	1.3	3.3	7.5	9.8
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	5.2	5.6	2.1	2.8
Local Internet media	2.7	1.0	4.2	2.2
Local radio	2.9	2.0	0.3	3.5
Russian websites	0.0	0.1	1.8	0.4
Media of "people's republics" in Donbas (including websites)	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0
Russian printed media	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0
Other sources	0.0	1.4	0.4	0.9
Hard to say / No answer	1.3	2.3	1.9	4.0

* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

In terms of the narrower topic of state strategy and goals for Donbas and Crimea 75-77% of Western, Central and Southern Ukrainians mention Ukrainian channels (Table 1.1.3). In the East there are 60% of such respondents, whereas 5% mention Russian channels. At the same time, every fifth Eastern respondent could not answer this question (21%).

Table 1.1.3

From which sources you receive information about state strategies and purposes regarding Crimea and Donbas?

(% of all respondents)

% in the column*	% of respondents of macro-region...			
	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)
Ukrainian TV (national channels)	77.1	74.8	76.2	60.1
Ukrainian Internet media	22.6	12.1	16.0	14.7
Social networks	11.2	11.5	12.2	14.2
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances	5.4	7.5	12.7	16.9
Ukrainian newspapers (national editions)	1.7	2.6	5.1	2.1
Local TV	1.7	0.3	2.4	3.5
Local printed media	2.2	0.5	1.0	0.0
Russian TV	0.3	1.5	3.0	4.7
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	3.6	3.0	0.6	2.1
Local Internet media	0.7	0.7	2.0	1.1
Local radio	0.6	0.4	0.0	1.1
Russian websites	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.4
Media of "people's republics" in Donbas (including websites)	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0
Russian printed media	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other sources	0.2	1.3	0.0	0.8
Hard to say / No answer	9.1	14.0	11.6	20.7

* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

As to the credence to information sources regarding the conflict in Donbas, 46% of Eastern Ukrainians trust information from Ukrainian TV channels (3% trust information from Russian TV channels). In other macro-regions 54-61% trust information from Ukrainian TV channels (Table 1.1.4).

Table 1.1.4

Which of the listed sources of information about the armed stand-off in Donbas you trust?

(% of all respondents)

% in the column*	% of respondents of macro-region...			
	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)
Ukrainian TV (national channels)	61.1	60.3	54.4	46.0
Ukrainian Internet media	22.3	10.7	12.6	8.9
Social networks	13.4	13.8	11.1	9.9
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances	7.1	7.3	11.1	11.2
Ukrainian newspapers (national editions)	3.8	4.0	2.7	1.7
Local TV	3.0	0.5	2.1	4.0
Local printed media	2.7	0.7	0.9	1.2
Russian TV	0.7	1.4	2.4	2.6
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	3.2	3.4	0.7	1.4
Local Internet media	0.8	0.1	1.3	0.4
Local radio	1.2	0.4	0.2	1.3
Media of "people's republics" in Donbas (including websites)	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0
Russian printed media	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
Official information from Ukrainian Ministry of Defense / media of this Ministry	0.7	0.2	0.3	0.0
Acquaintances who are or were in the zone of conflict, Crimea or territory controlled by "people's republics"	4.7	3.5	6.7	5.5
Other sources	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.8
I don't trust any sources	13.6	12.9	21.1	17.7
Hard to say / No answer	3.9	11.9	6.6	18.2

* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

Table 1.1.5 shows sources of information about state strategy and goals for Donbas and Crimea used by inhabitants of different types of communities.

Table 1.1.5

From which sources you receive information about state strategies and purposes regarding Crimea and Donbas?

(% of respondents who live in the corresponding type of community)

% in the column*	Village (n=693)	Urban-type settlements / Small towns (n=310)	Middle- size towns (n=130)	Big cities (n=910)
Ukrainian TV (national channels)	80.3	70.9	72.1	70.2
Ukrainian Internet media	12.5	16.1	10.8	20.0
Social networks	7.1	12.0	19.3	14.6
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues, acquaintances	7.1	12.9	10.9	9.9
Ukrainian newspapers (national editions)	3.0	1.9	1.6	3.4
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	3.4	2.4	2.0	1.8
Russian TV	2.2	2.7	0.5	1.8
Local TV	0.5	2.8	1.1	2.1
Local Internet media	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.1
Local printed media	1.4	0.8	1.9	0.6
Local radio	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.6
Russian websites	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.7
Media of "people's republics" in Donbas (including websites)	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.2
Russian printed media	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other sources	0.0	0.0	2.6	1.0
Hard to say / No answer	10.8	14.0	12.4	14.3

* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

Table 1.1.6 shows credence to the sources of information depending on experience of visiting the EU for the last 2 years. Those who visited EU somewhat less rely on TV and somewhat more on Internet resources. However, one should also take into account that Ukrainians who visited the EU are generally younger, better educated and wealthier.

Table 1.1.6

Which of the listed sources of information about the armed stand-off in Donbas you trust?

(% of respondents depending on whether they visited the EU for the last 2 years)

% in the column*	Visited EU (n=166)	Did not visit EU (n=1871)
Ukrainian TV (national channels)	48.7	58.0
Ukrainian Internet media	35.0	12.1
Social networks	22.1	11.5
Relatives, friends, neighbors, colleagues	10.2	8.6
Acquaintances who are or were in the zone of conflict, Crimea or territory controlled by “people’s republics”	6.6	4.7
Ukrainian radio (national stations)	2.8	2.4
Local TV	2.6	2.0
Ukrainian newspapers (national editions)	2.0	3.4
Local Internet media	1.6	0.6
Local printed media	1.2	1.4
Russian TV	1.1	1.7
Local radio	0.6	0.7
Official information from Ukrainian Ministry of Defense / media of this Ministry	0.4	0.3
Russian printed media	0.0	0.1
Media of “people’s republics” in Donbas (including websites)	0.0	0.1
Other sources	0.4	0.3
I don’t trust any sources	11.4	16.2
Hard to say / No answer	5.5	9.6

* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

1.2 Information check with alternative sources. Credence in case of contradictory information

35% of respondents claim that at least sometimes they check an information with “another” source (Diagram 1.2.1). However, given the structure of information sources (see above, 1.1), it seems that a good part of the respondents overestimate their verification skills.

At the same time, the respondents were asked about hypothetical situations of receiving contradictory information from different sources (Ukrainian central and local media, Russian media, media of “people’s republics”). The question was, which source of information they would probably treat as more trustworthy. **In case of contradictory information from different sources 58% would rather trust Ukrainian national media**, and only 1% would rather trust Russian media or media of “people’s republics”. At the same time, every third Ukrainian (38%) doesn’t know which media to trust in such situation.



Those who always check information, who sometimes check and who never check information – all these groups prefer Ukrainian national media as the most trustworthy source.

Diagram 1.2.1

If you get an information from Ukrainian national, Russian, your local media, or media of “Donetsk/Luhansk people’s republics”, would you check this information with the other side’s media?

If an information you get from Ukrainian national, Russian, your local media, or media of “Donetsk/Luhansk people’s republics” is contradictory, or at least significantly differs, which kind of media you usually trust most?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)



In case of contradictory information, **credence to Ukrainian national media becomes lower from the West to the East**. In the West 69% would rather believe Ukrainian media vs. 62% in the Central macro-region, 49% in the Southern macro-region, and 43% in the Eastern macro-region. (At the same time, the proportion of those who check information at least sometimes is about the same in all macro-regions: 31-36%) (Table 1.2.1). Although less credence to Ukrainian national media correlates with more credence to Russian media or media of “people’s republics” (from 0.5% in the Western macro-region to 5% in the Eastern macro-region), it also correlates with more people who don’t know which side to believe: 27% in the Western macro-region, 37% in the Central macro-region, 47% in the Southern macro-region, 48% in the Eastern macro-region.

Table 1.2.1

If you get an information from Ukrainian national, Russian, your local media, or media of “Donetsk/Luhansk people’s republics”, would you check this information with the other side’s media?

If an information you get from Ukrainian national, Russian, your local media, or media of “Donetsk/Luhansk people’s republics” is contradictory, or at least significantly differs, which kind of media you usually trust most?

(% of all respondents)

100% in the column	% of respondents of macro-region...			
	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)
Information check with alternative sources				
Yes	21.4	16.3	15.0	18.6
Sometimes	14.8	19.6	16.2	15.5
No	50.1	50.9	56.2	50.7
Hard to say / No answer	13.7	13.2	12.7	15.2
Which kind of media is preferable in case of contradictory information				
Ukrainian national media	68.8	62.3	48.6	42.9
Local media	4.3	0.2	2.9	4.6
Russian media	0.5	0.4	1.3	3.4
Media of “people’s republics”	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.3
Hard to say / No answer	26.5	37.1	47.0	47.8

Table 1.2.2 contains data for separate social and demographical population groups. These groups more often claim to check information at least sometimes:

- inhabitants of middle-size towns and big cities (39-46% vs. 27-31% among inhabitants of villages and small towns / urban-type settlements);
- men (42% vs. 29% women);
- younger and middle-aged persons (36-41% for the group 18-59 years old vs. 21-27% for 60+ group);
- people with higher education (45% vs. 35% for persons with vocational education, 29% with complete secondary education and 15% with incomplete secondary education);
- specialists and businessmen / self-employed (51% vs. no more than one third for persons with other occupation);
- high-income persons (61% vs. 43% of middle-income persons and 29% of low and very low-income persons).

At the same time, respondents from all social and demographical groups, in case of contradictory information, would rather believe Ukrainian media. The most important correlation is with lingual-ethnic categories. Among Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians 67% would rather trust Ukrainian media; among Russian-speaking Ukrainians – only 51%; among Russian-speaking Russians – 24% (at the same time, the proportion of those who don't know which source to trust increases from 31% to 65%). However, one should also take into account that this lingual-ethnic structure is closely related to regional distribution: 87% of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians inhabit Central and Western Ukraine, whereas three fourths of Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Russians inhabit Southern and Eastern Ukraine.

Table 1.2.2

If you get an information from Ukrainian national, Russian, your local media, or media of “Donetsk/Luhansk people’s republics”, would you check this information with the other side’s media?

If an information you get from Ukrainian national, Russian, your local media, or media of “Donetsk/Luhansk people’s republics” is contradictory, or at least significantly differs, which kind of media you usually trust most?

(% among respondents of the corresponding strata)

100% in the row	Information check				▶	Which source is rather credible					Potential of the strata* ↑↓
	Yes	Sometimes	No	Hard to say / No answer		Ukrainian media	Local media	Russian media	Media of “people’s republics”	Hard to say / No answer	
Community type and size											
- village (n=693)	12.4	18.1	52.6	17.0		59.4	1.9	0.6	0.3	37.8	33.8
- urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000) (n=310)	10.2	16.9	63.5	9.4		49.5	4.2	1.2	0.0	45.1	15.3
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	22.0	23.7	41.4	12.9		65.5	3.7	2.0	0.0	28.8	6.4
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	23.6	15.0	49.0	12.3		59.0	2.3	1.2	0.3	37.2	44.5
Gender strata											
- men (n=802)	21.7	20.0	46.1	12.2		57.3	2.2	1.3	0.4	38.8	45.1
- women (n=1241)	14.3	14.3	56.8	14.5		58.7	2.9	0.8	0.1	37.5	54.9
Age-specific strata											
- 18-29 years (n=280)	19.5	17.9	48.7	13.9		61.3	1.2	0.3	0.3	36.9	21.1
- 30-39 years (n=396)	21.4	17.6	48.6	12.4		52.5	2.1	0.5	0.0	44.8	18.5
- 40-49 years (n=308)	21.2	19.9	45.1	13.8		58.4	1.8	1.5	0.6	37.7	16.6
- 50-59 years (n=400)	16.5	19.6	54.1	9.8		55.7	4.8	2.3	0.4	36.8	17.7
- 60-69 years (n=353)	16.8	9.9	57.7	15.6		61.1	3.4	0.2	0.0	35.2	12.4
- 70+ years (n=306)	7.9	13.6	61.9	16.6		60.5	2.4	1.5	0.0	35.7	13.8
Educational strata											
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	6.2	8.5	68.4	16.9		63.7	0.8	0.0	0.0	35.4	8.6
- complete secondary (n=593)	13.2	15.9	57.5	13.5		60.9	2.8	1.9	0.0	34.3	28.1
- vocational (n=673)	15.2	19.4	52.2	13.2		54.6	2.0	1.3	0.5	41.6	32.1
- higher (n=615)	27.3	17.6	42.2	12.8		57.5	3.4	0.3	0.2	38.7	31.2
Lingual-ethnic strata											
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	18.8	19.0	50.9	11.3		66.6	2.3	0.6	0.0	30.5	57.3
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	15.7	13.8	55.2	15.2		51.4	2.2	1.1	0.7	44.7	34.3
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	18.5	12.4	48.2	20.9		23.7	6.2	4.8	0.0	65.3	3.4

100% in the row	Information check				▶	Which source is rather credible					Potential of the strata* ‘Y’
	Yes	Sometimes	No	Hard to say / No answer		Ukrainian media	Local media	Russian media	Media of “people’s republics”	Hard to say / No answer	
Primary occupation											
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	12.9	25.3	46.4	15.4		56.5	3.2	1.0	1.3	38.0	19.1
- office employee (n=205)	18.7	20.3	49.7	11.2		54.8	3.4	1.3	0.0	40.5	10.6
- specialist (n=218)	29.6	21.7	37.5	11.2		53.3	2.1	0.0	0.0	44.5	12.1
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	34.0	17.4	39.2	9.4		58.5	3.1	1.3	0.0	37.2	5.4
- housekeeper (n=203)	16.7	10.7	59.5	13.1		60.0	1.3	0.6	0.0	38.2	10.3
- retired (n=731)	13.1	11.6	60.1	15.2		61.2	2.9	1.2	0.0	34.8	31.0
- student (n=49)	22.9	11.6	48.1	17.3		70.4	0.0	1.4	0.0	28.2	4.3
- unemployed (n=126)	15.7	18.1	57.2	9.0		61.6	1.8	2.1	0.0	34.4	7.2
Household income level**											
- very low (n=273)	14.8	10.5	63.5	11.2		64.4	3.4	1.3	0.0	31.0	12.4
- low (n=1022)	10.8	18.3	57.6	13.3		57.5	3.2	1.0	0.4	37.9	49.3
- average (n=637)	25.0	18.0	42.8	14.2		57.0	1.4	0.9	0.2	40.4	34.1
- high (n=74)	42.5	18.8	30.4	8.3		63.1	1.8	1.6	0.0	33.5	4.2

* Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.

** "Very low" – households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" – households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" – households that can afford some expansive goods or anything at all.

1.3 Receiving and credence to information from Ukrainian TV channels


On an average, **an adult Ukrainian watches 3 Ukrainian TV channels**, but trust only 1.5 channels regarding events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and “people’s republics”.

Top channels for general audience nationwide are **1+1** (watched by 61% of Ukrainians), **Inter** (watched by 48% of Ukrainians), **TV Ukraine** (44%), **ICTV** (39%), **STB** (36%). **In terms of credence to information no more than 35% trust any particular channel.** The same five channels are leading as the most trustworthy sources of information: 1+1 (trusted by 35% of respondents), Inter (trusted by 22%), Україна (22%), ICTV (20%). That is, about a half of watchers of any particular channel trust its information about the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and “people’s republics”.

Diagram 1.3.1

Which Ukrainian TV channels you watch most often? / Which of those Ukrainian channels you trust most regarding the information on events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and “Donetsk/Luhansk people’s republics”?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)



There are significant differences in channel preferences between Ukrainian macro-regions. 1+1 is leading in Western and Central macro-regions; in the South its rating is still high, but its competitors are closer (Table 1.3.1). Inter and TV Ukraine have stronger positions in the Southern and Eastern macro-regions. ICTV has roughly the same level of popularity in all regions. STB is most watched in the South, somewhat less in the Western and Central macro-regions, least of all in the East. Some other channels also have visible regional peculiarities: e.g., ZIK, 24 channel and 5 channel are much more watched in the West, whereas NewsOne – in the South and East.

Table 1.3.1

Which Ukrainian TV channels you watch most often? / Which of those Ukrainian channels you trust most regarding the information on events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and “Donetsk/Luhansk people’s republics”?

(% of all respondents)

% in the column*	West (n=572)		Center (n=710)		South (n=491)		East (n=270)	
	Watch	Trust	Watch	Trust	Watch	Trust	Watch	Trust
1+1	68.6	39.9	63.0	39.4	63.4	33.9	35.0	18.2
Inter	42.4	16.2	43.2	21.3	54.5	27.9	59.3	26.8
TV Ukraine	34.7	12.9	42.4	24.2	51.1	25.5	51.7	26.2
ICTV	43.5	22.4	36.4	19.0	37.4	19.1	40.8	18.3
STB	35.5	10.0	36.2	17.6	43.7	18.8	23.9	7.7
New channel	14.8	2.4	17.3	9.2	17.9	4.0	26.6	10.4
112 Ukraine	16.2	8.0	14.0	7.7	11.4	5.4	22.3	11.6
NewsOne	2.1	0.5	6.3	3.6	10.6	6.3	15.4	9.8
5 channel	13.9	6.1	6.0	2.3	2.2	1.0	3.4	2.0
ZIK	10.6	7.9	3.2	1.9	2.7	1.9	3.1	1.0
24 channel	10.9	6.4	1.6	0.6	3.6	0.9	1.2	0.6
UA:Pershyj	3.8	1.8	5.0	3.5	2.9	0.6	2.1	0.4
Pryamyj channel	1.2	0.5	2.9	1.0	2.4	1.6	3.3	1.7
Espresso TV	2.7	1.2	2.7	1.4	1.0	0.7	0.0	0.0
Hromadske TV	2.5	1.6	1.0	0.4	2.2	0.9	0.6	0.0
ATR	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Do not watch Ukrainian TV	6.4	0.0	8.7	0.0	8.4	0.0	7.9	0.0
Hard to say / No answer	1.6	17.5	3.6	22.8	1.5	25.0	5.0	31.4

* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

Only one fourth of Ukrainian TV watchers (27%) believe that Ukrainian channels truly provide objective information about the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and “people’s republics”. Significantly more people (43%) believe that the information provided by TV is not true (whereas 30% reserved their opinion).

The proportion of those who believe in objectiveness of the information provided by Ukrainian TV channels becomes lower from the West to the East (31% to 20%).

Diagram 1.3.2

Do you believe that presented information about the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and “people’s republics” is true to facts?

(% of respondents who watch Ukrainian TV channels)




Table 1.3.2 provides information on whether the information provided by TV channels is true to facts for those who watch the corresponding channel and those who generally believe its information. Skeptical attitude is visible virtually everywhere. The only exception is 5 channel and those who trust its information: within the group of its watchers 60% believe that its information is true to facts, whereas with all other channels this belief is shared by no more than one third of their audience.

Table 1.3.2

Do you believe that the presented information about the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and “people’s republics” is true to facts?

(% of respondents, who watch / trust information of the corresponding TV channel*)

100% in the row	Yes	No	Hard to say / No answer
Total audience			
- 1+1 (n=1267)	29.6	41.4	29.0
- Inter (n=1037)	23.5	47.1	29.5
- TV Ukraine (n=949)	23.9	47.2	28.9
- ICTV (n=801)	24.3	47.6	28.1
- STB (n=763)	23.5	47.6	28.9
- New channel (n=343)	24.9	46.6	28.5
- 112 Ukraine (n=308)	30.0	45.5	24.5
- NewsOne (n=161)	27.8	35.5	36.7
- 5 channel (n=137)	41.0	35.3	23.8
- ZIK (n=108)	32.8	36.8	30.4
Trust information about the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and “people’s republics”			
- 1+1 (n=719)	37.9	35.0	27.1
- Inter (n=480)	33.3	39.5	27.2
- TV Ukraine (n=465)	29.9	43.5	26.6
- ICTV (n=393)	32.4	43.8	23.8
- STB (n=305)	32.5	43.2	24.2
- New channel (n=117)	35.2	40.0	24.8
- 112 Ukraine (n=165)	42.1	33.5	24.4
- NewsOne (n=93)	39.1	23.1	37.8
- 5 channel (n=68)	59.6	26.6	13.8
- ZIK (n=70)	34.4	37.9	27.7


* The table shows top 10 channels watched by no less than 5% of Ukrainian population.

Two thirds of Ukrainians watch TV serials, **53%** of them **mostly watch TV serials on Ukrainian TV** (Diagram 1.3.3). 10% watch Western TV serials via Internet. 4% watch Russian TV serials via Internet, 3% via Russian TV (totally 7% somehow watch Russian TV serials).

Diagram 1.3.3

Where do you watch TV serials most often?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)



* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers

In all regions most of the people watch TV serials, mostly on Ukrainian TV (Table 1.3.4).

Table 1.3.4

Where do you watch TV serials most often?

(% of all respondents)

% in the column*	% of respondents of macro-region...			
	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)
Ukrainian TV	54.4	47.4	58.7	50.5
Internet (Western TV serials)	7.8	14.1	6.3	12.7
Internet (Russian TV serials)	2.7	5.0	3.4	3.5
Russian TV	2.3	1.7	4.2	4.9
Do not watch TV serials	38.3	36.0	32.8	28.3
Hard to say / No answer	0.8	3.3	1.2	4.9

* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

1.4 Social networks usage


2 of 5 adult Ukrainians (42%) use at least 1 social network (Diagram 1.4.1). **Facebook is currently the most popular social network in Ukraine, used by 36% of Ukrainians.** Other social networks are used by no more than 11% of Ukrainians.

29% of Ukrainians use only one of the «Western» social networks. No more than 3% of Ukrainians use only Russian social networks, 8% have accounts in both Western and Russian social networks.

Diagram 1.4.1

Which social networks you use to get information about the events in Ukraine and the world?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)



* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers

Facebook is the most popular social network in all regions (Table 1.4.2).

Table 1.4.2

Which social networks you use to get information about the events in Ukraine and the world?

(% of all respondents)

% in the column*	% of respondents of macro-region...			
	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)
Facebook	36.8	38.8	30.2	34.3
Vkontakte	7.8	11.6	14.0	12.2
Instagram	9.3	11.5	6.5	11.0
Odnoklassniki	4.7	4.7	13.7	6.8
Twitter	3.3	7.8	4.0	5.7
LinkedIn	0.9	0.2	0.3	0.4
Other	1.1	0.6	1.1	1.3
Do not use social networks	51.0	50.5	54.9	55.2
Hard to say / No answer	6.8	4.9	6.3	2.2

* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

CHAPTER II. FULLNESS OF INFORMATION AND INTERPRETATION OF CURRENT EVENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT IN THE EAST OF UKRAINE AND ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA




2.1 Fullness of information on particular issues

Most of Ukrainians admit **having not enough information** about the governmental strategies and goals regarding Crimea (63% vs. 23% of those who believe having rather or fully enough information), regarding the “people’s republics” in Donbas (60% vs. 26%) and regarding the new Law on Reintegration of Donbas (68% vs. 13%) (Diagram 2.1.2). As compared with KIIS survey in December 2016, the level of informational awareness is now somewhat higher (in 2016 17% believed having enough information about Crimea, 20% about Donbas).

Diagram 2.1.2

Do you have sufficient information about...?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)



Western Ukrainians believe themselves the most informed about strategies and goals regarding both Crimea and Donbas (34% have «enough information» regarding Crimea and 40% – regarding Donbas, vs. no more than one fourth in other macro-regions) (Table 2.1.).

Table 2.1.1

Do you have sufficient information about...?

100% in the column	% of respondents of macro-region			
	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)
State strategies and goals regarding Crimea				
Enough	19.6	20.0	25.1	34.2
Not enough	66.2	63.5	67.9	44.7
Hard to say / No answer	14.2	16.5	7.0	21.1
State strategies and goals regarding “people’s republics” in Donbas				
Enough	18.8	23.8	27.8	39.9
Not enough	65.8	58.8	65.3	41.8
Hard to say / No answer	15.3	17.4	7.0	18.3
Newly adopted Law on Reintegration of Donbas				
Enough	10.4	10.4	16.9	18.4
Not enough	66.8	71.1	70.3	58.0
Hard to say / No answer	22.8	18.5	12.8	23.6

2.2 Knowledge about the Law on Reintegration of Donbas

Only 5% of respondents claim to be familiar with at least some of the provisions of the Law on Reintegration of Donbas (Diagram 2.2.1). 50% did hear something but do not know any details. 41% of respondents replied that this is the first time they hear about it.

Diagram 2.2.1

Are you familiar with the Law on Reintegration of Donbas?

(% of all respondents)





Diagram 2.2.2 shows familiarity with the Law depending on sources of received information about state strategies and goals regarding Crimea and Donbas. best informed, in comparison, are those who get information from Ukrainian websites.

Diagram 2.2.2

Are you familiar with the Law on Reintegration of Donbas?

(% of respondents who get the information about state strategies and goals regarding Crimea and Donbas from the corresponding source)



2.3 Interpretations of current events in the context of annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the East of Ukraine

Ukrainians have quite contradictory interpretations of the current events. On the one hand, **52% believe that the current war was initiated by Russia and separatists** (at the same time, 15% blame Ukraine, and one third has no definite opinion, which is disturbing after 4 years of war); **43% believe that Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speaking persons are persecuted in Crimea and the “people’s republics”** (vs. 10%, who believe that Russians and Russian-speaking persons are persecuted in Ukraine) (Diagram 2.3.1).

On the other hand, people rather reject particular restrictive measures:

- **44% do not support the ban of Russian TV channels** (supported by 37%),
- **46% do not support the ban of Russian social networks** (supported by 30%),
- **53% do not support the ban of certain artists and Russian movies** (supported by 29%).

Ukrainians also have split opinions regarding freedom of speech in their country: 30% believe there is an attack on the freedom of speech, 33% claim that in Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media; 38% has no definite opinion about this issue. Among those who believe that only the government should oppose disinformation, 31% believe there is an attack on the freedom of speech in Ukraine, and 32% claim that in Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media. However, among those who say that opposition to disinformation is either shared responsibility of the government and NGOs or sole responsibility of NGOs, 45-48% claim that in Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, and only 19-23% believe there is an attack on the freedom of speech.

Among the Ukrainian macro-regions (see Table 2.3.1) **more or less “pro-Ukrainian” interpretation of events and some support of the governmental decisions are visible only in the West**. At the same time, even to the question, who initiated the war, 28% of Western Ukrainians either blame Ukraine or have no definite opinion. Just slightly more than a half of Western Ukrainians (52-56%) support ban of Russian TV serials / social networks / Russian artists.

In the Central macro-region only 55% blame Russia / separatists for initiating the war (although 14% blame Ukraine, and 31% have no definite opinion). The inhabitants of this macro-region mostly support ban of Russian TV channels, but are mostly against the ban of Russian TV serials, artists and social networks.

In the Southern and Eastern macro-regions only one third of the respondents believe that the war was initiated by Russia and separatists (17-18% blame Ukraine, the rest have no definite opinion). Also, the majority here stands against any restrictive measures against Russian TV channels, serials, artists and social networks.

Diagram 2.3.1

Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option “Hard to say / No answer”.

(% of all respondents, n=2043)







The war was initiated by Ukrainian government and oligarchs	 <p>15.0 51,8</p> <p><i>Hard to say / No answer – 33.2</i></p>	The war was initiated by separatists and Russia
In Ukraine there is an attack on the freedom of speech	 <p>29.6 32,8</p> <p><i>Hard to say / No answer – 37.7</i></p>	In Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, whereas the state's and society's reaction is too weak
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	 <p>36.6 43,7</p> <p><i>Hard to say / No answer – 19.7</i></p>	The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	 <p>29.2 53,0</p> <p><i>Hard to say / No answer – 17.8</i></p>	The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights
The ban of Russian social networks is a necessary step for the protection of state	 <p>30.2 45,8</p> <p><i>Hard to say / No answer – 24.0</i></p>	The ban of Russian social networks is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in Crimea and on territories controlled by “Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics”	 <p>43.3 9,6</p> <p><i>Hard to say / No answer – 47.0</i></p>	Ethnic Russians, Russian-speaking citizens and dissidents are persecuted in Ukraine

Table 2.3.1

Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option “Hard to say / No answer”.

100% in the column	% of respondents of macro-region			
	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)
Who initiated the war				
The war was initiated by Ukrainian government and oligarchs	12.7	13.7	18.2	17.0
The war was initiated by separatists and Russia	71.6	55.4	37.3	29.0
Hard to say / No answer	15.7	30.8	44.5	54.0
Freedom of speech in Ukraine				
In Ukraine there is an attack on the freedom of speech	27.4	23.1	33.8	43.3
In Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, whereas the state's and society's reaction is too weak	47.0	30.5	29.5	15.9
Hard to say / No answer	25.6	46.5	36.7	40.8
Ban of Russian TV channels				
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	55.5	37.6	26.0	15.1
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	25.8	40.1	57.6	63.9
Hard to say / No answer	18.7	22.3	16.4	21.1
Ban of Russian artists and TV serials				
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	52.3	24.9	20.5	9.8
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	29.5	54.5	66.6	71.7
Hard to say / No answer	18.2	20.6	12.9	18.5
Ban of Russian social networks				
The ban of Russian social networks is a necessary step for the protection of state	53.0	27.0	19.1	13.2
The ban of Russian social networks is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	28.5	44.0	60.2	58.8
Hard to say / No answer	18.5	29.0	20.7	28.0
Persecutions of Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking people				
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in Crimea and on territories controlled by “Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics”	72.1	40.4	26.4	24.1
Ethnical Russians, Russian-speaking citizens and dissidents are persecuted in Ukraine	2.7	9.6	11.4	20.6
Hard to say / No answer	25.1	49.9	62.2	55.3

Tables 2.3.2, 2.3.3 i 2.3.4 show interpretations of the same events for different social-demographical categories of population.

Table 2.3.2

Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option “Hard to say / No answer”.

(% among respondents of the corresponding strata)

100% in the row	Who initiated the war			Persecutions of Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking people			Potential of the strata* ↑↓
	Ukraine / oligarchs	Russia / separatists	Hard to say / No answer	Ukrainian-speaking	Russian-speaking	Hard to say / No answer	
Community type and size							
- village (n=693)	14.4	55.0	30.6	47.4	6.8	45.8	33.8
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310)	16.6	37.7	45.7	31.5	6.7	61.8	15.3
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	22.1	48.8	29.1	32.9	17.5	49.6	6.4
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	13.9	54.7	31.4	45.8	11.7	42.5	44.5
Gender strata							
- men (n=802)	16.6	53.5	29.8	44.8	9.9	45.3	45.1
- women (n=1241)	13.6	50.4	35.9	42.1	9.4	48.5	54.9
Age-specific strata							
- 18-29 years (n=280)	13.0	55.9	31.1	46.3	9.1	44.6	21.1
- 30-39 years (n=396)	15.4	51.8	32.8	43.2	10.1	46.7	18.5
- 40-49 years (n=308)	17.6	54.0	28.4	48.0	8.4	43.6	16.6
- 50-59 years (n=400)	15.6	49.4	34.9	42.5	11.5	46.0	17.7
- 60-69 years (n=353)	14.2	49.5	36.3	38.1	9.1	52.8	12.4
- 70+ years (n=306)	14.4	48.0	37.6	39.0	9.5	51.4	13.8
Educational strata							
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	7.1	50.4	42.5	34.8	7.0	58.2	8.6
- complete secondary (n=593)	17.2	51.1	31.7	41.1	10.9	48.1	28.1
- vocational (n=673)	14.7	49.8	35.5	42.9	10.3	46.8	32.1
- higher (n=615)	15.5	54.8	29.6	48.0	8.6	43.4	31.2
Lingual-ethnic strata							
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	12.0	61.7	26.3	55.2	5.6	39.2	57.3
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	17.0	40.7	42.3	28.7	13.7	57.7	34.3
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	27.9	22.2	50.0	13.8	28.7	57.5	3.4
Primary occupation							

100% in the row	Who initiated the war			Persecutions of Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking people			Potential of the strata* ↑↓
	Ukraine / oligarchs	Russia / separatists	Hard to say / No answer	Ukrainian-speaking	Russian-speaking	Hard to say / No answer	
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	14.0	54.1	32.0	46.0	10.0	44.1	19.1
- office employee (n=205)	16.2	47.0	36.8	38.5	8.3	53.2	10.6
- specialist (n=218)	13.7	60.5	25.8	53.0	7.2	39.8	12.1
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	26.9	47.7	25.4	51.2	13.1	35.7	5.4
- housekeeper (n=203)	15.3	53.4	31.3	47.2	4.9	47.9	10.3
- retired (n=731)	14.7	49.1	36.2	39.1	10.7	50.1	31.0
- student (n=49)	10.3	52.1	37.6	35.1	11.1	53.8	4.3
- unemployed (n=126)	16.4	55.5	28.2	42.1	17.3	40.6	7.2
Household income level**							
- very low (n=273)	14.7	46.4	39.0	35.0	15.5	49.5	12.4
- low (n=1022)	13.9	52.1	34.0	40.3	10.1	49.6	49.3
- average (n=637)	17.0	52.1	30.8	48.8	7.5	43.7	34.1
- high (n=74)	12.6	60.3	27.1	58.9	8.6	32.4	4.2

* Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.

** "Very low" – households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" – households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" – those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.

Table 2.3.3

Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option “Hard to say / No answer”.

(% among respondents of the corresponding strata)

100% in the row	Freedom of speech in Ukraine			Ban of Russian TV			Potential of the strata* ↑↓†
	Attack	Too much pro-Kremlin media	Hard to say / No answer	Support	Do not support	Hard to say / No answer	
Community type and size							
- village (n=693)	27.4	33.1	39.4	37.6	37.3	25.0	33.8
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310)	33.7	20.8	45.5	27.9	51.7	20.5	15.3
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	21.7	41.3	37.0	25.0	59.5	15.6	6.4
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	30.9	35.4	33.7	40.5	43.5	16.0	44.5
Gender strata							
- men (n=802)	30.3	34.8	34.9	40.5	40.6	18.9	45.1
- women (n=1241)	28.9	31.1	39.9	33.4	46.3	20.3	54.9
Age-specific strata							
- 18-29 years (n=280)	24.4	36.0	39.6	39.9	40.7	19.4	21.1
- 30-39 years (n=396)	27.9	38.3	33.8	35.3	48.7	16.0	18.5
- 40-49 years (n=308)	32.3	34.0	33.8	39.3	47.1	13.6	16.6
- 50-59 years (n=400)	37.9	26.1	36.0	36.1	45.8	18.0	17.7
- 60-69 years (n=353)	28.7	28.9	42.4	32.9	41.3	25.8	12.4
- 70+ years (n=306)	26.4	31.2	42.4	34.0	37.0	29.0	13.8
Educational strata							
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	24.7	30.6	44.7	31.1	35.5	33.4	8.6
- complete secondary (n=593)	27.5	34.0	38.5	35.2	45.2	19.6	28.1
- vocational (n=673)	32.9	28.3	38.8	33.0	47.3	19.7	32.1
- higher (n=615)	29.3	36.8	33.8	43.0	41.0	16.0	31.2
Lingual-ethnic strata							
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	26.4	36.6	37.0	44.9	35.0	20.1	57.3
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	31.3	30.1	38.6	28.3	52.5	19.2	34.3
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	51.0	12.1	36.9	10.8	73.3	15.8	3.4
Primary occupation							
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	32.0	32.4	35.7	37.7	43.7	18.6	19.1
- office employee (n=205)	34.6	28.8	36.6	34.7	48.6	16.8	10.6
- specialist (n=218)	29.0	35.1	35.9	49.0	40.1	10.9	12.1
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	29.5	36.5	34.0	41.0	50.6	8.4	5.4
- housekeeper (n=203)	28.4	33.1	38.5	32.9	46.2	20.9	10.3

100% in the row	Freedom of speech in Ukraine			Ban of Russian TV			Potential of the strata* ‘Y’
	Attack	Too much pro-Kremlin media	Hard to say / No answer	Support	Do not support	Hard to say / No answer	
- retired (n=731)	28.2	30.5	41.2	33.3	40.2	26.5	31.0
- student (n=49)	20.8	40.2	39.0	40.9	36.2	22.8	4.3
- unemployed (n=126)	27.8	44.5	27.7	35.5	54.0	10.6	7.2
Household income level**							
- very low (n=273)	32.7	27.6	39.6	38.8	41.2	20.0	12.4
- low (n=1022)	29.8	29.0	41.2	31.8	45.5	22.7	49.3
- average (n=637)	29.2	37.4	33.4	40.6	43.3	16.1	34.1
- high (n=74)	23.7	55.1	21.2	56.5	35.3	8.2	4.2

* Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.

** “Very low” – households that have no sufficient income even for food, “low” – households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, “average” – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), “high” – those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.

Table 2.3.4

Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option “Hard to say / No answer”.

(% among respondents of the corresponding strata)

100% in the row	Ban of TV series / artists			Ban of Russian social networks			Potential of the strata*
	Support	Do not support	Hard to say / No answer	Support	Do not support	Hard to say / No answer	
Community type and size							
- village (n=693)	30.9	47.6	21.5	31.6	38.4	30.0	33.8
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310)	20.9	60.5	18.6	20.5	52.1	27.3	15.3
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	17.9	62.0	20.1	24.6	52.1	23.3	6.4
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	32.4	53.3	14.3	33.3	48.4	18.3	44.5
Gender strata							
- men (n=802)	31.3	50.2	18.4	32.1	45.2	22.7	45.1
- women (n=1241)	27.5	55.4	17.2	28.6	46.4	25.0	54.9
Age-specific strata							
- 18-29 years (n=280)	32.1	52.6	15.4	28.8	53.8	17.5	21.1
- 30-39 years (n=396)	30.6	55.1	14.3	33.5	51.7	14.8	18.5
- 40-49 years (n=308)	31.1	54.6	14.3	33.2	52.7	14.1	16.6
- 50-59 years (n=400)	28.1	54.5	17.4	30.1	44.2	25.7	17.7
- 60-69 years (n=353)	28.0	50.5	21.5	29.5	36.1	34.4	12.4
- 70+ years (n=306)	23.2	49.5	27.3	25.2	28.4	46.5	13.8
Educational strata							
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	25.2	46.7	28.1	20.2	27.5	52.3	8.6
- complete secondary (n=593)	26.9	54.0	19.1	27.8	46.4	25.9	28.1
- vocational (n=673)	26.6	56.0	17.4	27.5	48.8	23.6	32.1
- higher (n=615)	35.1	50.9	13.9	38.0	47.3	14.7	31.2
Lingual-ethnic strata							
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	38.2	43.0	18.9	40.3	35.4	24.2	57.3
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	19.3	64.2	16.5	17.5	60.0	22.6	34.3
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	6.7	79.5	13.8	10.0	65.7	24.3	3.4
Primary occupation							
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	31.6	48.9	19.5	30.3	47.1	22.6	19.1
- office employee (n=205)	30.2	55.6	14.2	31.4	55.2	13.4	10.6
- specialist (n=218)	39.2	47.7	13.0	44.8	44.2	11.0	12.1
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	35.8	54.3	10.0	40.7	52.8	6.5	5.4
- housekeeper (n=203)	28.3	54.5	17.1	26.1	54.1	19.8	10.3

100% in the row	Ban of TV serials / artists			Ban of Russian social networks			Potential of the strata* ↑
	Support	Do not support	Hard to say / No answer	Support	Do not support	Hard to say / No answer	
- retired (n=731)	25.5	51.5	23.1	26.9	33.1	40.0	31.0
- student (n=49)	19.6	63.9	16.5	16.7	69.3	14.0	4.3
- unemployed (n=126)	30.5	61.5	8.0	30.8	49.2	19.9	7.2
Household income level**							
- very low (n=273)	29.0	53.5	17.5	28.5	35.9	35.6	12.4
- low (n=1022)	26.5	53.5	20.0	26.8	45.2	28.0	49.3
- average (n=637)	32.6	53.4	14.0	33.5	51.3	15.2	34.1
- high (n=74)	38.3	46.1	15.6	50.6	40.1	9.3	4.2

* Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.

** "Very low" – households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" – households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" – those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.

Table 2.3.5 shows interpretations of the mentioned events by respondents depending on their attitude to governmental activity of opposing Russian propaganda (more details see in Chapter III). Those who consider governmental efforts insufficient are more inclined to support restrictive measures against Russian TV channels / serials / artists / social networks. Chapter III will show that respondents from Western and Central macro-regions are rather more dissatisfied with the governmental efforts, so that the results partially reflect regional specifics.

Table 2.3.5

Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option “Hard to say / No answer”.

(% of the respondents depending on their assessment of governmental effectiveness in different ways of opposing Russian propaganda)

100% in the column	Broadcasting for Donbas			Creation of Ukrainian content			Enhancement of media literacy		
	Enough (n=272)	Not enough (n=1029)	Hard to say (n=710)	Enough (n=481)	Not enough (n=977)	Hard to say (n=552)	Enough (n=311)	Not enough (n=947)	Hard to say (n=756)
Who initiated the war									
The war was initiated by Ukrainian government and oligarchs	16.9	15.2	13.0	17.5	15.0	11.6	18.9	14.5	13.1
The war was initiated by separatists and Russia	52.2	58.3	44.0	51.6	57.1	44.9	53.2	55.8	47.1
Hard to say / No answer	30.9	26.5	43.0	30.9	28.0	43.5	27.9	29.6	39.8
Freedom of speech in Ukraine									
In Ukraine there is an attack on the freedom of speech	29.1	30.0	29.1	32.3	28.9	28.2	30.4	29.9	28.5
In Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, whereas the state's and society's reaction is too weak	34.1	42.3	20.0	32.9	41.4	19.2	34.4	40.9	22.8
Hard to say / No answer	36.8	27.7	50.9	34.8	29.7	52.6	35.2	29.2	48.7
Ban of Russian TV channels									
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	36.0	46.1	24.7	38.9	45.4	21.3	39.7	42.2	29.7
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	46.0	38.7	48.8	45.6	38.6	49.2	45.5	42.3	43.8
Hard to say / No answer	18.0	15.1	26.5	15.4	15.9	29.6	14.9	15.6	26.5
Ban of Russian artists and serials									
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	28.8	36.5	20.2	29.5	36.1	18.7	31.2	33.5	24.0
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in	57.9	48.8	56.7	57.2	49.2	54.8	54.2	52.1	53.0

100% in the column	Broadcasting for Donbas			Creation of Ukrainian content			Enhancement of media literacy		
	Enough (n=272)	Not enough (n=1029)	Hard to say (n=710)	Enough (n=481)	Not enough (n=977)	Hard to say (n=552)	Enough (n=311)	Not enough (n=947)	Hard to say (n=756)
Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights									
Hard to say / No answer	13.3	14.7	23.1	13.3	14.7	26.5	14.6	14.4	23.0
Ban of Russian social networks									
The ban of Russian social networks is a necessary step for the protection of state	29.2	38.2	20.5	32.6	36.5	19.0	34.0	34.8	23.6
The ban of Russian social networks is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	49.8	42.4	48.6	49.0	42.3	48.3	49.4	46.0	43.7
Hard to say / No answer	21.0	19.4	30.9	18.4	21.2	32.7	16.6	19.2	32.7
Prosecution of Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking									
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in Crimea and on territories controlled by "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics"	43.3	53.4	30.5	46.8	51.5	28.4	41.7	52.3	33.8
Ethnic Russians, Russian-speaking citizens and dissidents are persecuted in Ukraine	10.6	9.3	9.0	12.0	8.6	8.7	13.0	9.4	7.6
Hard to say / No answer	46.1	37.3	60.5	41.2	40.0	63.0	45.3	38.3	58.6

Table 2.3.6 provides data depending on the respondents' attitude to quotas for Ukrainian language on radio and TV, and their assessment of governmental effectiveness in this respect (more details see in Chapter III). Those who are generally against quotas stand much stronger against application of any restrictive measures to Russian media content; also, within this group of respondents, only 39% believe that the war was initiated by Russia / separatists. On the other hand, those who support quotas, and negatively assess governmental effectiveness in this respect, are more inclined to support restrictive measures. However, one should also take into account that attitude to quotas closely correlates with regional structure; this correlation significantly impacts the results below.

Table 2.3.6

Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option “Hard to say / No answer”.

(% of the respondents depending on their assessment of governmental effectiveness in implementing quotas for Ukrainian language on radio and TV)

100% in the column	Implementing Ukrainian language on radio and TV			
	Against quotas (n=874)	Enough (n=238)	Not enough (n=358)	Hard to say (n=81)
Who initiated the war				
The war was initiated by Ukrainian government and oligarchs	21.6	11.0	11.0	11.6
The war was initiated by separatists and Russia	38.9	71.9	72.7	54.8
Hard to say / No answer	39.5	17.0	16.2	33.6
Freedom of speech in Ukraine				
In Ukraine there is an attack on the freedom of speech	35.5	21.7	29.2	22.1
In Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, whereas the state's and society's reaction is too weak	25.4	47.7	50.7	29.8
Hard to say / No answer	39.1	30.6	20.1	48.1
Ban of Russian TV channels				
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	18.9	61.4	68.5	44.0
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	66.3	23.8	23.2	29.4
Hard to say / No answer	14.8	14.8	8.3	26.6
Ban of Russian artists and serials				
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	15.1	49.9	57.5	37.3
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a mistake and	73.4	33.7	35.1	35.6

100% in the column	Implementing Ukrainian language on radio and TV			
	Against quotas (n=874)	Enough (n=238)	Not enough (n=358)	Hard to say (n=81)
only restricts citizens' rights				
Hard to say / No answer	11.4	16.4	7.4	27.2
Ban of Russian social networks				
The ban of Russian social networks is a necessary step for the protection of state	14.2	51.5	61.7	36.9
The ban of Russian social networks is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	66.9	27.7	24.4	28.9
Hard to say / No answer	18.9	20.8	13.9	34.1
Prosecution of Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking				
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in Crimea and on territories controlled by "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics"	27.6	70.8	67.6	48.4
Ethnical Russians, Russian-speaking citizens and dissidents are persecuted in Ukraine	17.2	4.3	2.8	6.5
Hard to say / No answer	55.2	24.9	29.6	45.1

Table 2.3.7 presents respondents' interpretations depending on their self-assessment of ability to recognize rotten information (more details see in Chapter III). Those who believe themselves more capable to detect fakes are somewhat more inclined to hold that the war was initiated by Russia / separatists, and that an attack on the freedom of speech is currently going on in Ukraine. This very group is also somewhat more inclined to support restrictive measures against Russian TV channels / serials / artists / social networks. However, one should take into account (see Chapter III) that this group mostly consists of younger, better educated and wealthier Ukrainians who live in middle-size towns and big cities.

Table 2.3.7

Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option “Hard to say / No answer”.

(% among respondents depending on their self-assessment of ability to detect fakes)

100% in the column	Can detect fakes mostly or always (n=1053)	Cannot detect fakes mostly or always (n=640)
Who initiated the war		
The war was initiated by Ukrainian government and oligarchs	15.4	16.1
The war was initiated by separatists and Russia	57.3	46.4
Hard to say / No answer	27.3	37.5
Freedom of speech in Ukraine		
In Ukraine there is an attack on the freedom of speech	33.6	25.9
In Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, whereas the state's and society's reaction is too weak	36.1	34.3
Hard to say / No answer	30.3	39.8
Ban of Russian TV channels		
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	41.8	32.8
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	44.5	42.5
Hard to say / No answer	13.8	24.7
Ban of Russian artists and serials		
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	33.5	25.5
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	53.4	55.0
Hard to say / No answer	13.1	19.5
Ban of Russian social networks		
The ban of Russian social networks is a necessary step for the protection of state	34.7	25.1
The ban of Russian social networks is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	49.3	43.3

100% in the column	Can detect fakes mostly or always (n=1053)	Cannot detect fakes mostly or always (n=640)
Hard to say / No answer	16.0	31.7
Prosecution of Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking		
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in Crimea and on territories controlled by “Donetsk/Luhansk people’s republics”	47.9	41.4
Ethnical Russians, Russian-speaking citizens and dissidents are persecuted in Ukraine	10.8	9.9
Hard to say / No answer	41.3	48.7

Table 2.3.8 presents respondents' interpretations depending on their usage of social networks, particularly "Western" and "Russian" ones. The results show that using "Russian" social networks (both solely and combined with "Western" networks) correlates with more dissatisfaction regarding restrictive measures against Russian TV channels / serials / artists / social networks.

Table 2.3.8

Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option "Hard to say / No answer".

100% in the column	% of respondents using...			
	only "Western" social networks (n=530)	both "Western" and "Russian" social networks (n=138)	only "Russian" social networks (n=51)	no social networks (n=1276)
Who initiated the war				
The war was initiated by Ukrainian government and oligarchs	17.3	14.6	18.3	13.8
The war was initiated by separatists and Russia	57.2	48.0	47.7	50.6
Hard to say / No answer	25.5	37.4	33.9	35.6
Freedom of speech in Ukraine				
In Ukraine there is an attack on the freedom of speech	29.9	32.4	22.2	29.8
In Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, whereas the state's and society's reaction is too weak	39.8	35.2	43.9	28.6
Hard to say / No answer	30.3	32.4	33.9	41.6
Ban of Russian TV channels				
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	44.6	30.5	27.8	34.5
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	39.7	59.3	60.4	41.9
Hard to say / No answer	15.7	10.2	11.8	23.6
Ban of Russian artists and serials				
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	35.4	20.8	21.4	28.3
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	49.5	72.8	67.4	50.6
Hard to say / No answer	15.1	6.4	11.2	21.2
Ban of Russian social networks				
The ban of Russian social networks is a necessary step for the protection of state	35.7	20.1	16.7	30.2
The ban of Russian social networks is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	50.0	72.5	72.5	37.4
Hard to say / No answer	14.3	7.4	10.8	32.4

100% in the column	% of respondents using...			
	only “Western” social networks (n=530)	both “Western” and “Russian” social networks (n=138)	only “Russian” social networks (n=51)	no social networks (n=1276)
Prosecution of Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking				
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in Crimea and on territories controlled by “Donetsk/Luhansk people’s republics”	51.8	35.0	29.6	41.5
Ethnical Russians, Russian-speaking citizens and dissidents are persecuted in Ukraine	6.9	15.7	19.6	9.6
Hard to say / No answer	41.4	49.2	50.8	48.9

Table 2.3.9 presents respondents' interpretations depending on whom they held responsible for opposing Russian propaganda.

Table 2.3.9

Please select in each pair one sentence which best reflects your personal opinion about the events or state acts and decisions. You may select either any of the two answers in each pair or option "Hard to say / No answer".

(% of the respondents depending on whom they held responsible for opposing Russian propaganda)

100% in the column	State (n=1011)	NGOs (n=40)	Both state and NGOs (n=681)
Who initiated the war			
The war was initiated by Ukrainian government and oligarchs	12.3	19.7	15.7
The war was initiated by separatists and Russia	58.7	55.0	56.5
Hard to say / No answer	29.0	25.3	27.8
Freedom of speech in Ukraine			
In Ukraine there is an attack on the freedom of speech	31.3	19.1	22.9
In Ukraine there are too much pro-Kremlin propagandist media, whereas the state's and society's reaction is too weak	31.5	47.8	44.9
Hard to say / No answer	37.2	33.1	32.2
Ban of Russian TV channels			
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	40.6	12.9	44.4
The ban of Russian TV channels in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	39.9	83.6	38.6
Hard to say / No answer	19.5	3.6	17.0
Ban of Russian artists and serials			
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a necessary step for the protection of state	33.2	8.4	35.0
The ban of some Russian artists and movies in Ukraine is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	48.6	81.1	50.0
Hard to say / No answer	18.1	10.5	15.0
Ban of Russian social networks			
The ban of Russian social networks is a necessary step for the protection of state	33.7	10.7	37.1
The ban of Russian social networks is a mistake and only restricts citizens' rights	43.5	73.0	40.9
Hard to say / No answer	22.8	16.3	22.1
Prosecution of Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking			
Ukrainian-speaking citizens and Ukrainian patriots are persecuted in Crimea and on territories controlled by "Donetsk/Luhansk people's republics"	48.1	24.6	51.9
Ethnical Russians, Russian-speaking citizens and dissidents are persecuted in Ukraine	7.6	42.1	6.4
Hard to say / No answer	44.3	33.3	41.7

CHAPTER III. OPPOSITION TO RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA AND MEDIA LITERACY




3.1 Who is responsible for opposing Kremlin propaganda and disinformation. “Success secrets” of Russian propaganda

49% of Ukrainians believe that **opposition to Kremlin propaganda is the responsibility of Ukrainian state organs** (Diagram 3.1). 33% suggest to “split” the responsibility between state organs and NGOs.

Diagram 3.1.1

In your opinion, who should take steps to oppose Kremlin propaganda and disinformation?

(% of all respondents)




Ukrainians have no unanimous opinion regarding the **secret of influence of Kremlin propaganda**. Most often they suggest that its effectiveness is due to **serious resource investments** into propaganda (38% of respondents), **lack of critical thinking** of commonplace people (33%), **Russia's bribing foreign media and politicians** (30%) (Diagram 3.1.2).

Diagram 3.1.2

In your opinion, what is the secret of influence of Kremlin propaganda on many people in the whole world?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)



* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers

Opinions about the secret of influence of Kremlin propaganda have some regional distinctions. Western Ukrainians mostly talk about Russia's investing money into propaganda and bribing foreign media and politicians; respectively, the problem of critical thinking recedes to the third place (see Table 3.1.1). Ukrainians in the Central macro-region give equal weight to money investments and lack of critical thinking. Southern Ukrainians consider lack of critical thinking as the main problem. Eastern Ukrainians are different in that here 54% of respondents gave no answer to this question, vs. no more than 19% of such respondents in the other macro-regions.

Table 3.1.1

In your opinion, what is the secret of influence of Kremlin propaganda on many people in the whole world?

(% of all respondents)

% in the column*	% of respondents of macro-region...			
	West (n=572)	Center (n=710)	South (n=491)	East (n=270)
Russia invests a lot of money in propaganda	56.4	37.6	28.1	19.7
Many people has no critical thinking regarding what they see/read in media	32.3	34.4	42.2	15.6
Russia invests a lot of money in order to corrupt foreign media and politicians	48.9	26.9	24.4	9.1
Russian propaganda is very convincing	17.4	22.9	22.0	18.8
Russian propaganda is very aggressive	11.7	21.0	16.2	7.9
The leaders of other countries cannot oppose propaganda	10.0	12.7	15.6	5.2
Other	0.5	1.1	1.4	0.0
Hard to say / No answer	14.8	16.7	18.6	53.7

* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

Those who have experience of visiting the EU for the last 2 years pay more attention to Russia's investing money into propaganda and bribing foreign media and politicians (Table 3.1.2).

Table 3.1.2

In your opinion, what is the secret of influence of Kremlin propaganda on many people in the whole world?

(% of respondents depending on their experience of visiting the EU for the last 2 years)

% in the column*	Visited the EU (n=166)	Did not visit the EU (n=1871)
Russian propaganda is very aggressive	17.1	15.4
Russian propaganda is very convincing	15.0	21.3
Russia invests a lot of money in propaganda	55.1	36.4
Russia invests a lot of money in order to corrupt foreign media and politicians	53.6	27.6
Many people has no critical thinking regarding what they see/read in media	38.0	32.9
The leaders of other countries cannot oppose propaganda	9.1	12.0
Other	0.0	1.0
Hard to say / No answer	10.9	22.4

* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

3.2 Effectiveness assessment of opposing propaganda by the government and NGOs. Ukrainian language quotas on radio and TV


Ukrainians **rather critically assess effectiveness** of both state and NGOs in **opposing Kremlin propaganda**. They assess somewhat better the creation of Ukrainian content: 24% believe that the state is doing enough in this direction (47% disagree), 19% positively assess corresponding activities of NGOs (44% disagree) (Diagram 3.2.1).

16% of respondents positively assess governmental activity in implementing media literacy in educational institutions (46% disagree), 14% positively assess the activity of NGOs (42% disagree). 13% believe that the state is doing enough regarding restoration of broadcasting for Donbas (50% disagree), 10% believe the same about NGOs (42% disagree).

Diagram 3.2.1

How do you assess the effectiveness of the state / NGOs in opposing Kremlin propaganda?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)



Ukrainians from all regions critically assess the efficiency in question, although those from South and East are of somewhat better opinion regarding the efforts of both state and NGOs (Table 3.2.1).

Table 3.2.1

How do you assess the effectiveness of the state / NGOs in opposing Kremlin propaganda?

(% of all respondents)

100% in the column	West (n=572)		Center (n=710)		South (n=491)		East (n=270)	
	State	NGOs	State	NGOs	State	NGOs	State	NGOs
Restoration of broadcasting for Donbas								
Enough	7.9	7.7	12.6	8.3	16.8	11.7	20.6	17.2
Not enough	63.9	52.7	49.6	47.2	46.3	43.4	28.9	26.1
Hard to say / No answer	28.2	39.6	37.9	44.5	36.9	44.9	50.5	56.6
Creation of Ukrainian content, including for movies and TV series								
Enough	18.6	17.8	22.6	13.9	29.9	23.5	29.0	23.5
Not enough	58.3	49.2	49.9	49.9	44.0	41.4	23.2	21.9
Hard to say / No answer	23.1	33.1	27.5	36.1	26.2	35.1	47.7	54.6
Implementation of media literacy in educational institutions								
Enough	13.2	14.4	13.8	11.1	19.5	15.8	19.4	18.7
Not enough	55.4	47.7	50.1	46.7	41.0	37.7	26.8	23.2
Hard to say / No answer	31.4	37.9	36.2	42.2	39.6	46.4	53.8	58.1

Table 3.2.2 presents assessment of state effectiveness among the respondents who are potentially most interested in opposing propaganda. As well as Ukrainians in general, these respondents assess relatively better state activities in creating content.

Table 3.2.2

How do you assess state effectiveness in opposing Kremlin propaganda?

(% of the respondents who support trainings in media literacy / believe themselves capable to identify rotten information at least in most cases)

100% in the column	Support trainings in media literacy (n=1231)	Believe themselves capable to identify fakes at least in most cases (n=1053)
Restoration of broadcasting for Donbas		
Enough	12.5	15.3
Not enough	58.3	53.9
Hard to say / No answer	29.2	30.8
Creation of Ukrainian content, including for movies and TV serials		
Enough	25.6	26.8
Not enough	55.1	50.7
Hard to say / No answer	19.3	22.5
Implementation of media literacy in educational institutions		
Enough	15.5	18.6
Not enough	54.9	49.9
Hard to say / No answer	29.6	31.5

Table 3.2.3 presents assessment of effectiveness of NGOs depending on the respondents' interest to media literacy and their self-assessment in terms of ability to identify fakes.

Table 3.2.3

How do you assess the effectiveness of NGOs in opposing Kremlin propaganda?

(% of the respondents who consider media literacy trainings expedient / believe themselves capable to identify rotten information at least in most cases / personally interested in receiving training in media literacy)

100% in the column	There is a need in teaching media literacy		Identification of fakes		Interested in training	
	Yes (n=1231)	No (n=362)	Can identify fakes at least in most cases (n=1053)	Cannot identify fakes in most cases (n=640)	Yes (n=402)	No (n=1304)
Restoration of broadcasting for Donbas						
Enough	9.4	15.5	11.7	8.1	13.1	9.2
Not enough	52.3	41.6	49.2	48.5	50.6	43.4
Hard to say / No answer	38.3	43.0	39.0	43.4	36.3	47.4
Creation of Ukrainian content, including for movies and TV serials						
Enough	19.6	21.1	20.6	17.0	20.7	18.0
Not enough	51.5	42.0	48.6	47.1	52.1	41.2
Hard to say / No answer	28.9	36.9	30.8	35.9	27.2	40.8
Implementation of media literacy in educational institutions						
Enough	14.8	16.5	17.6	10.1	17.3	13.8
Not enough	49.4	40.5	44.2	48.1	50.6	37.1
Hard to say / No answer	35.9	43.0	38.2	41.8	32.1	49.1

Table 3.2.4 presents assessment of NGOs for different age categories.

Table 3.2.4

How do you assess the effectiveness of NGOs in opposing Kremlin propaganda?

(% of the respondents of the given age)


100% in the column	18-29 years (n=280)	30-39 years (n=396)	40-49 years (n=308)	50-59 years (n=400)	60-69 years (n=353)	70+ years (n=306)
Restoration of broadcasting for Donbas						
Enough	11.5	8.8	10.0	8.1	11.3	11.9
Not enough	45.6	46.6	51.7	48.2	45.3	29.3
Hard to say / No answer	42.9	44.7	38.4	43.7	43.4	58.7
Creation of Ukrainian content, including for movies and TV serials						
Enough	18.4	20.0	20.6	16.2	18.3	18.2
Not enough	46.1	45.2	47.9	47.1	43.6	30.3
Hard to say / No answer	35.6	34.8	31.5	36.7	38.1	51.5
Implementation of media literacy in educational institutions						
Enough	16.9	14.5	15.9	10.6	15.0	11.2
Not enough	44.3	45.0	46.3	44.6	40.4	24.8
Hard to say / No answer	38.8	40.4	37.9	44.8	44.6	64.0

Implementation of quotas for Ukrainian language on radio and TV **is supported by 33%** of Ukrainians; 43% do not support it (Diagram 3.2.2). At the same time, among those who consider this step expedient, only one third believe that the state and NGOs are doing enough in this direction.

Diagram 3.2.2

Do you consider expedient implementation of quotas for Ukrainian language on radio and TV?


(% of all respondents, n=2043)



How do you assess the effectiveness of the state / NGOs in opposing Kremlin propaganda: implementation of quotas for Ukrainian language on radio and TV?

(% of the respondents who consider implementation of the quotas expedient, n=678)

Hard to say / No answer ■ Not enough ■ Enough



The support for quotas becomes significantly lower from the West to the East: if in the Western macro-region 50% greet this initiative (24% disagree), in the Central macro-region this step is supported by only 36% (39% disagree) (Diagram 3.2.3). In the Southern and Eastern macro-regions most of the respondents (respectively, 57% i 67%) are against quotas (whereas 22% i 14%, respectively, support them).

Diagram 3.2.3

Do you consider expedient introduction of quotas for Ukrainian language on radio and TV?

(% of all respondents)





Table 3.2.5 shows attitude to the quotas for different social-demographical strata.

Table 3.2.5

Do you consider expedient introduction of quotas for Ukrainian language on radio and TV?

(% among respondents of the corresponding strata)

100% in the row	Yes	No	Hard to say / No answer	Potential of the strata* ↑
Community type and size				
- village (n=693)	40.0	33.4	26.6	33.8
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310)	22.1	49.5	28.4	15.3
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	31.4	45.5	23.1	6.4
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	31.9	47.8	20.3	44.5
Gender strata				
- men (n=802)	33.6	42.7	23.7	45.1
- women (n=1241)	32.7	43.3	24.0	54.9
Age-specific strata				
- 18-29 years (n=280)	36.8	39.2	24.0	21.1
- 30-39 years (n=396)	33.3	48.4	18.2	18.5
- 40-49 years (n=308)	30.7	49.3	20.0	16.6
- 50-59 years (n=400)	32.1	44.0	23.9	17.7
- 60-69 years (n=353)	30.6	40.8	28.7	12.4
- 70+ years (n=306)	33.5	34.8	31.7	13.8
Educational strata				
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	30.1	34.3	35.6	8.6
- complete secondary (n=593)	33.7	44.5	21.8	28.1
- vocational (n=673)	28.7	45.7	25.6	32.1
- higher (n=615)	37.8	41.4	20.8	31.2
Lingual-ethnic strata				
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	41.7	31.7	26.6	57.3
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	22.6	57.2	20.2	34.3
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	16.9	65.0	18.1	3.4
Primary occupation				
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	25.5	46.9	27.6	19.1
- office employee (n=205)	25.6	50.6	23.8	10.6
- specialist (n=218)	41.8	41.1	17.1	12.1
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	39.9	49.0	11.1	5.4
- housekeeper (n=203)	37.2	38.8	24.0	10.3
- retired (n=731)	32.5	39.5	28.1	31.0
- student (n=49)	34.2	36.5	29.3	4.3

100% in the row	Yes	No	Hard to say / No answer	Potential of the strata* 
- unemployed (n=126)	42.1	43.7	14.2	7.2
Household income level**				
- very low (n=273)	31.1	44.1	24.8	12.4
- low (n=1022)	28.4	44.4	27.3	49.3
- average (n=637)	39.6	41.4	19.0	34.1
- high (n=74)	41.4	43.6	15.0	4.2

* Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.

** "Very low" – households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" – households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" – those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.

Table 3.2.6 shows assessment of the governmental measures depending on the respondents' attitude to the quotas.

Table 3.2.6

How do you assess state effectiveness in opposing Kremlin propaganda?

(% of the respondents depending on their attitude to the quotas for Ukrainian language)

100% in the column	Yes (n=678)	No (n=874)	Hard to say (n=465)
Restoration of broadcasting for Donbas			
Enough	12.4	15.6	10.8
Not enough	60.8	44.9	43.9
Hard to say / No answer	26.8	39.4	45.4
Creation of Ukrainian content, including for movies and TV serials			
Enough	23.3	26.8	20.8
Not enough	59.8	41.5	40.2
Hard to say / No answer	16.9	31.7	39.0
Implementation of media literacy in educational institutions			
Enough	14.4	18.5	12.8
Not enough	52.9	44.0	41.5
Hard to say / No answer	32.7	37.5	45.7

3.3 Self-assessment of ability to recognize fakes

Slightly more than a half of Ukrainians (53%) believe that they are capable to **distinguish good-quality information** from disinformation and fakes at least in most cases (Diagram 3.3.1). On the other hand, one third of Ukrainians (31%) believe themselves incapable to apply this distinction or capable to apply it only in some cases.



Among the criteria of identification of (non-)fakes Ukrainians mostly refer to their credence to the media that disseminates this or that information (for 33% of Ukrainians this is one of the key criteria) and indication of authorship (30%).

Diagram 3.3.1

Do you believe that you yourself can distinguish good-quality information from disinformation and fakes?

How do you identify fake information?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)




In all regions roughly the same proportion of respondents claim that they are capable to discern rotten information at least in most cases (Diagram 3.3.2).

Diagram 3.3.2

Do you believe that you yourself can distinguish good-quality information from disinformation and fakes?

(% of all respondents)



Those categories of the respondents are more confident about their ability to recognize fakes (Table 3.3.1):

- Respondents from middle-size towns and big cities (60-68% believe that they mostly can identify fakes vs. 43-49% of rural respondents);
- Men (61% vs. 47% women);
- Younger persons (the figures are gradually lowering from 60% for respondents below 30 to 33% for persons 70+);
- Better educated Ukrainians (66% for respondents with higher education vs. no more than 50% for persons with lower level of education);
- Specialists, students, businessmen (66-73% vs. no more than 55% for other occupations; least of all retired persons – 41%);
- Wealthier Ukrainians (66-73% for those who have high or average income vs. 46% low-income persons and 38% very low-income persons).

Additionally one should remark that 71% of those who visited the EU for the last 2 years believe in their ability to recognize fakes at least in most cases, vs. 51% of those who did not visit the EU. However, one should also take into account that those who visited the EU are mostly Western Ukrainians, younger, better educated and wealthier persons.

Table 3.3.1

Do you believe that you yourself can distinguish good-quality information from disinformation and fakes?

(% among respondents of the corresponding strata)

100% in the row	Ability to discern fakes					Potential of the strata* ‘Y’
	Yes	Usually yes	Usually no	No	Hard to say / No answer	
Community type and size						
- village (n=693)	13.3	29.5	16.6	23.1	17.6	33.8
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310)	20.3	29.0	11.8	18.3	20.6	15.3
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	25.9	41.7	11.0	13.4	8.0	6.4
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	24.5	35.8	9.1	16.5	14.1	44.5
Gender strata						
- men (n=802)	24.7	35.7	11.7	14.9	12.9	45.1
- women (n=1241)	16.4	30.7	12.5	22.0	18.4	54.9
Age-specific strata						
- 18-29 years (n=280)	22.5	37.8	10.6	15.9	13.1	21.1
- 30-39 years (n=396)	19.4	35.4	15.3	16.9	13.1	18.5

100% in the row	Ability to discern fakes					Potential of the strata* ↑↓
	Yes	Usually yes	Usually no	No	Hard to say / No answer	
- 40-49 years (n=308)	24.3	37.8	9.2	15.2	13.5	16.6
- 50-59 years (n=400)	20.7	33.2	12.5	16.1	17.5	17.7
- 60-69 years (n=353)	19.2	28.3	13.1	21.9	17.5	12.4
- 70+ years (n=306)	12.8	20.4	12.7	30.9	23.3	13.8
Educational strata						
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	7.9	22.7	16.8	31.4	21.2	8.6
- complete secondary (n=593)	17.3	31.1	13.8	20.2	17.5	28.1
- vocational (n=673)	17.2	33.2	11.8	21.4	16.4	32.1
- higher (n=615)	29.2	37.2	9.8	11.3	12.6	31.2
Lingual-ethnic strata						
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	19.1	33.8	13.2	18.8	15.1	57.3
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	20.2	34.0	11.0	19.3	15.5	34.3
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	28.3	18.9	8.0	16.7	28.2	3.4
Primary occupation						
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	18.9	34.9	11.8	19.8	14.6	19.1
- office employee (n=205)	17.7	36.7	10.3	17.8	17.5	10.6
- specialist (n=218)	25.6	46.6	5.7	8.9	13.2	12.1
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	36.3	36.2	10.8	7.5	9.2	5.4
- housekeeper (n=203)	20.5	31.3	10.5	27.8	9.9	10.3
- retired (n=731)	16.1	25.1	13.0	25.3	20.5	31.0
- student (n=49)	26.6	39.7	11.2	7.1	15.4	4.3
- unemployed (n=126)	20.1	34.7	21.0	12.2	11.9	7.2
Household income level**						
- very low (n=273)	14.4	23.3	18.7	27.3	16.4	12.4
- low (n=1022)	14.6	31.6	12.6	21.7	19.4	49.3
- average (n=637)	27.9	38.5	9.9	12.9	10.8	34.1
- high (n=74)	37.6	35.9	7.7	10.0	8.8	4.2
Visiting the EU for the last 2 years						
- так (n=166)	29.7	41.0	9.2	12.5	7.6	8.7
- ні (n=1871)	19.1	32.2	12.5	19.5	16.7	90.9

* Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.


** "Very low" – households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" – households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" – those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.

Whether or not Ukrainians have accounts in social networks – in both groups two thirds claim that at least in most cases they can discern disinformation (Diagram 3.3.3).

Diagram 3.3.3

Do you believe that you yourself can distinguish good-quality information from disinformation and fakes?

(% of the respondents depending on their usage of social networks)




3.4 Attitude to enhancement of media literacy and readiness to take part in training programs

Most of Ukrainians (61%) believe that the state and NGOs should exert efforts for enhancement of media literacy (Diagram 3.4.1). At the same time, they have no definite opinion about the preferable target audience. Those who believe that such trainings make sense more often refer to teenagers (48%) than adults (29%).

Diagram 3.4.1


In your opinion, should the state and NGOs exert efforts for enhancement of media literacy, ability to critically process information, distinguish good-quality from bad-quality information and information from disinformation?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)



In your opinion, who should be the primary target audience of media literacy trainings?

(% of the respondents who believe that teaching media literacy is expedient, n=1231)



Ukrainians in Western, Central and Southern macro-regions mostly believe that teaching media literacy is important (61-66%); among Eastern Ukrainians only 43% share this opinion (Table 3.4.1).

Table 3.4.1

In your opinion, should the state and NGOs exert efforts for enhancement of media literacy, ability to critically process information, distinguish good-quality from bad-quality information and information from disinformation?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)

In your opinion, who should be the primary target audience of media literacy trainings?

(% of the respondents who believe that teaching media literacy is expedient, n=1231)

100% in the column	% of respondents of macro-region...			
	West (n=572/383)	Center (n=710/427)	South (n=491/307)	East (n=270/114)
Teaching media literacy is expedient				
Yes	65.8	61.4	63.4	43.1
No	17.5	14.6	17.7	28.9
Hard to say / No answer	16.7	24.0	18.9	27.9
Primary target audience				
Adults	31.0	30.9	23.7	30.7
Teenagers	44.4	44.0	53.0	57.2
Children	20.8	17.8	17.4	6.2
Hard to say / No answer	3.7	7.3	5.9	5.9


In all social-demographical categories of Ukrainian population there is a majority that stands for teaching media literacy (Table 3.3.2).


Preferences for primary target audience of such teaching do not depend on the respondents' age: in all age-specific strata 28-30% prefer adult audience, 47-52% – teenagers, 15-21% – children.

Table 3.3.2

In your opinion, should the state and NGOs exert efforts for enhancement of media literacy, ability to critically process information, distinguish good-quality from bad-quality information and information from disinformation?

(% among respondents of the corresponding strata)

100% in the row	Yes	No	Hard to say / No answer	Potential of the strata* 
Community type and size				
- village (n=693)	60.4	14.9	24.8	33.8
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310)	61.8	15.9	22.3	15.3
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	60.3	24.0	15.7	6.4
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	60.7	20.3	19.0	44.5
Gender strata				
- men (n=802)	63.0	18.5	18.5	45.1
- women (n=1241)	58.8	17.7	23.5	54.9
Age-specific strata				
- 18-29 years (n=280)	64.0	15.3	20.6	21.1
- 30-39 years (n=396)	62.9	19.3	17.8	18.5
- 40-49 years (n=308)	67.5	14.5	18.1	16.6
- 50-59 years (n=400)	57.6	20.8	21.7	17.7
- 60-69 years (n=353)	61.1	15.0	23.9	12.4
- 70+ years (n=306)	48.3	24.1	27.6	13.8
Educational strata				
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	41.5	27.8	30.8	8.6
- complete secondary (n=593)	57.5	19.0	23.5	28.1
- vocational (n=673)	62.6	15.6	21.8	32.1
- higher (n=615)	66.9	17.0	16.1	31.2
Lingual-ethnic strata				
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	64.8	15.1	20.1	57.3
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	55.5	22.2	22.3	34.3
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	50.0	21.1	28.8	3.4
Primary occupation				
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	59.7	21.6	18.6	19.1

100% in the row	Yes	No	Hard to say / No answer	Potential of the strata* 
- office employee (n=205)	57.9	17.3	24.8	10.6
- specialist (n=218)	72.4	12.5	15.1	12.1
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	74.1	14.7	11.2	5.4
- housekeeper (n=203)	60.8	19.3	19.9	10.3
- retired (n=731)	55.0	19.9	25.1	31.0
- student (n=49)	63.0	16.2	20.8	4.3
- unemployed (n=126)	64.9	15.8	19.3	7.2
Household income level**				
- very low (n=273)	54.4	25.8	19.8	12.4
- low (n=1022)	56.4	19.4	24.1	49.3
- average (n=637)	68.1	13.7	18.2	34.1
- high (n=74)	70.9	19.4	9.8	4.2

* Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.

** "Very low" – households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" – households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" – those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.

Table 3.4.1 provides information about the most popular TV channels among those who does and does not consider teaching media literacy expedient.

Table 3.4.1

Which Ukrainian TV channels you watch most often? / Which of these channels you trust most regarding the events in Ukraine and relations between Ukraine, Russia and “people’s republics”?

(% of the respondents depending on their attitude to teaching media literacy)

% in the column*	% дивляться		% довіряють	
	Teaching needed (n=1231)	Teaching not needed (n=362)	Teaching needed (n=1231)	Teaching not needed (n=362)
1+1	62.8	55.6	35.4	37.6
Inter	44.3	49.6	17.7	26.2
TV Ukraine	41.7	44.4	18.2	28.3
ICTV	39.1	41.2	17.9	26.5
STB	34.8	35.2	11.7	19.3
New channel	18.5	19.2	5.8	8.0
112 Ukraine	14.3	19.4	8.0	6.8
NewsOne	6.9	6.5	4.0	3.3
5 channel	7.7	7.2	4.0	2.0
ZIK	6.5	2.8	4.5	1.5
24 channel	4.9	6.0	2.7	1.4
UA:Pershyj	4.0	3.1	2.0	1.0
Pryamyj channel	2.8	1.8	1.1	1.1
Espresso TV	2.6	1.3	1.5	0.1
Hromadske TV	2.1	1.2	1.0	0.5
ATR	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0


* The sum in each column is more than 100% because the respondents could select several answers.

At the same time, despite rather widespread understanding that media literacy is important, and despite rather critical self-assessment, **only 22% of Ukrainians would personally agree to receive such training** (Diagram 3.4.1). Most of those who agree (56%) would prefer online courses.

Diagram 3.4.1


Would you yourself agree to receive training, including online, for the enhancement of your media literacy?

(% of all respondents, n=2043)



Which way of training would be most convenient for you?

(% of the respondents personally interested in media literacy courses, n=402)




Western Ukrainians are most interested in trainings for enhancement of your media literacy: 31% would take part in such courses vs. no more than 20% in other regions (Diagram 3.4.2).

Diagram 3.4.2

Would you yourself agree to receive training, including online, for the enhancement of your media literacy?

(% of all respondents)




At the same time, those who better assess their own abilities to identify fakes, are more interested in trainings: 31% of those who believe themselves capable to identify fakes always, 26% of those who believe themselves capable to identify fakes in most cases, and 16-17% of those who believe themselves incapable to identify fakes in most cases (Diagram 3.4.3).

It is also remarkable that among those who see the “success secret” of Russian propaganda in the lack of critical thinking only 22% would agree to take part in the courses for enhancement of media literacy.

Diagram 3.4.3

Would you yourself agree to receive training, including online, for the enhancement of your media literacy?

(% of the respondents depending on their self-assessment in terms of ability to identify fakes)



These respondents are more interested in getting such trainings:

- Respondents from middle-size towns and big cities (26% vs. 18% of rural respondents and those from small towns);
- Younger persons (40% for respondents below 30, 21-24% for respondents between 30-49, no more than 16% for persons 50+);
- Better educated Ukrainians (34% for respondents with higher education vs. no more than 19% for persons with lower level of education);
- Students, specialists, businessmen (35-48%);
- Wealthier Ukrainians (46% of those who have high or average income vs. 32% low-income persons and 10-17% very low-income persons).


It is remarkable that among those who visited the EU for the last 2 years 38% would take part in such trainings vs. 20% of those who did not visit the EU. However, one should also take into account that Ukrainians who visited the EU are generally younger, better educated and wealthier, so that it is difficult to say which feature mostly influences people's readiness to take part in the trainings.

Table 3.4.2

Would you yourself agree to receive training, including online, for the enhancement of your media literacy?

(% among respondents of the corresponding strata)

100% in the row	Yes	No	Hard to say / No answer	Potential of the strata* ↑
Community type and size				
- village (n=693)	17.6	68.2	14.2	33.8
- Urban-type settlement / small town (<20.000)(n=310)	18.2	65.0	16.8	15.3
- middle-size town (20-99.000) (n=130)	26.3	55.3	18.4	6.4
- big city (>100.000) (n=910)	26.4	55.5	18.1	44.5
Gender strata				
- men (n=802)	23.2	60.7	16.2	45.1
- women (n=1241)	21.4	61.7	17.0	54.9
Age-specific strata				
- 18-29 years (n=280)	39.6	43.5	16.8	21.1
- 30-39 years (n=396)	23.7	58.2	18.1	18.5
- 40-49 years (n=308)	20.7	57.5	21.8	16.6
- 50-59 years (n=400)	15.7	68.4	15.9	17.7
- 60-69 years (n=353)	12.3	73.1	14.6	12.4
- 70+ years (n=306)	12.4	77.0	10.7	13.8
Educational strata				
- incomplete secondary and lower (n=161)	15.1	75.9	8.9	8.6
- complete secondary (n=593)	14.7	72.7	12.6	28.1

100% in the row	Yes	No	Hard to say / No answer	Potential of the strata* 
- vocational (n=673)	18.9	60.0	21.1	32.1
- higher (n=615)	34.4	48.1	17.5	31.2
Lingual-ethnic strata				
- Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (n=1187)	25.0	58.6	16.3	57.3
- Russian-speaking Ukrainians (n=676)	20.0	62.9	17.0	34.3
- Russian-speaking Russians (n=75)	13.7	67.2	19.1	3.4
Primary occupation				
- worker (industry, agriculture) (n=350)	17.6	66.3	16.1	19.1
- office employee (n=205)	20.5	55.3	24.1	10.6
- specialist (n=218)	34.6	45.1	20.3	12.1
- self-employed, businessmen, farmer (n=95)	36.7	51.3	12.0	5.4
- housekeeper (n=203)	28.7	51.3	20.0	10.3
- retired (n=731)	12.0	75.3	12.7	31.0
- student (n=49)	48.2	33.9	17.9	4.3
- unemployed (n=126)	22.9	62.8	14.3	7.2
Household income level**				
- very low (n=273)	10.1	75.2	14.6	12.4
- low (n=1022)	16.7	69.7	13.6	49.3
- average (n=637)	31.8	46.5	21.7	34.1
- high (n=74)	45.9	38.7	15.4	4.2
Visiting the EU for the last 2 years				
- yes (n=166)	38.4	43.5	18.1	8.7
- no (n=1871)	20.6	63.0	16.4	90.9

* Potential of the strata means the proportion of inhabitants who belong to the strata.

** "Very low" – households that have no sufficient income even for food, "low" – households that have sufficient income for food, but not for clothes, "average" – households that have sufficient income for food and clothes, but not for some more expansive goods (TV set, etc.), "high" – those who can afford some of the expansive goods or anything at all.